VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #0170/01 0441211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131211Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0233
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6703
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN FOR D. MAHLEY AND P. DURHAM 
OES/SAT FOR B. FORD 
CIA/WINPAC FOR J. CASKER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018 
TAGS: MTCR KSCA PARM TSPL PREL MNUC AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA'S SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM: THE 
 EMBASSY'S PERSPECTIVE 
  
 REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 138 AND PREVIOUS 
  
      ¶B. STATE 10771 
      ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 00124 AND PREVIOUS 
  
 Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY WAYNE, FOR REASONS 1.4 
 (B) AND (D) 
  
 ------- 
 Summary 
 ------- 
  
 ¶1. (C) This cable provides the Embassy's recommendation for 
 policy change regarding longstanding USG opposition toward 
 Argentina's space launch vehicle (SLV) program.  We believe 
 that opposition, based on Argentina's 1992 assurances that it 
 would not develop a space launch vehicle ""for the foreseeable 
 future,"" is no longer productive.  A better approach would be 
 to switch to a neutral stance toward the program, while in 
 the process securing agreement that Argentina maintain 
 complete transparency by briefing and/or offering program 
 access to experts of our choosing or to the Missile 
 Technology Control Regime.  Such a step could be a cost-free 
 way to remove a longstanding bilateral irritant.  End Summary. 
  
 ------------------ 
 Why This Step Now? 
 ------------------ 
  
 ¶2. (C) Ref (A) reported on a recent conversation with 
 Argentine space agency (CONAE) Executive Director Dr. Conrad 
 Varotto.  During that meeting, Varotto stressed that 
 Argentina's political leadership continues to place great 
 importance on Argentina's space launch vehicle (SLV) program, 
 which the USG has opposed.  With Argentina unwilling to 
 abandon the program, and with the understanding that 
 interagency discussions regarding possible U.S. courses of 
 action are currently ongoing, we hope to contribute to the 
 successful resolution of this seeming dilemma with the 
 recommendation in this cable. 
  
 ------------------ 
 The Argentine Case 
 ------------------ 
  
 ¶3. (C) Argentina offers a number of reasons why it does not 
 consider itself bound by 1992 assurances to U.S. officials 
 and to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that it 
 would foreswear development of a SLV.  Specifically, the GOA 
 claims to have made a number of diplomatic representations 
 arguinig for release from the commitment dating from 1999, 
 and has since that time consistently expressed its 
 disagreement with the idea that its pursuit of a ""peaceful"" 
 SLV should be limited.  The GOA is also proud of its 
 non-proliferation record subsequent to the dismantling of the 
 Condor program, a point Varotto stressed February 4 when he 
 said: ""It is important that people in Washington understand 
 something.  Those of us involved in sensitive programs -- 
 nuclear and other (sic) -- invented our own export control 
 regime even before Argentina had any export control 
 legislation.  You're not talking to enemies, but rather to 
 promoters of export controls."" 
  
 ¶4. (C) Varotto also claims that Argentina is working toward 
 the eventual establishment of a regional space agency, a 
 development he understands will be difficult to achieve but 
 one that he purports to believe is inevitable.  A reg]m Bq,jb1\BQbignal 
 Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR), while the higher 
 costs of other providers render their services inaccessible. 
 Partnerships with launch providers have proven imperfect 
 mechanisms, because although costs are reduced, Argentina has 
 found on a number of occasions that the needs of more senior 
 partners mean instruments important to Argentina are left 
  
 behind. 
  
 ------------ 
 A Trump Card 
 ------------ 
  
 ¶5. (C) The GOA understands that solid arguments against all 
 of the preceding points exist, but it believes it holds a 
 trump card.  That is, the GOA believes that because it 
 qualified its 1992 assurances to the USG and to the MTCR with 
 the phrase ""for the foreseeable future,"" instead of more 
 clearly foreswearing SLV development for all time, those 
 assurances are no longer valid.  Argentina has seen eight 
 different presidents since 1992, goes the argument, and it is 
 not reasonable to demand policy consistency through such 
 change and over almost sixteen years absent a more binding 
 international agreement. (Comment: We find considerable merit 
 in this argument.  End Comment.) 
  
 ------------------- 
 Practical Realities 
 ------------------- 
  
 ¶6. (C) Leaving the Argentine arguments aside, it is useful to 
 examine our own ability to influence the GOA's position 
 toward its SLV program.  High-level GOA officials -- 
 including the current foreign minister -- have publicly 
 proclaimed the program to be a national priority.  GOA 
 officials would find it difficult to backtrack from those 
 statements.  Current president Cristina Fernandez de 
 Kirchner, as well as her predecessor and husband Nestor 
 Kirchner, have shown themselves to be extremely sensitive to 
 perceived slights, and have often played the anti-American 
 card in response to an act or statement seen as an 
 encroachment upon Argentina's sovereign prerogatives (Ref C). 
  Forcing the issue with the president would likely lead to an 
 other-than-optimal outcome.  We also understand that any 
 attempt to enlist a significant number of MTCR partners to 
 join us in reinforcing our opposition would be unlikely to 
 bear fruit.  We must therefore conclude -- and Varotto has 
 told us as much -- that there is little the USG can do to 
 convince Argentina to renounce its SLV program. 
  
 --------------------------------------------- ------- 
 Our Recommendation: Making the Best of the Situation 
 --------------------------------------------- ------- 
  
 ¶7. (C) Because we are not aware of any information that 
 indicates that the Argentine SLV program represents a 
 nonproliferation danger, and taking the factors above into 
 account, we believe the best path to a mutually acceptable 
 and final resolution to this longstanding irritant would be 
 to release Argentina from its 1992 commitments.  As a 
 condition, we could ask that Argentina brief its program and 
 keep it open to the MTCR and/or to experts of our choosing, a 
 step Varotto has indicated the GOA is willing to take 
 (although Varotto also noted that Argentina's political 
 leadership would probably only agree to unobtrusive 
 briefings/inspections).  Turning Varotto's pledges of 
 transparency into action is worth a concerted effort, in our 
 view. 
  
 ¶8. (C) Additionally, such a course of action would be 
 construed by the GOA as a gesture of friendship, and would be 
 seen as recognition and vindication of Argentina's strong 
 anti-proliferation vocation since the demise of the Condor 
 program.  Best of all, it would put this issue to bed at no 
 cost, give us leverage to intervene if program developments 
 give rise to proliferation concerns, and show that we are 
 serious when we say that all states should be allowed to reap 
 the benefits of space for peaceful purposes. 
 WAYNE