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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS USTR FOR AGAMA 
DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EINV ECON MARR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AF DAS MOSS'S MEETING WITH SGF KINGIBE 
 
REF: A. A) ABUJA 142 
     ¶B. B) ABUJA 152 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robin R. Sanders for reasons 1.4. (b & d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Ambassador and AF DAS Moss met with 
Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) Kingibe 
 
SIPDIS 
January 23, and discussed the situation in the Niger Delta, 
the recent sidelining of Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) Chair Ribadu, and the court case against 
Pfizer Pharmaceuticals.  On the Delta, Kingibe said the GON 
had just launched a new initiative aimed at addressing the 
past grievances of local people, particularly the Ijaw in 
Bayelsa and Delta states, but also at confronting what he 
considered "criminality," particularly in Rivers State.  He 
acknowledged that the GON had been sometimes "hesitant" to 
accept previous offers of security assistance from the USG 
because it did not want to internationalize what it believed 
should remain an internal matter.  He acknowledged that the 
sidelining of Ribadu had been badly handled, but insisted 
that this should not be read as any decrease in President 
Yar'Adua's commitment to fighting corruption.  On Pfizer, 
Kingibe urged us to treat the Attorney General as our main 
point of contact, but acknowledged that the Kano State 
Government was also part of the equation.  The conversation 
also briefly touched on Nigerian peacekeepers in Somalia, the 
bid of a U.S. company to rebuild parts of Nigeria's rail 
network, and the conclusion of a Bilateral Investment Treaty. 
End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On January 23, visiting AF DAS Todd Moss, accompanied 
by the Ambassador, EconCouns and PolCouns (notetaker) met 
with SGF (the position is roughly equivalent to the White 
House Chief of Staff) Babagana Kingibe.  SGF's Political 
Advisor Abubakar Muhammed was also present. 
 
Expanding the Bilateral Relationship 
------------------------------------ 
¶3. (C) DAS Moss noted that President Yar'Adua's recent U.S. 
visit was widely considered a success, and had increased our 
expectation for improved cooperation with the GON as well as 
raised the bar for Nigeria to improve its democracy.  Kingibe 
said Yar'Adua was also satisfied with the visit, and 
acknowledged that it was the GON's responsibility to fulfill 
those expectations and maintain the momentum in the 
relationship.  He promised to keep pushing ahead. 
 
¶4. (C) Kingibe said he had a growing respect for the 
President, whom he described as deliberative and steady, and 
"a man who says what he means and means what he says."  This 
was a major shift from the more Machiavellian ways of former 
President Obasanjo, and had taken some getting used to. 
Kingibe added that this was a "make or break time" for the 
Yar'Adua administration, and that the relationship with the 
USG continued to be of major importance. 
 
Niger Delta Policy 
------------------ 
¶5. (C) DAS Moss asked Kingibe to lay out the GON's current 
strategy for addressing the continuing disruption and 
insecurity in the Niger Delta; he stressed that the USG wants 
to play a supportive and constructive role there.  Kingibe 
acknowledged that progress on the Delta was vital for 
President Yar'Adua's overall agenda, and that the GON had 
made less progress in tackling the issue than he and the 
President had hoped.  When they laid out a strategy back in 
July in a meeting with elders from the region, they had 
expected results within three months; seven months later, 
they had little to show for it. 
 
¶6. (C) According to Kingibe, the GON had just launched a new 
outreach effort aimed primarily at addressing the grievances 
of the Ijaw people in Delta and Bayelsa states, for which 
Vice President Goodluck Jonathan (himself an Ijaw) was acting 
as the point.  This effort was to come up with a new strategy 
within the next few weeks to promote "inclusiveness and 
economic advancement" in the region.  Kingibe added that, 
while it was also necessary to address security issues in 
order to make progress on other areas, the main focus would 
be on engagement and dialogue.  (Comment:  VP Jonathan was 
 
ABUJA 00000202  002 OF 003 
 
 
also at least the figurehead of the Yar'Adua administration's 
earlier unsuccessful effort to promote dialogue in the Delta, 
and did not impress in that role.  End comment.) 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to Rivers state, Kingibe characterized the 
security problems there as more a case of "pure criminality" 
than real grievance, and would require a tougher stance.  He 
said the new Governor in the state (Rotimi Amaechi), who, 
like many politicians in the area, had previously had ties 
with some of the criminal gangs, now appeared seriously 
committed to taking the so-called "militants" on.  Community 
leaders in the state, who had previously been cowed by the 
gangs, were now also starting to speak out against the 
continuing unrest. 
 
¶8. (C) DAS Moss recalled that the USG had made previous 
offers to the GON of monitoring equipment, assistance with 
tracing militants' weapons, etc., which were intended to 
assist security efforts in the Delta, but these had generally 
not been taken up.  He asked if the GON wanted such help, or 
did it prefer to take the issue of Delta security on without 
outside help.  Kingibe acknowledged the GON's own ambiguity 
on this point.  The government was "hesitant" to see the 
"creeping internationalization of an internal problem," to 
which there would likely be a negative domestic political 
reaction.  That said, he added, his hesitation did not mean 
the GON was ruling out such help "for all time," but it would 
prefer to deal with the problem itself, and, he believed it 
could do so. 
 
¶9. (C) DAS Moss noted that the problems of the Delta were not 
caused by a lack of resources.  The state governments 
received very large allocations, but the funds did not 
produce results because of corruption, particularly by past 
Governors.  He asked if we could help deal with this problem, 
for example by assisting with tracking where funds allocated 
to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) actually 
went. 
 
¶10. (C) Kingibe acknowledged the problems both with 
corruption in state governments and the allocation of NDDC 
funds to projects of questionable development value.  He 
noted that the Delta states constantly demanded more of the 
national revenue, but were not able to give evidence of how 
previous funds had been spent.  He said the federal 
government was trying to address both problems, both by 
pursuing governors responsible for corruption and by changing 
the way the NDDC funds were used.  He said future NDDC 
projects would have to involve more than one state, so no 
individual state governor could control them. 
 
The EFCC Issue 
-------------- 
¶11. (C) DAS Moss said the decision to send EFCC Chairman 
Ribadu off on a one-year study course had played very badly 
in the U.S. and internationally.  President Yar'Adua, during 
his visit to Washington, had impressed us with his commitment 
to reform in Nigeria, particularly in the area of corruption. 
 For him, so soon after his return, to have sidelined the 
person seen as the GON's point man on corruption brought many 
to question Yar'Adua's commitment.  It was simply not 
credible to argue that the leader of the fight against one of 
Nigeria's biggest problems needed to be pulled out to go on a 
study course. 
 
¶12. (C) Kingibe acknowledged that the issue had been 
mishandled (see also ref. A), and had hurt the government 
domestically as well as internationally.  He insisted that, 
whatever the public perception, President Yar'Adua remained 
deeply committed to the fight against corruption, but Kingibe 
recognized that the onus was on the GON to show this was 
true.  He asked the USG to make a distinction between 
supporting the EFCC as an institution and backing Ribadu as a 
person.  He described Ribadu as something of a loose cannon; 
he was vigorous in pursuing corruption, but "vigor without 
caution" was not necessarily a good thing.  Ribadu's very 
public disagreements with the Attorney General and others 
were not helpful or tenable over the long term, he argued. 
 
The Pfizer Case 
 
ABUJA 00000202  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------- 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador noted that, on President Yar'Adua's 
recommendation (see ref. B), she will be seeing Attorney 
General (AG) Aondoakaa shortly to discuss the court case in 
Kano against Pfizer Pharmaceuticals.  We were trying to 
encourage dialogue between the parties to help find a 
settlement of the case.  She asked if the AG was the right 
interlocutor, or were there others? 
 
¶14. (C) Kingibe pointed out that the federal government was 
not the only, or even the main, player in the case; the Kano 
State Government was the principal party facing Pfizer. 
Still, the President had discussed the case with the state 
Governor, as had AG Aondoakaa with the Kano state AG, in both 
cases to urge a settlement.  Kingibe thought Aondoakaa should 
remain the Ambassador's "go to" person on 
this case.  He warned that there were some "ambulance 
chasers" involved in the case up in Kano whom we would do 
well to avoid.  The Ambassador also added that she would keep 
him in the loop on the issue when needed, to which he not 
only added his concurrence, but also offerd to assist when 
stumbling blocks arose. 
 
Other Items 
----------- 
¶15. (C) Peacekeeping:  DAS Moss thanked Kingibe for Nigeria's 
willingness to send peacekeepers to Somalia, and asked what 
the next step was on making this a reality.  Kingibe deferred 
to the Minister of Defense (with whom Moss was meeting 
January 24, see septel) on this.  He thought, however, that 
agreeing to an MOU with the African Union was the likely next 
step, especially in light of Nigeria's sometimes difficult 
experience in Darfur. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Railway reconstruction:  Kingibe asked if anyone at 
the Ministry of Transport had contacted us concerning the bid 
of U.S. firm Lemna Corporation to rebuild parts of Nigeria's 
rail network.  EconCouns said we would be seeing the Minister 
of Transport on January 24, and expected to discuss it then. 
Kingibe said that, for him, the important thing was that 
someone did get back to us about the matter, which the 
Ambassador had raised with the President. 
 
¶17. (C) BIT:  Moss asked if the GON was proceeding to 
consider our proposal to negotiate a Bilateral Investment 
Treaty.  Kingibe said the Presidency has already signed off 
on the principal of concluding such a deal.  The actual 
negotiations were "someone else's department." 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶18. (C) Throughout the meeting, Kingibe was eager to 
underline the Presidency's and his own wish for open and 
close working ties with the USG.  We will see if this 
positive discussion turns into concrete actions on the issues 
key to U.S. goals and objectives in Nigeria.  End comment. 
 
¶19.  (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Moss. 
SANDERS