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O 141502Z JAN 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7390
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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2018 
TAGS: KNPP IAEA PARM AORC IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: ELBARADEI SEES PROGRESS FROM TEHRAN TRIP 
 
REF: UNVIE 0006 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d, h 
 
 1.(C) Summary: DG ElBaradei told the Ambassador January 14 
that his weekend discussions in Tehran resulted in progress 
and agreement to resolve all outstanding issues within four 
weeks.  The Iranians provided information on new generation 
centrifuges and allowed him to visit the P2 R&D facility.  He 
reported that Supreme Leader Khameni acknowledged the 
importance of AP implementation (if the nuclear file is moved 
back to the IAEA) but denied any military nuclear program, 
past or present.  ElBaradei saw no movement on suspension. 
He described the Iranian leadership as open to negotiations, 
even suggesting that we expand U.S.-Iran-Iraq talks to 
include the nuclear issue, but also deeply suspicious of the 
West.  ElBaradei also observed that a UNSCR prior to the 
March elections could strengthen hard-liners in Iran. 
Separately, the German Ambassador told us that FM Steinmeier 
is expected to meet with ElBaradei January 16-17 and will 
provide his P5 1 counterparts a readout prior to next week's 
meeting in Berlin.  IAEA public comment on the Tehran visit 
was restrained.  Full text of the IAEA press statement is in 
para 9.  End Summary 
 
 
ElBaradei Sees Progress 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a January 14 telcon with Ambassador Schulte, 
ElBaradei reported progress on outstanding issues and advised 
that the contamination issue was basically done.  The 
Iranians agreed to address, over the next four weeks, 
military-related issues, including the weaponization studies, 
PHRC and Gachin mine.  When asked about FM Mottaki's public 
statements postulating a March finish date, the DG confirmed 
the four-week timeframe, though he was very tentative in 
calling it a "deadline."  ElBaradei described Iran as "more 
transparent" and reported that, "in a good step," he and 
Safeguards DDG Heinonen were allowed access to an R&D 
facility for new generation centrifuges.  According to the 
DG, this was a new facility, not previously visited by the 
IAEA.  (Note: We will confirm this with Heinonen.)  It was 
small-scale, containing computers, equipment and rotors, and 
there was mechanical testing underway.  The DG offered a 
personal assessment that Iran would not undertake industrial 
scale enrichment (i.e. beyond 3000 centrifuges) until new 
generation centrifuges were ready. 
 
¶3. (C) The DG told Ambassador Schulte that he pushed his 
Iranian interlocutors on provisional implementation of the 
Additional Protocol, and argued for suspension or a 
"freeze-for-a-freeze."  Supreme Leader Khameni accepted the 
importance of the AP but said that it would only be applied 
if Iran's nuclear file were returned from the UNSC to the 
IAEA.  ElBaradei assessed that progress on the AP was 
"conceivable" but there was no indication of any movement on 
suspension, which he attributed to a fundamental lack of 
trust. 
 
¶4. (C) Overall, ElBaradei found the Iranian leadership open 
to negotiations, even offering to expand U.S.-Iran-Iraq talks 
to include the nuclear issue.  He described Ayatollah Khameni 
as affable and well-briefed but suspicious of U.S. and 
Western motivations and readiness to conduct serious 
negotiations.  The Supreme Leader insisted that Iran never 
had a weapons program.  President Ahmadinejad was not at the 
meeting with Khameni, but ElBaradei saw no difference in 
their positions. 
 
¶5. (C) ElBaradei also observed that the March 6 election 
would improve the internal situation in Iran with the 
expected election of a centrist Parliament.  Unnamed "highly 
influential people" in Iran cautioned that a UNSC resolution 
in advance of the election would only strengthen the hand of 
the hard-liners.  (Comment: ElBaradei continues to put much 
emphasis on internal political divisions in Iran.) 
 
Steinmeier to Vienna 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald advised DCM that Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier will be in Vienna January 
16-17 for meetings with ElBaradei and his team.  Steinmeier 
is making this visit in order to be able to report first hand 
on ElBaradei's trip to P5 counterparts at the meeting the 
Germans are expecting to host the week following in Berlin. 
 
 
Public Line Muted 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) IAEA public comment on Iran was limited.  The DG's 
only interaction with the press while in Tehran was after 
meeting with AEOI Director Aghazadeh on Friday.  ElBaradei 
was reported as saying that they discussed accelerating the 
pace of cooperation to clarify all outstanding issues before 
his March report to the Board.  He reportedly described the 
talks as "frank and friendly" and asked for maximum 
transparency and assurances to clarify past and present 
issues.  He hoped this would "provide an atmosphere to 
overcome the standoff between the P5 1 and Iran."   An IAEA 
press statement issued upon the DG's return noted two 
developments: agreement on the four-week timeline for work 
plan implementation and information provided by Iran 
regarding new generation centrifuges.  The statement also 
mentions discussion of AP implementation and other confidence 
building measures called for by the Security Council (full 
text in para 9).  The Spokesperson's office indicted that 
there would not be further information. 
 
 
¶8. (C) DCM spoke January 14 with IAEA spokeswoman Melissa 
Fleming, who confirmed that the Agency was working very hard 
to minimize public comment beyond the January 13 statement. 
Asked about the statement's reference to information on new 
generation centrifuges, she indicated that Heinonen had 
gotten "lots of detail" and was able to "see one of them." 
She added that the Iranians had passed information in a 
separate Heinonen meeting, not in discussions with ElBaradei. 
 She conceded that Heinonen had been skeptical (as he was 
with us) about this recent trip, but noted EXPO Director 
Cserveny (who also made the trip) was very upbeat about 
prospects for resolving the outstanding issues. 
 
¶9. (U) Text of IAEA press statement: 
 
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, accompanied by 
Mr. Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General for Safeguards and 
Mr. Vilmos Cserveny, Director for External Relations and 
Policy Coordination, visited Teheran from January 11 to 12, 
¶2008. 
 
During meetings with senior officials, that included meetings 
with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni and President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, discussions took place on ways and means 
to accelerate implementation of safeguards in Iran as well as 
additional confidence building measures.  While progress in 
the implementation of the work plan agreed between the IAEA 
Secretariat and Iran in August 2007 was noted, an agreement 
 
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was reached on the time-line for implementation of all the 
remaining verification issues specified in the work plan. 
According to the agreed schedule implementation of the work 
plan should be complete in the next four weeks. 
 
During the visit discussion also took place on the importance 
of the implementation of the Additional Protocol as well as 
on other confidence building measures called for by the 
Security Council.  Furthermore, Iran also provided 
information on its research and development activities on a 
new generation of centrifuges. 
 
End text. 
SCHULTE