VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0126 0321032
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011032Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7644
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1816

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000126 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/RD/SCA, DS/DSS/ITA, CA AND SA/INS 
NEW DELHI FOR LEGAL ATTACHE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER
SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 02/01/2008 
 
REF: COLOMBO 0114 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened an Emergency 
Action Committee (EAC) meeting on February 1, 2008.  The EAC 
discussed Post,s security posture in light of possible 
attacks by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 
retaliation for a bombing in LTTE controlled Mannar District 
and in the context of the upcoming Sri Lanka Independence Day 
holiday.  The EAC concluded that security arrangements in 
place were commensurate with the threat and that adjustments 
to procedural or personal security measures were not required 
at this time.  The EAC agreed that Post,s security advice to 
the general American public was also appropriate to the 
threat. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 1, 2008, AmEmbassy Colombo convened an 
EAC meeting.  Present were the Ambassador, DCM, RSO, DAO, 
PAO, RAO, POL, ECON, MGT, CONS, ODC and USAID.  The agenda 
items for the meeting were: 
 
--Possible LTTE attacks in Colombo in retaliation for the 
January 29 bombing of a bus, the passengers of which included 
children, near the Madhu Church area in Mannar District, 
Northern Province 
 
--The general security situation relative to the Sri Lankan 
Independence Day holiday (February 4) 
 
¶3. (SBU) The claymore mine bombing of a bus on January 29 in 
LTTE controlled Mannar District killed 18 people, including 
twelve children (reftel). The LTTE has blamed the attack on 
GSL security forces, while the GSL has publicly denied 
involvement. LTTE's modus operandi has been to strike back 
after such incidents and its past retaliatory attacks have 
targeted GSL facilities and personnel, as well as civilians, 
in Colombo and elsewhere in the South. The EAC agreed that 
the LTTE will probably retaliate, but noted that there 
existed no information regarding the exact timing or nature 
of attack. The RSO noted the LTTE was unlikely to target 
Americans or American interests and that the threat to 
Americans continues to be the chance of being a collateral 
victim if caught in the proximity of an attack. The EAC 
concurred with the RSO and concluded that Post,s procedural 
security measures and advice for personal security were 
commensurate with the threat. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Turning to security for the February 4 Independence 
Day holiday, the RSO repeated his assessment that Americans 
or American interests were unlikely to be the targets of 
attacks during the holiday. The RSO added that according to 
Sri Lanka Police Service (SLPS) sources, the LTTE had never 
successfully attacked during an Independence Day celebration. 
Nevertheless, SLPS sources believed that the likelihood of an 
attempted LTTE attack during the holiday was high, so GSL 
security forces throughout the country, and especially in 
Colombo, were on high alert. Security precautions for the 
formal ceremony scheduled for the morning of February 4 will 
be stringent. GSL security will conduct bomb sweeps and 
thereafter guard the venue (Galle Face Green) on a 
round-the-clock basis. The navy will patrol the sea adjacent 
to the site. Police sharpshooters with high-powered weapons 
will stand guard on rooftops of buildings close to the event. 
Security forces will strictly control access to the event. 
Police and military will close and cordon adjacent roads. 
Only invited guests may attend. The guests include 
ambassadors and high commissioners of foreign missions 
resident in Sri Lanka. The RSO determined that available 
information precluded recommending against attendance. The 
EAC concurred with the RSO,s conclusion. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The EAC reviewed Post,s current Travel Warning and 
Warden Message. Both of these documents warn Americans to 
avoid the likely targets of LTTE attacks (including GSL 
facilities, military convoys and VIP motorcades) and to defer 
non-essential visits to crowded public places and 
high-profile venues. As this advice is appropriate for the 
current security situation, the EAC decided that revising the 
information was not essential at this time. 
 
¶6. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security situation 
and report further developments, if any, septel.  POC for 
this message is RSO Michael V. Perkins, who may be contacted 
at 94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 1 after regular 
business hours), or via the classified and unclassified email 
systems. 
BLAKE