VZCZCXRO7742
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0171/01 0450615
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140615Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2186
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1433
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSNATO AFSOUTHBN NAPLES IT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV
SUBJECT: SERBIA ON THE EVE OF KOSOVO'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
REFS: A) BELGRADE 62, B) 07 BELGRADE 1733, C) BELGRADE 150 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Serbia's leaders and activists are preparing for Kosovo's 
imminent declaration of independence and the European Union's 
decision to deploy a mission to Kosovo.  Ruling parties plan to 
convene parliament to oppose both moves, while nationalist groups 
have announced protests calling an EU mission equal to an 
"occupation" of Kosovo.  While the GOS is still finalizing how it 
will react, there are indications of what impact Kosovo independence 
will have in Serbia in the immediate, medium and long terms.  End 
Summary. 
 
Immediate reactions 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The GOS will react both politically and legally, based on 
the GOS "action plan" (ref a) and parliament's Kosovo resolution 
(ref b).  While the plan remains, as DSS Vice President Milos 
Aligrudic told poloff February 12, a "state secret," an advisor in 
the Kosovo Ministry said the plan was generally based on the 
supremacy of UNSCR 1244 and its mandate for UNMIK (ref c).  In a 
February 13 statement to a state news agency, Prime Minister 
Kostunica reiterated the provision in parliament's December 2007 
resolution that the GOS will immediately "annul the unilateral 
Kosovo independence."  He called it "historic...because it is 
Serbia's ultimate decision to reject the existence of a false state 
on its territory once and for all."  Kostunica said that the GOS 
will then inform the UNSC and UN Secretary General that "all illegal 
acts of unilateral independence declaration have been declared null 
and void."  Aligrudic told poloff, February 12, that the GOS would 
expect the UN, and UNMIK, to annul Kosovo's declaration of 
independence as well.  On an encouraging note, Serbia's Chief of 
Defense Zdravko Ponos publicly reiterated that Serbian would not use 
military to respond to developments in Kosovo. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  According the February 13 edition of the pro-government 
daily "Politika," the Cabinet is meeting February 14 to discuss 
immediate actions against those governments that recognize Kosovo. 
A follow-on article further elaborated that the first step would be 
to recall Serbian ambassadors from capitals.  There was no mention 
of downgrading diplomatic relations.  Embassy's contacts earlier 
have said that the most severe response would be for those countries 
in the first wave of recognition.  Serbian leaders have also said 
the GOS will increase investment in parallel structures in Kosovo. 
"Politika" also reported on February 13 that according to "unnamed 
government sources" these parallel institutions could last six to 
eight years.  In Kostunica's February 13 statement, he called on 
Kosovo Serbs to remain in Kosovo and he promised GOS support.  The 
GOS, he said, "considers every person in Kosovo an equal and fully 
legitimate citizen of Serbia, and it is our duty to do absolutely 
everything to ensure normal living conditions for our people in the 
province." 
 
¶4. (SBU)  As a possible sign of things to come, the Kosovo Ministry 
was dismissive of post's repeated efforts for meetings this week. 
Elsewhere in the GOS, there was a sense of uncertainty about the 
path Serbia is on, and growing resentment within the ruling 
coalition.  A contact within the avowedly pro-EU, Democratic Party 
(DS) Deputy Prime Minister's European Integration Office told 
econoff that the office questioned whether the name should be 
changed to the "Russian Integration Office" because of the Prime 
Minister's policies.  In a February 12 meeting with poloff, a G17 
Plus official called Kosovo Minister Samardzic "Serbia's Acting 
Foreign Minister."  Nevertheless, both the DS and G17 have rejected 
the idea of leaving government over these differences. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Serbia also intends to mount a last-ditch effort at the 
UNSC, with Russian support.  MFA Political Director Boris Stefanovic 
confirmed to DCM that Foreign Minister Jeremic left February 13 for 
New York.  A local UN Office representative (protect) told poloff, 
Feburary 13, that the GOS had officially requested a UNSC meeting 
"soon" but that it all seemed to be orchestrated by Moscow.  The GOS 
aim, it seemed, was for a meeting, possibly over the weekend, in 
order to get the Council to agree -- and inform the Secretary 
General --  that Kosovo's declaration of independence would be 
illegal, and that the UN should react accordingly (i.e. compelling 
UNMIK to annul Pristina's declaration). 
 
Nationalist Reaction 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Two nationalist groups announced that they will stage a 
protest on Saturday, February 16, in front of the Slovenian Embassy 
in Belgrade to rally against the EU's plans to send a mission to 
Kosovo.  The groups, "1389" and "Nasi," have advertised the 
 
BELGRADE 00000171  002 OF 003 
 
 
demonstration as a way to equate the EU mission as the "occupation." 
 Slovenian poloff told poloff, February 13, that his mission did not 
expect more than 300 protestors and they were not worried about 
violence or damage.  The Slovene DCM, however, told EU DCMs at a 
February 13 EU meeting that the Slovenes were evacuating dependents. 
 Apparently the Slovenian Embassy is the only EU embassy to 
evacuating dependents. 
 
NGOs, U.S. Investment Worried 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Some groups, however, are concerned.  President of the NGO 
Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Andrej Nosov, told poloff on 
February 13 that human rights NGOs were "running around, meeting 
with each other" to plan for post-Kosovo contingencies.  U.S. Steel 
officials informed the embassy that it is permitting family members 
and dependents of international staff in Serbia to depart Serbia for 
neighboring countries for the next 7-10 days.  U.S. Steel clarified 
that it took this action on its own accord and the decision to do so 
was made at U.S. Headquarters.  It was not based on any credible 
threat, and is only precautionary at this stage, US Steel told the 
embassy.  Normal US Steel operations in Serbia are expected to 
continue during this time. 
 
Kosovo's Political Lifespan 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU)  There are conflicting signs of how long Kosovo's 
independence will be a serious political factor in the GOS, Serbia's 
European future, and U.S.-Serbia relations.  Srdjan Miljkovic, North 
Americas Division Chief at MFA, told poloff on February 13 that he 
expected the Kosovo issue to be the issue on the agenda for "two to 
three months."  Miljkovic said he did not foresee problems on the 
working level on the days following a decision on Kosovo.  In 
further clarification, he said he expected working level meetings 
and dialogue would still occur without any hindrance or delay.  He 
acknowledged that Serbia would of course respond diplomatically at 
higher levels to any decision.  It was obvious by his response that 
those specific actions had not yet been widely shared within the 
Ministry.  Ministry of Defense officials have assured DATT 
representatives that mil-to-mil cooperation would continue, though 
they acknowledged a strong DSS-orientation among some of the "older" 
officers. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  A political analyst at the pro-Western Balkan Trust for 
Democracy was more pessimistic.  Filip Medic told poloff, February 
13, that he saw a DSS-Radicals "shadow coalition" emerging from the 
internal divisions over Serbia's relationship with the EU.  (Serbian 
Orthodox Church Bishop Artemije reiterated previous statements on 
February 13, calling for a "government of national salvation" with 
all political parties to oppose Kosovo independence and reject the 
EU offer.)  Medic said the "nascent truce in the [DS-DSS] governing 
coalition...might prove very damaging to Tadic and the DS in the 
short to mid term" because the DS is still the flagship pro-EU 
party.  Aligrudic similarly told poloff, Feburary 13, that the 
DS-DSS differences over EU accession would remain as long as the EU 
insisted on sending a mission to Kosovo based on the Ahtisaari Plan. 
 Even more gloomily, Nenad Sebek, Director of the Center for 
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, told DCM on 
February 12 that by reconciling with the DSS, Tadic had "reached in 
to Kostunica's cold dark grave and brought him back to life."  In 
this regard, Kosovo's independence will remain a serious political 
obstacle indefinitely. 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Similarly, "Politika" wrote on February 13 that the 
Kosovo issue was "strengthening" the government coalition and would 
keep it focused (distracted).  The article did not give any 
indication on how long Kosovo would figure as the major issue on 
Serbian political scene, but assessed that other pressing issues -- 
such as EU accession -- would not return as politically relevant 
issues for up to six months (sooner if the EU offered an SAA, the 
paper wryly wrote.)  "Politika" estimated that following a Kosovo 
declaration of independence, GOS parties would likely continue their 
agreed "united state politics" on Kosovo for at least a couple of 
months.  In the following two to four months, Serbia would have to 
respond to UDI with a hard-line stance that there be neither 
contacts nor cooperation with Kosovo Albanians and government who 
recognize Kosovo independence. 
 
Long-term Disruption 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Serbian officials have said publicly and privately over 
the last several months that the GOS will only consider legitimate 
those Kosovo institutions authorized by UNSCR 1244.  According to 
"Politika," Serbia should resist all external pressures to sign 
individual agreements (i.e. on electricity or water) with the new 
Kosovo government.  According to an "anonymous DSS source" for 
 
BELGRADE 00000171  003 OF 003 
 
 
"Politika," the GOS would prohibit ministries from entering such 
agreements, as these would imply gradual recognition of 
independence.  Agreements must only be made with UNMIK not the EU 
mission, and all communication on Kosovo-related matters must go 
through the UN, not the EU.  "Politika" wrote that this state of 
affairs could last up to six-eight years, but Kostunica and those 
close to him have given no indication that this policy will ever 
change. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Local and municipal elections planned for May 2008 will be 
the first major test as DS and DSS, along with all other parties, 
will have to encourage voters with domestic policy platforms and not 
entirely about Kosovo. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU)  In the short term, the Serbian government will push as 
hard as possible in the UN to try to stop a Kosovo declaration of 
independence.  After Kosovo declares, parliament will annul it and 
the GOS will ask all international bodies to reject as well.  The 
ruling coalition will remain united on Kosovo, particularly now that 
it has achieved consensus to delay any decision on the offered EU 
agreement.  For the next weeks, it is not reasonable to expect 
Serbian leaders to focus on anything else.  In the medium and long 
term, the challenge will be to reintroduce the critical issue of 
Serbia's progress on European integration.  The DS may profess it 
wishes to move the national political discourse back to European 
integration, but Kostunica will oppose this as long as he is Prime 
Minister and the EU mission remains in Kosovo.  End Comment. 
 
BRUSH