VZCZCXRO8960
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #0105 0351336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041336Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6222
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB, DRL/AE 
 
E.O. 12958:  Decl 02/03/18 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS KDEM MD
SUBJECT:  Anti-Russian Christian Democrat Leader Also Critical of 
Romania 
 
REFS:  Chisinau 0071 
 
Classified by CDA Kelly Keiderling under 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: In a February 1 meeting with Ambassador Kirby, 
Christian Democrat (PPCD) leader Iurie Rosca sought assurances that 
the USG would not "guarantee" Moldovan neutrality.  The Ambassador 
explained that the U.S. was not in a position to guarantee the 
neutrality of another sovereign nation.  In discussing Transnistria, 
Rosca reflexively rejected the possibility of any fair solution as 
long as Voronin was President and the Russians were involved.  While 
culturally and linguistically pro-Romanian, he strongly criticized 
Romania's failure to sign the border treaty, and presented himself as 
a true patriot supporting Moldovan independence.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Rosca showed visible relief when the Ambassador stated that 
the USG would not "guarantee" Moldova's neutrality as part of a 
Transnistria settlement.  Dismissing the analogy to post-WWII 
Austria, the Ambassador pointed out that the U.S. had no military or 
legal claim over Moldova's sovereignty.  Moldova could, he said, bind 
itself to limited-term neutrality, but that was Moldova's choice to 
make.  Russian statements about western "guarantees" of Moldova's 
neutrality, the Ambassador concluded, were best seen as a distraction 
from more important issues.  The Ambassador further noted, to Rosca's 
rather chagrined acceptance, that Moldova was completely unready for 
NATO membership. 
 
¶3. (C) Rosca was adamant that Russia had to withdraw its troops 
before a final agreement, and that Moldova should not conclude an 
agreement on Transnistria while the pro-Russian Voronin was in power. 
 Regarding ownership guarantees for Transnistrian/Russian businesses, 
Rosca replied that Moldova could offer solid reassurances only after 
the 2009 elections.  When asked about 5 + 2 talks, Rosca replied that 
they could be effective after the "1 + 1" (Voronin and Putin) talks 
came to an end. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that a sustainable solution to the 
Transnistria conflict would require the support of other concerned 
parties (i.e., parliamentarians and political party leaders).  Rosca 
expressed strong support for the U.S. approach to treaty negotiations 
(which included senators from both parties), and noted that Voronin 
would need a three-quarters (76 of 101 members) parliamentary vote to 
confirm a settlement.  He also accepted that an inclusive approach 
was necessary to spread political credit (and risk of blame) across 
the Moldovan political spectrum. 
 
¶5. (C) However, when asked whether he would support a Voronin effort 
to include other political leaders in the settlement process, he 
replied:  "Probably.  But not now.  Only after 2009.  When we have a 
President with a normal patriotic attitude."  Further, Rosca 
acknowledged that the Communist Party would have to be included in 
such a broad-front approach even if it lost its parliamentary 
majority after the 2009 elections.  Even with Voronin out of the 
picture, Rosca noted that Russian intransigence could derail any hope 
of non-Communist parties accepting a deal. 
 
¶6. (C)  For all his antipathy to Voronin and the Russians, Rosca 
showed no compensatory pro-Romanian reflexes.  In fact, he strongly 
criticized Romania's failure to sign the basic border treaty, noting 
that the Russians were exploiting the failure in order to prevent a 
Transnistrian solution.  (Note:  Transnistrian leaders interpret any 
Romanian "weakness" on Moldovan sovereignty as part of Romanian 
hegemonic designs on Moldova and Transnistria.  End note.)  Rosca 
stated that he would try to persuade Romanian Prime Minister Basescu 
to do the right thing and sign the border treaty immediately.  Rosca 
said that Basescu's reluctance to sign arose from political pressures 
in Romania, ignorance in the Prime Minister's Democratic Party (PD), 
and from the failure of the Romanian Ambassador to Moldova to keep 
his government informed.  The worst effect of Romania's failure to 
sign, Rosca concluded, was that it allowed Voronin to portray Romania 
as the enemy. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  At every turn of the conversation, Rosca showed his 
visceral opposition to Voronin and Russia.  Even Rosca's criticism of 
Romania was ultimately based on the fact that it assisted Voronin. 
As one who could play a key role in formulating Moldova's approach to 
a Transnistrian settlement after the 2009 elections, Rosca displayed 
the antipathy to compromise and all-parties inclusion that retards 
the development of consensual democracy in the country. 
 
Keiderling