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S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018 
TAGS: IAEA KNPP PARM IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: TIME TO KILL THE WORK PLAN? 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 20 B) UNVIE 006 AND PREVIOUS C) LONDON 
 
     103 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for 
Reasons 1.4 b, d, h 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Like-minded Ambassadors and Charges (P3 1, 
Australia, Canada, Japan) took stock of the DG's weekend trip 
to Tehran and the status of the work plan in a January 15 
Australian-hosted meeting.  All agreed that the DG had not 
made any breakthrough on key issues (disclosure of the past 
weapons program, the Additional Protocol and suspension) 
despite his one-off visit to the new generation centrifuge 
facility (ref a).  Given Supreme Leader Khamenei's continued 
denial that Iran had a past nuclear weapons program, no one 
expected a "confession" from Iran to be forthcoming within 
the slippery IAEA-announced deadline of four weeks.  Many 
continued to complain about ElBaradei's "loose talk" to the 
press.  Missions also attested to disgruntlement among the 
Secretariat staff on the way some work plan issues have been 
 
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closed, and expressed concern that the February DG report 
will be even vaguer than the November report.  The UK and 
Australia noted that too much emphasis had been placed on the 
work plan while the French worried that DG could close all 
the issues and declare the Iran file "normalized."  Missions 
raised the possibility of various activities (joint 
demarches, coordinated press statements, etc.) to put the DG 
on notice that absent a confession and implementation of 
confidence-building measures nothing will be normalized. 
Most thought that the work plan's usefulness would soon run 
out and it may be time to reassert the Board's authority in 
March.  Depending on the tone of the DG's report and action 
in New York, a Board resolution could lay down a marker that 
the work plan has failed to restore Board and UNSC confidence 
in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. 
 End Summary. 
 
Whither the Work Plan? 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) At our suggestion, Australian Ambassador Shannon 
called a meeting of like-minded COMs (P3 1, Australia, 
Canada, Japan) to take stock of the Iran file and 
expectations for the March Board.  Shannon had not received a 
readout of the DG's Tehran trip, but noted that ElBaradei 
seemed to have delivered familiar messages and set another in 
a "long string" of work plan deadlines.  Australian Msnoff 
assessed that despite some limited cooperation on work plan 
issues to date, it was clear that Iran was not being 
proactive on remaining issues:  there was no information 
beyond press reports that Iran had provided an explanation of 
contamination at the technical university; no access to the 
former PHRC director; and there was not yet any substantive 
discussion of the weaponization studies.  He also reported 
that the Iran PIV at Natanz in December resulted in 
"unimpressive" enrichment amounts and levels, which the 
Secretariat staff now attributes to technical problems rather 
 
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than politically motivated self-restraint on Iran's part. 
 
¶3. (C) Shannon expressed concern that in the same way that 
P1/P2 issues were swept under the carpet, disgruntled 
Safeguards staff expected the February report to use even 
vaguer language than that deployed in November.  Rather than 
"consistent" or "not inconsistent," the February DG report 
could resort to terms such as "plausible," "probable" or 
"likely" in assessing Iran's explanations. German Charge 
Kemmerling reported his understanding that Iran had provided 
extensive documentation on the contamination issue, which may 
give a "consistent" story but cannot be independently 
corroborated.  He also reported Berlin's understanding that 
an IAEA team will go to Iran to discuss remaining issues 
January 19. 
 
DG Got Little and Talks Too Much 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Schulte provided a readout of his January 
14 telcon with the DG on his Iran trip (ref a).  The 
Ambassador noted that the DG had not achieved any of the 
three goals he had set at the outset: a "confession" of the 
past nuclear program; implementation of the AP; and 
suspension or a "freeze-for-a freeze" (ref b) and only 
secured an apparently one-off visit to the new generation 
centrifuge facility.  UK Ambassador Smith reported that EXPO 
Director Cserveny downplayed the trip's accomplishments as: 
"if any, within the limited scope of the work plan." AccessQto the advance 
 
d centrifuge facility indicated a bit more 
transparency on Iran's part, according to Cserveny, but there 
was no engagement on suspension.  Iran was ready to talk but 
with no preconditions on suspension or the AP and conditioned 
AP implementation on returning the nuclear file from the UNSC 
to the IAEA.  Iran had made at least a minor concession in 
granting access to the advanced centrifuges, Shannon noted, 
and true to form, the DG achieved another prolongation of the 
process. 
 
¶5. (C) On next steps, Shannon reported unconfirmed rumors 
that the NAM triumvirate would ask for a technical briefing 
before the February report, but none of the like-minded COMs 
expressed an interest in such a briefing at this point. 
Shannon also took issue with the DG's continued "loose 
language," noting in particular, misleading statements that 
there is no evidence Iran has a nuclear weapons program.  He 
suggested that like-minded Missions raise this individually 
with ElBaradei. (Note: Speaking to "Al-Hayat," ElBaradei 
refers to DNI estimates on a timeframe for manufacturing 
fissionable material, were Iran to pursue a weapons program. 
In the same interview, the DG also cast himself as the 
intermediary between the P5 1 and Iran, rather than as 
Director General of the IAEA. End note.) Shannon was 
pessimistic about the prospects for P5 1 agreement on a UNSCR 
before the DG's report, which he cautioned could be a "dud." 
Ambassador Schulte confirmed that the goal was to adopt a 
UNSCR early in February before the report; it was a priority 
for the Security Council to reaffirm its engagement and the 
suspension requirement.  The Germans also confirmed that FM 
Steinmeier would meet with ElBaradei on January 17 in order 
to report to his counterparts at the anticipated Berlin 
Ministerial next week. 
 
Not Guilty Verdict? 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire queried why 
the DG had gone to Tehran in the first place?  He could not 
hold out any hope on suspension and heard nothing new, so it 
was apparent that his sole focus was the work plan, she 
surmised.  The DG had put his credibility on the line, having 
described the work plan as a "final chance" and a "litmus 
test," and now faced a critical moment at the March Board. 
He needed a conclusion to this, and if the work plan fails, 
he's fresh out of ideas.  Kemmerling shared this assessment, 
noting that it would have been a "miracle" if the DG had made 
any headway on suspension.  In light of the Supreme Leader's 
denial that Iran ever had a nuclear weapons program, he 
doubted that lower levels of the Iranian bureaucracy would be 
likely to proffer a "confession" under the work plan. 
 
¶7.  (C) Japanese Ambassador Amano agreed that the DG had 
failed on all three of his objectives for the trip, and 
seemed to place his hopes in a future "confession" within 
four weeks.  Amano considered the prospect that the DG could 
pronounce Iran "confessed to being not guilty" at the 
conclusion of the work plan.   Ambassador Schulte observed 
that the DG must be reminded of our expectations that Iran be 
held to a high standard and that his credibility is at stake. 
 Regarding the key issue of weaponization studies, Iran must 
admit and explain the genesis and purpose of the studies; 
thus any pronouncement of "not guilty" cannot be adequate, he 
opined. 
 
Moving Beyond the Work Plan 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Shannon underscored the need to expand the rhetoric 
beyond the work plan in order to reassert Chapter VII UNSCRs 
and to restore the confidence of the international community 
by addressing present, not just past, issues.  He argued that 
the usefulness of the work plan would soon run out.  UK 
Ambassador Smith agreed that the Board must re-shift the 
focus to the wider context, including suspension and the AP. 
He cautioned against loading too much on the work plan as the 
"litmus test" given an inherent risk that the DG could 
present the work plan as "done."  It was not clear whether 
the DG would report the same level of dissatisfaction with 
Iranian cooperation as in previous reports.  Smith recalled 
the DG's tone and lack of conviction in his London meetings 
last week (ref c); the DG lectured on how the P5 1 had gone 
wrong and how we "must be kidding ourselves" on suspension. 
Smith also suggested that we could leverage disgruntlement 
within the Secretariat and express our unhappiness with 
Iran's responses.  Shannon suggested that we should encourage 
the DG to repeat his admonition that the IAEA's knowledge of 
Iran's nuclear program is diminishing. 
 
Reasserting Board Authority 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) French Charge Gross was even more skeptical of the 
Secretariat's intentions.  He recalled the P3 1 demarches on 
 
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the DG in August warned that the work plan could not result 
in the "normalization" of the Iran file.  He saw a failure of 
credibility and duplicity on the part of the Secretariat in 
the letters sent to Iran after the November Board that so 
diverged from the language in the DG report.  Gross recounted 
that Cserveny had warned him "you cannot challenge what we 
say, or you will break the machine."  He advised a demarche 
in Board member capitals prior to the Board that 
"normalization" via the work plan is not acceptable and 
asserting the importance of suspension, Code 3.1, the AP and 
the nine Board resolutions on Iran.  Gross also suggest 
coordinating public statements regarding our concerns and 
offered to develop language.  Smith expressed concern about 
NAM activism on the Iran file and pressure for normalization. 
 UK Msnoff observed Iran could not be considered a "routine" 
case because its implementation of Code 3.1. is a clear 
breach of its safeguards obligations. 
 
¶10.  (C) Gross suggested that if developments in New York 
allow it may be time for a Board resolution.  Shannon noted 
that "normalization" would mean no more special reports to 
the Board and that a resolution should set a requirement for 
DG reports.  Amano responded that since the Board reported 
the Iran file to the UNSC, the DG must report to the Board 
and Iran must remain on the agenda so long as it remains 
under a UNSCR.  He advised that only the UNSC could return 
Iran's file to the Board.  Absent this, the Board cannot 
declare Iran a "routine" matter. 
 
¶11. (C) Gervais-Vidricaire advised that the Board will need 
to pronounce itself on the results of the work plan and she 
fully expected a nuanced report.  Shannon questioned whether 
it was time to pressure the DG to put an end to the work plan 
process.  DCM recalled that the work plan had been nothing 
but trouble since August, buying Iran time, and it may well 
be time to put an end to it.  Ambassador Schulte agreed that 
the Board must reassert its authority over the DG who needs 
to be reminded that he represents the Board.  He did not rule 
out a resolution noting that in March it will be over two 
years since the last Board resolution and that the 
composition of the Board is more auspicious than in the past. 
 
¶12. (S) Comment:  Very clearly, none of our like minded 
friends, not even the Germans, had any expectation that Iran 
would comply with the terms on the UNSCRs or the work plan 
before the March Board.  There was also fear that ElBaradei 
will report to the Board that there are no more outstanding 
issues with little justification.  We and the UK find it hard 
to believe he could close the weaponization issues without a 
confession, but do not discount it.  Counterbalancing 
ElBaradei's clear desire to "normalize" the Iranian issue, 
his credibility is at stake, and he knows it, particularly if 
inspectors are grumbling about his closing issues for 
political reasons; therefore, neither can we discount a 
statement from him that while the deadlines have not been 
met, the work plan remains unfinished and open questions 
remain on the list.  Given Iranian statements that the new 
deadline to finish the work plan is not "four weeks" but "40 
days" or "March" sometime, another likely outcome is simply 
another new deadline, sometime after the March 3-7 Board. 
That would make it extremely difficult to garner broad 
support for a BOG resolution declaring the work plan dead. 
As further information emerges from the Secretariat on the 
handling of the contamination issue and on the Iranian 
responses to the weaponization issues, we will firm up our 
coordinated activities with this group, while focusing on 
steps to keep pressure on the DG, including to comply with 
his self-imposed "four-week" deadline. 
 
SCHULTE