VZCZCXRO1722
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0594/01 0601821
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 291821Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5972
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKISH ENVOYS AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS GOI 
RELATIONS, PKK, ONGOING OPERATIONS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 376 AND PREVIOUS (SITREPS) 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 570 (MCNS) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Turkish PM Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu 
asserted to Ambassador that Turkish ground operations were 
inevitable after the October kidnapping of Turkish soldiers 
and refused to predict when the operation would end. 
Ambassador pressed for operations to end before they upset 
the fragile political balance in Iraq and urged frequent 
public messaging that Turkish actions in the north are aimed 
at the PKK only and are limited in scope and duration. Both 
agreed that President Talabani's official invitation to visit 
Ankara in the near-term is an important aspect in managing 
both bilateral and internal Iraqi tensions, although 
Ambassador noted that Talabani is unlikely to go so long as 
there are Turkish troops on the ground in Iraq.  Ambassador 
urged that Talabani's delegation include Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) representatives.  Davutoglu and GOT Iraq 
Coordinator Murat Ozcelik cautioned that including someone 
from the KRG would be very difficult but that a Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) representative might be acceptable. 
Davutoglu agreed with Ambassador that the solution to the PKK 
problem lies in political and diplomatic actions and not just 
military, but provided scant details on Turkish plans other 
than the Talabani visit and increased bilateral engagement. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador met February 27 with Turkish PM Advisor 
Ahmet Davutoglu and GOT Iraq Coordinator Murat Ozcelik at the 
start of the Turkish envoys' one-day visit to Baghdad. 
Accompanying Ambassador were Political-Military 
Minister-Counselor Marcie Ries, NSC Senior Director Brett 
McGurk, and Senior Advisor David Pearce.  Accompanying 
Davutoglu and Ozcelik were PM Deputy U/S Hakan Fidan, Turkish 
CDA Ahmet Yazal and several Turkish embassy officials. The 
delegation's schedule included meetings with FM Zebari and VP 
Hashimi, a lunch hosted by President Talabani and an 
end-of-day briefing with MNF-I CG Petraeus and Ambassador 
before departure. 
 
Operations Should Come to a Close ASAP 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Ambassador expressed appreciation for the visit, which 
he said would help keep relations steady and on track.  The 
meetings should provide a good sense on how Iraqi reactions 
(to Turkish military operations) are shaped.  Particularly 
since just before the Turkish ground operations began (ref 
a), Ambassador emphasized that he has been intensively 
engaged with the Iraqi leadership, especially Kurdish 
leaders, to ensure that events do not spiral out of control. 
He said since the extremely tense first day of the ground 
incursion on February 21, tensions have lessened but the 
cumulative effect of ongoing operations continues to take a 
toll.  As operations continue, emotions in Iraq are rising. 
For example, Ambassador noted, at the Ministerial Council on 
National Security (MCNS) on February 24 (ref b), the Iraqi 
leadership raised several exaggerated rumors about Turkish 
activities, such as an intention by the GOT to introduce the 
Turkish armed forces to the entire north.  This underscores 
the need to wrap up the kinetic operations as soon as 
possible, the Ambassador pressed; the longer it goes on, the 
higher the risk of something untoward occurring that 
escalates the conflict and destabilizes Iraq. 
 
Talabani Invite to Turkey; KRG Inclusion in Talks Vital 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶4. (S) Ambassador said he had reinforced with President 
Talabani that his invitation to Ankara is important and he 
should accept it, including with careful thought about how 
best to organize the visit and contribute to bilateral 
relations.  However, Ambassador noted, the timing could be 
problematic; we are not sure that Talabani can conduct a 
visit while Turkish operations are ongoing.  We are trying 
hard to keep Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
President Masood Barzani linked up and cooperating, 
Ambassador stated.  A split in the Kurdish ranks under this 
stress would not be good for them, for Iraq, for the U.S. or 
for Turkey.  In that vein, Ambassador continued, direct GOT 
engagement with the KRG is vitally important, particularly 
over the longer-term.  For that reason, Ambassador urged, it 
is important that when Talabani goes to Turkey, 
representative(s) from the KRG join his delegation.  Under 
the umbrella of a state visit, including the KRG could be 
used as a beginning for some direct public discussion. 
 
¶5. (S) In the context of improving Iraqi-Turkish-Kurdish 
relations, Ambassador said it is time to look again at the 
 
BAGHDAD 00000594  002 OF 004 
 
 
Makhmour refugee camp issue and whether such progress as 
Kurdish language rights in Turkey might lessen the reluctance 
of the refugees to return to Turkey.  Ambassador mentioned 
that, among several issues on which the U.S. is pressing 
President Barzani, the issue of the KRG asking the Turkish 
special forces based in northern Iraq to leave will remain. 
Ambassador reiterated the importance of using the Turkish 
visit to lower the temperature and urged the envoys to 
reiterate useful messages, i.e., that the operations are 
solely against the PKK and not against Iraq or the Kurds and 
that they will be limited in duration and scope and will end 
as soon as possible. 
 
We Understand Need for Dialogue 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Senior Advisor Davutoglu responded by thanking the 
U.S. for its increased cooperation in fighting the PKK.  He 
said particularly after PM Erdogan met President Bush, the 
coordination with the U.S. has been excellent and the GOT is 
"very grateful." Davutoglu admitted that the success of any 
military operation requires diplomatic and political 
elements.  He asserted that the GOT had been very patient 
since the October kidnapping of its soldiers who were brought 
to northern Iraq; Turkey could have retaliated immediately 
but it would have caused problems between the GOT and GOI/KRG 
and the GOT and USG.  Instead, the GOT has upped the tempo of 
its direct coordination with the GOI, Davutoglu noted, 
including PM to PM talks as well as Davutoglu's discussions 
with GOI spokesman Ali Dabbagh and Ozcelik's contacts with PM 
Maliki's advisors.  Prior to this increase, we also had 
channels to the north (KRG), some of them open.  A common 
strategy against terror is in all of our interests, Davutoglu 
said; this includes not only diplomatic and political 
initiatives, but also military. 
 
Cannot Predict When Operations Will End 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Davutoglu noted that the GOT instructed the Turkish 
General Staff (TGS) that the sole target of military 
operations is the PKK and that even under provocation, 
Turkish forces should not fight the Peshmerga or the Iraqi 
Security Forces.  The targets and the scope of the operations 
are clear, Davutoglu emphasized; Turkey, too, wants to bring 
the soldiers home to their families as soon as possible.  But 
the timing of withdrawal will depend on when objectives are 
achieved.  Since the day ground operations began on February 
21, Davutoglu said the GOT continues to make efforts to 
engage with the GOI, USG and "the north."  For example, on 
the accusations that airstrikes destroyed key bridges, 
Davutoglu asserted the bridges were primitive footpath 
bridges used to supply terrorists and not bridges used by 
civilians.  He said the message "to the north" (i.e., Masood 
Barzani) noted that there were no civilian casualties, no 
operations in settled areas and no bad confrontations between 
Turkish forces and the Peshmerga.  The GOT asked that the KRG 
and GOI not provoke the situation and offered to repair any 
civilian bridge destroyed.  Davutoglu claimed that after 
these messages were passed, the statements from the north 
were moderated. 
 
Public Messages Are Important 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) If Turkey's intention was to create problems for Iraq, 
Davutoglu asserted, Turkey could have done so via numerous 
means -- including economic sanctions or the closing of the 
Habur Gate.  Instead, Turkey established links with the 
north.  But the way ahead also depends on the attitude of the 
Kurds and their public statements.  Both countries need to 
control "psychologies" and be aware of each country's public 
reaction.  "High emotion" displayed by the Kurdish leaders 
may end up making it difficult for Turkey to end military 
operations soon.  Ali Dabbagh's statement on the eve of the 
visit, Davutoglu said, caused extreme upset and made the GOT 
believe the GOI wanted to sabotage the visit.  Referring to a 
U.S. request for more useful messaging by Turkey that 
emphasized limited operations against the PKK (and not Iraq 
or the Kurds) and made reference to non-military options, 
Davutoglu said Turkey had responded positively, including via 
PM Erdogan's televised remarks. 
 
Kurds Are Difficult but We Want Talabani to Visit 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9. (S) Davutoglu said that the PKK is also a threat to Iraqi 
Kurds; the Kurds should work with Turkey against the PKK, 
like in the 1990s.  Kurdish rhetoric is a problem and has 
caused missed opportunities in the past to get a GOT-KRG 
dialogue going, such as when Masood Barzani's comments 
 
BAGHDAD 00000594  003 OF 004 
 
 
comparing Kirkuk to Diyarbakir last February derailed a 
planned meeting between KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani and then-FM 
Gul.  The GOT needs to see a change in the KRG mentality, 
Davutoglu continued, before Turkey can welcome a KRG 
delegation.  As for the Turkish Special Forces based in 
northern Iraq since 1997, Davutoglu said their removal would 
have to be in parallel with the PKK's elimination as they 
serve a deterrent function. 
 
¶10. (S) Davutoglu made clear that the GOT would like 
President Talabani to visit as soon as possible, within days 
or weeks but not months.  President Gul invited him 
personally and he accepted.  The GOT is concerned about mixed 
signals since the ground operations began regarding this 
visit; Turkey cannot guarantee to have its troops out of Iraq 
beforehand.  If the PKK steps up attacks in Turkey as the 
Kurdish new year approaches in March, we will be hard-pressed 
to extend the invitation again.  Such a trip, in fact, could 
help end operations sooner, Davutoglu asserted. 
 
¶11. (S) Ozcelik said that the GOT needs to know what Masood 
Barzani is thinking and expressed concern about Masood's 
pride getting in the way of moving ahead in the relationship. 
Turkey has no intention of playing Talabani against Masood 
Barzani.  The GOT can work with KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani.  If 
President Talabani visited Turkey without the condition that 
Turkish troops are out of Iraq, it will show that the Iraqi 
President, a Kurd, is trying to put things on the right 
track.  The GOT understands, Ozcelik continued, that a future 
solution lies in working with both Barzanis.  Perhaps for the 
Talabani visit, a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
representative could join the delegation but not an official 
of the KRG.  It is a delicate line we must straddle. 
 
Iraqi Politic is Fragile 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (S) Ambassador agreed that moving ahead requires careful 
calculation but said he wanted to underscore the fragility of 
the Iraqi political construct.  It will take constant effort 
by all of us to keep things in balance, he said.  The issue 
of public statements needs to be understood in the context of 
Iraqi politics.  When Iraqi spokesman Ali Dabbagh makes a 
statement, it is in part to moderate Kurdish reaction against 
the GOI because of political tensions.  Ambassador repeated 
that the longer the kinetic operations, even within the set 
parameters, the more stress is put on both the delicate 
political balance in Iraq and on key leadership relationships. 
 
It is the KRG that is Problematic 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (S) Political and diplomatic action is needed to 
eliminate the PKK problem, Ambassador said.  Talabani's visit 
is an important vehicle for the two governments to discuss 
how to work together, and the KRG and KDP are an essential 
part of the final solution.  Talabani is a moderate force for 
Iraq.  Ambassador said that for Masood Barzani and the KDP, 
it is important to realize that they do not see the situation 
the same way as Turkey.  Ambassador explained that at the 
core of their concerns lies the belief that the GOT has made 
a fundamental decision that the KRG should not exist. 
 
¶14. (S) Davutoglu complained again of the missed 
opportunities in 2007, but expressed the belief that once the 
Turkish public saw a visit by the Kurdish Iraqi President, 
such demonstrated cooperation would "open new gates" with the 
KDP and help with the Turkish public's ability to tolerate 
relations with the KRG.  He said there is a constitutional 
question, and while it is unresolved, Iraqi Shia and Sunni 
will not like it if we get too close to the KRG.  Once the 
constitutional process is resolved, we can talk to the KRG, 
Davutoglu opined; in fact we can talk to the KDP and PUK now. 
Ozcelik continued by noting that the GOT understands the KRG 
is a part of Iraq and hopes the KRG understands that the GOT 
and KRG have reconcilable differences on such issues as 
territorial aims.  Turkey is the most helpful neighbor to 
Iraq, Ozcelik added.  Ambassador said it is important that 
the GOT find a way to move ahead now and use this opportunity 
for a new start -- "leap over some small barriers that have 
prevented dialogue."  Ambassador asked Davutoglu to elaborate 
on his constitutional point.  Davutoglu explained that 
constitutional review is ongoing and the Sunnis have concerns 
about federalism, regions formation and disputed territories 
(i.e., Article 140), asserting that "the Iraqi political map 
is not finished."  (Note: Ozcelik later privately asked 
PolMil MC to disregard Davutoglu's comments on the 
constitutional issue. End Note). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
BAGHDAD 00000594  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶15. (S/NF) Davutoglu's comments that the Turks will be in 
Northern Iraq until the mission succeeds did not help matters 
much here. In our view, the longer the operation continues, 
the deeper the cleavages between the Prime Minister and KRG 
leaders, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and so 
on, with attendant consequences for our agenda here.  That 
said, we understand the meeting between Talabani and 
Davutoglu went quite well, with Talabani accepting the 
invitation proferred, albeit keeping his options open about 
when he will make the trip, as going while there are still 
Turkish troops in Iraq would clearly be very badly received 
by his constituents. 
CROCKER