VZCZCXRO4409
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHCH #0127 0420545
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110545Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6244
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS CHISINAU 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MD
SUBJECT: CHANGING THE ELECTION COMMISSION, AND THE RULES OF THE 
GAME, BEFORE 2009 ELECTIONS 
 
REFS:  A. Chisinau 0085, B. 07 Chisinau 1517, C. 07 Chisinau 1509, 
¶D. 07 Chisinau 1455, E. 07 Chisinau 1380 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified.  Please Protect Accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Unhappy with opposition party dominance of the 
Central Electoral Commission (CEC), the ruling Communist Party may 
be planning to take legal measures to ensure itself a dominant 
position in the electoral-administration body for the 2009 
parliamentary elections.  Revising existing CEC legislation would be 
a public-relations disaster, but the GOM could argue that the 
changes simply conform to EU norms.  Such a step combined with other 
draft legislation changes the rules of the game in ways that 
strengthen the ruling party and make it harder for small parties to 
gain seats in Parliament.  End Summary. 
 
Adjusting the Rules one Year before Elections 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Within weeks, an informal coalition of the Communist (PCRM) 
and Christian Democrat (PPCD) parties may pass in final reading 
changes to the Electoral Code which limit small-party access to 
Parliament.  Two bills are involved, one which forbids electoral 
coalitions during election campaigns, and another that will most 
likely raise the popular-vote threshold from 4% to 5%, though the 
initial draft had specified 6%. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Challenging minority-party dominance in the CEC is 
apparently the Communist Party's next idea for gaining addition 
control over the electoral process.  The CEC has responsibility for 
registering or rejecting candidates, solving disputes, and ensuring 
that rules are followed.  The only way to change the composition of 
the CEC is to change the rules by which members are appointed, and 
apply the new rules to oust members before the expiration of their 
terms.  The Communists have the majority vote in Parliament required 
to push through such legislation, no matter how opportunistic this 
would appear.  We hear from both contacts in the CEC as well as 
staffers in Parliament that such a move is now under consideration. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Our contacts have told us that the new rules would provide 
that the Government, the President and the Parliament each appoint 
three CEC members, easily guaranteeing a five-seat majority for the 
PCRM in the nine-member body.  The current CEC was appointed on 
November 11, 2005, for a five-year term; one of its members is 
appointed by the President, one by the Government and seven by the 
Parliament. (Parliament's group of seven includes five members from 
opposition parties.)  That formula was adopted in a 2005 agreement 
between PCRM and PPCD (along with opposition leaders Diacov and 
Serebrian), under which they agreed to vote for Voronin as President 
in exchange for  opposition control of the CEC.  Now that Voronin is 
in his final term as President and no longer needs all the 
non-Communist Party votes in Parliament, the PCRM wants control of 
the CEC, which it ceded in the 2005 vote deal, back again. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The legal changes, our sources say, would arouse local and 
international opposition.  However, they said, the PCRM could 
sanitize the operation somewhat by dividing the CEC into two 
distinct organizations-a permanent body that decides on electoral 
policy, and commissions temporarily constituted to oversee each 
election.  The division, allowing PCRM dominance of any ad hoc 
commission for the 2009 elections, would have the advantage of 
conforming to European standards, as many European countries have 
such a dual CEC structure.  It is not absolutely certain that the 
PCRM is going to attempt to force through this change; we are 
reporting unofficial comments by well-placed individuals in a 
position to know. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Additionally, a reported January 29 rejection by the 
Ministry of Finance of the CEC's draft budget may be a harbinger of 
future PCRM activities.  The rejection, which we heard about 
privately from GOM contacts, has resulted in the suspension of CEC 
funding and the freezing of its bank accounts. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The budgetary freeze and the threat of restructuring the 
CEC, along with the budgetary manipulations described in ref C, hint 
at administrative threats to the integrity of elections.  The actual 
manipulations of elections described in refs B, D, and E indicate 
that the PCRM is willing to take direct action as well  We know that 
the Communist Party is eager to stay in power, and apparently it is 
willing to use a variety of means to engineer the rules of the game 
to its own advantage.  End comment.