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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0473/01 0501003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191003Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5785
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000473 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2018 
TAGS: VPGOV KDEM PINR PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: GOI FIGHTS KEROSENE CORRUPTION, MILITIA RACKETS 
 
REF: A. 2007 BAGHDAD 4002 - IESC MEETING OF DECEMBER 7 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 342 - IESC MEETING OF FEBRUARY 1 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 177 - A GLIMPSE OF COURAGE IN BAGHDAD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Deputy Political Counselor Greg D'Elia for 
 reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Sayid Nemah Jabour of the office of the 
Iraqi National Security Advisor told poloff February 15 that 
the new Project Clean Delivery (PCD) kerosene distribution 
system had significantly diminished militia revenue from the 
theft and sale of kerosene.  Jabour said that an Iraqi 
interagency team had conducted a "clean" delivery through PCD 
to six of Baghdad's most dangerous neighborhoods since 
January 28.  Approximately 90 percent of kerosene deliveries 
in the PCD neighborhoods avoided militia profiteering and 
government corruption by going straight from the fuel depot 
to the consumer, in the estimate of Jabour and the Deputy 
Inspector General of the Ministry of Oil (MoO), Alaa Mahdi 
Al-Deen.  According to Jabour and Al-Deen, PCD has served the 
GoI as an invaluable diagnostic instrument, exposing the 
fraudulent practices of MoO officials who aid and abet 
militia control of essential services.  Jabour described to 
the Prime Minister on February 1 the systemic corruption in 
kerosene distribution that PCD uncovered during its first 
five days -- the MoO cannot account for about 85 percent of 
the kerosene distributed in non-PCD Baghdad neighborhoods 
during the period that PCD has operated.  Jabour argued that 
the violent response of militants -- killing two local 
officials involved with PCD and threatening two others -- 
confirms the project's impact.  Jabour's team intends to 
build on PCD to improve and sustain a new Baghdad-wide 
distribution system for kerosene, and to extend their system 
to other petroleum products.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
PROJECT AIMS TO IMPROVE ESSENTIAL SERVICES, FIGHT CORRUPTION 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) BACKGROUND: Initiated in September 2007 by the 
Embassy political section, Project Clean Delivery (PCD) aims 
to build GoI capacity to provide essential services by 
improving efficiency, removing corruption and countering 
militia influence (reftels A and B).  PCD seeks to help 
Iraqis develop "best practices" recommendations through a 
close focus on one service -- the distribution of kerosene to 
Baghdad residents.  The timing has been critical, since 
Baghdad residents rely on kerosene to heat their homes during 
the winter.  After two months of inter agency research and 
development by a team comprising seventeen different 
Coalition agencies, Embassy officers identified in November 
an Iraqi "champion" to lead the project: Sayid Jabour 
(strictly protect) of the office of the National Security 
Advisor. 
 
¶3.  (C) BACKGROUND CONT'D: Jabour immediately assumed 
ownership of the project and assembled an Iraqi inter agency 
team from eight government entities.  With Jabour fully in 
charge, the Coalition adopted a support and advisory role. 
That approach was vindicated in late November when Jabour and 
his team devised a new kerosene distribution plan that 
featured significantly enhanced security measures and inter 
ministerial coordination.  They then implemented a pilot 
project to deliver kerosene more efficiently and "cleanly" in 
one Baghdad neighborhood -- Kindi -- during December.  After 
the success of their pilot project, the Iraqi PCD team began 
January 28 to expand their new system to six more 
neighborhoods, and plan to continue expanding it throughout 
Baghdad.  END BACKGROUND. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
A "CLEAN" DELIVERY TO 28,000 FAMILIES IN BAGHDAD 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (C) Members of the Iraqi inter agency PCD team told 
PRToff that, as of February 17, they had delivered 
approximately 2.8 million liters of kerosene to 28,000 
families in seven Baghdad neighborhoods (Kindi (pilot 
project), Ameriya, Ghazaliya, Zayuna, Beladiyat, Zafaraniya, 
and Salhiya).  Jabour said that his team and the MoO 
Inspector General's (IG) office tracked the kerosene 
delivered through PCD from the ground (or import) to the 
depot and then all the way to the consumer.  Since the 
project's expansion began on January 28, they have provided a 
weekly update on its implementation directly to the Prime 
Minister at the Iraq Executive Steering Committee (I-ESC) 
meeting.  To illustrate his close inspection, the MoO Deputy 
IG, Alaa Mahdi Al-Deen (strictly protect), told PRToff 
February 18 that the GoI has delivered precisely 2,801,030 
liters of kerosene through the new PCD system.  In a separate 
conversation, the leading Baghdad Provincial Council member 
on the PCD team, Salam Hanoun Mosalat (strictly protect), 
told PRToff February 18 that PCD has delivered 2,788,900 
 
BAGHDAD 00000473  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
liters -- a difference of less than 0.05 percent from the MoO 
report.  (NOTE: While the GoI implemented the new PCD 
distribution system, Coalition Battalions on the ground 
observed the delivery and, in several instances, intervened 
in support of the Iraqi PCD team.  END NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
SUNNI NEIGHBORHOODS GET KEROSENE FOR FIRST TIME SINCE 2006 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Despite the high demand in Baghdad for kerosene 
during a cold winter, Neighborhood Council (NAC) members and 
PCD team members report that most residents served by PCD had 
not yet received any government-allocated kerosene.  As a 
result, Jabour said, national, provincial and local 
government officials have earned substantial credit at the 
community level for successful delivery of kerosene through 
PCD.  EPRT team leaders as well as MNF-I spot reports and 
surveys confirm this claim.  The Coalition Battalion 
Commander in Ghazaliya reported that several women literally 
wept with joy while receiving their families' allotment of 
kerosene.  Sheikh Khaled in Ameriya, a leader of the May 2007 
local rebellion against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), told the 
local EPRT team leader that his Sunni-majority neighborhood 
had received kerosene from the GoI for the first time since 
November 2006, thanks to the PCD initiative.  Moreover, 
Jabour and Coalition officers heard first-hand reports from 
the Ghazaliya NAC and local residents about the effectiveness 
and success of the PCD system during Jabour's February 6 
visit to Ghazaliya.  The locals informed Jabour that, since 
2005, Ghazaliya residents had received only five percent of 
their government allocation of kerosene; then, in the first 
week of February, PCD delivered the full portion of kerosene 
to the vast majority of families in Ghazaliya. 
 
¶6.  (C) Sayid also heard in southern (Sunni) Ghazaliya about 
the failure of the GoI to deliver other essential services to 
that area.  Jabour, noting that his trip had raised his 
awareness of service delivery problems in Sunni 
neighborhoods, told poloff on February 7 that he plans to 
investigate the various complaints he heard in Ghazaliya. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
EXPOSING GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION AND MILITIA REVENUE 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7.  (C) Corruption was rampant and unmonitored before the new 
distribution mechanism, Jabour told poloff February 7, but 
PCD has focused senior GoI leadership on the need for 
improved security and inter ministerial coordination.  The 
new approach, he explained, has enabled honest officials to 
identify and diminish corruption.  In the neighborhoods that 
have benefited from PCD, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), with 
support from Coalition Forces (CF), have neutralized militia 
influence and diminished -- likely eliminated -- militia 
profits from kerosene distribution by securing and monitoring 
the transportation of kerosene directly from fuel depots to 
the citizens. 
 
¶8.  (C) Jabour said that the kerosene delivered to Baghdad 
residents through the PCD system represents only 15 percent 
of the approximately 20 million total liters supplied to 
Baghdad during the same period.  He has asked MoO officials 
in charge of fuel distribution in Baghdad where the other 85 
percent went, but has yet to receive a satisfactory answer. 
Jabour said that he now realizes that millions of liters of 
kerosene have been stolen or misallocated this winter.  As a 
result, locals have had to buy their kerosene from the black 
market at severely inflated prices.  Most of the income from 
the sale of stolen kerosene, Jabour stressed, goes to fund 
militias and terrorists.  He said that the Prime Minister 
raised kerosene-associated corruption in a February 6 meeting 
with two Deputy Ministers and two Directors General at the 
MoO.  (NOTE: Minister of Oil Hussein Al-Sharastani was out of 
the country at the time of the meeting.  END NOTE.)  The 
Prime Minister asked these officials to account for millions 
of liters of kerosene intended for Baghdad residents this 
winter. 
 
¶9. (C) Jabour noted that the MoO's financial accounts appear 
to balance -- purportedly demonstrating the delivery to 
locals by the MoO of every single liter received in Baghdad 
-- but that these accounts have no bearing on the "reality on 
the ground," where Jabour has seen that corrupt officials and 
militants hijack, misdirect, and steal from kerosene delivery 
trucks.  (NOTE: Members of the Coalition's "Energy Fusion 
Cell" participating in PCD have discovered that Ministry of 
Oil officials regularly send trucks filled with fuel to 
government-owned "gas stations" that exist on paper but are 
actually empty lots or abandoned buildings.  They believe 
that MoO truck drivers, instead of delivering fuel products 
to gas stations, deliver them straight to the black market, 
most often controlled by militias and terrorists.  END NOTE.) 
 
BAGHDAD 00000473  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
MILITANTS RESPOND TO CLEAN DELIVERY WITH VIOLENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶10.  (C) After the murder in early January of a NAC member 
involved in PCD (reftel C), militants continued to react 
violently to the project's implementation.  Jabour said that 
a local leader of Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) responded angrily on 
January 29 to the new, tightly monitored kerosene 
distribution method by entering the offices of the northern 
Ghazaliya NAC and threatening to kill the NAC member in 
charge of fuel distribution.  He punched a guard in the face 
on his way into the office.  (NOTE: The local Coalition 
Battalion (1-75 CAV) confirmed the incident.  END NOTE.)  In 
Beladiyat on January 29, locals told Jabour that JAM members 
drove by the distribution point and fired guns out of their 
car windows over peoples' heads -- a "drive by" shooting 
apparently intended to intimidate local residents and the NAC 
member helping them.  Early on the morning of February 1, men 
entered the home of the same NAC member's bodyguard and shot 
him to death.  Jabour believes these men were JAM members, 
and the GoI is investigating this murder. 
 
¶11.  (C) In southern Ghazaliya on February 6, local militants 
launched an improvised explosive device (IED) at a truck 
transporting kerosene as part of the PCD system -- an almost 
unprecedented attack.  (NOTE: Militants usually do not 
believe that fuel trucks have sufficient protection to 
require an IED attack; if they want to divert or steal from 
fuel trucks, they simply hijack them.  Local Coaltion units 
believe that AQI detonated this IED because they perceived 
that northern (Shia) Ghazaliya received more kerosene than 
did southern (Sunni) Ghazaliya.  END NOTE.)  In another 
neighborhood, Zayuna, JAM members stayed away from the 
well-protected kerosene trucks while people picked up their 
kerosene.  In the evenings, however, JAM went door-to-door 
asking for a portion of the money they did not receive at the 
point of sale; they told people that they -- JAM members -- 
had delivered the kerosene, not the government, and they 
therefore deserved to be paid. 
 
------------------------------------- 
PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW DELIVERY SYSTEM 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Members of the Iraqi team -- including Provincial 
and Neighborhood Council members, and the MoO Deputy IG -- 
estimate that 90 percent of local residents in the targeted 
neighborhoods received their kerosene at the government 
stipulated quantity and price thanks to the new PCD 
distribution system.  (NOTE: Coalition forces in the Energy 
Fusion Cell and on the ground in the affected neighborhoods 
concur with this assessment.  END NOTE.)  PCD did not achieve 
100 percent success, however, despite high-level GoI 
attention, Iraqi inter agency coordination, and Coalition 
support.  Notable problems emerged during the implementation 
of PCD in some of Baghdad's toughest neighborhoods.  While 
most Iraqi participants in the initiative performed 
admirably, some soldiers in the Iraqi Army (IA) extorted 
extra fees from residents; several NAC members diverted 
trucks to support the black market; thieves stole several 
thousand liters of kerosene from a truck located on an IA 
forward operating base; and some MoO officials at the Baghdad 
Distribution Center attempted to obstruct implementation of 
the new system. 
 
¶13.  (C) The Deputy IG at the MoO, a participant on the Iraqi 
inter agency team, noted these and other problems candidly 
and openly in his own written assessment of the PCD system, 
which he has submitted to the Prime Minister at successive 
I-ESC meetings.  Jabour said that he would work to rectify 
the corrupt practices that his team observed at the Baghdad 
Distribution Center and within the Neighborhood Councils. 
"You can't expect to transform a system that has corruption 
everywhere and not have problems," he said.  "They are 
inevitable."  (COMMENT: The continued success of the new PCD 
distribution system will depend upon the GoI's implementation 
of management controls and provision of the security required 
to enforce them.  END COMMENT.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
CLEAN DELIVERY IN BROADER CONTEXT 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) According to the Iraqi PCD team and post's local 
contacts, the GoI has failed to distribute an adequate supply 
of kerosene to Baghdad residents during every winter since 
¶2003.  MoO technocrats estimate that Baghdad needs to receive 
approximately two million liters of kerosene per day in order 
to meet demand.  This winter, according to the MoO IG, 
Baghdad has received, on average, 650,000 liters per day. 
GoI officials and residents allege that a complex web of 
 
BAGHDAD 00000473  004 OF 004 
 
 
inter-related factors -- including corruption, militia 
influence, insurgent attacks, antiquated infrastructure, 
incompetence, and lack of inter ministerial coordination -- 
hamper both the supply and distribution of this commodity 
during the critical winter months.  Local contacts and 
Coalition intelligence analysts also report that militias and 
terrorists earn a significant portion of their revenue from 
stealing and selling kerosene. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED TO OTHER SERVICES 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (C) Jabour, recognizing that hundreds of thousands of 
Baghdad residents did not receive an adequate supply of 
kerosene this winter, told poloff February 15 that his team 
will apply the lessons learned this winter to improve and 
sustain the new distribution mechanism.  Jabour said that he 
believes his team can also apply these lessons to the 
distribution of other petroleum products and, ultimately, 
other essential services.  The Coalition interagency team 
supporting Project Clean Delivery has begun to facilitate the 
preparation of a comprehensive "after action" analysis and 
assessment of the project for use by the Iraqi inter agency 
team, with the aim of replicating the project's most 
successful elements in more neighborhoods and additional 
services. 
CROCKER