VZCZCXRO2885
RR RUEHLMC RUEHVK
DE RUEHUM #0002/01 0020640
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020640Z JAN 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1773
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3104
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2034
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0031
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0073
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0032
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5915
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 1584
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0240
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2800
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1670
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0553
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0212
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0418
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 0204
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0061
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ULAANBAATAR 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM, EB/ESC, AND EB/IFD/OIA 
STATE PASS USTR, USGS, DOC/ITA, EXIM, OPIC, AND EPA 
STATE PASS AID/ANE D. WINSTON 
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC FOR F.REID 
TREASURY PASS USEDS TO IMF, WORLD BANK 
MANILA AND LONDON FOR USEDS TO ADB, EBRD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EMIN PREL ELTN ETRD MG
SUBJECT: Mongolia's Coal: Dispelling That Old Black Magic 
 
Ref: a)Ulaanbaatar 712, b)Ulaanbaatar 652 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. A few Mongolian officials claim that Mongolia's 
coal deposits stretch west to east in an unbroken (and 
unsubstantiated) 170-billion ton belt of untapped hydrocarbon 
wonder.  However, Western firms actively prospecting for both 
thermal and coking coal argue that Mongolia's coal reserves, while 
respectable, are deposed in discrete basins rather than a titanic 
belt. But there are some major nuggets among these deposits, such as 
the exceedingly fine and well-situated six billion ton coking and 
thermal coal Tavan Tolgoi (TT) deposit near the Mongolia-China 
border, for example.  Moreover, no matter the size of the deposits, 
companies warn that coal is only valuable if, and only if, it can be 
brought to a market economically, which in Mongolia's case must be 
China.  What makes some Mongolian coal marketable is its high 
quality, good location, and fit with the needs of Chinese and 
regional demand. The key point is that Mongolian coal offsets demand 
elsewhere in China and Asia, making it a very fungible asset. This 
market-driven truth has led most of those exploring Mongolia's coal 
reserves to concentrate their exploration investments in the Gobi 
desert coal reserves bordering China.  Firms remain highly critical 
of the Government of Mongolia's (GOM) tendency, in recent years, to 
sometimes be arbitrary, un-transparent, or inconsistent with respect 
to the implementation of its mining laws. END SUMMARY. 
 
A Rhapsody in Black 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Experts say Mongolia has lots of coal, some exceedingly 
fine and well-situated: The six billion ton coking and thermal coal 
Tavan Tolgoi (TT)deposit near the Mongolia-China border comes to 
mind.  However, hard-nosed questions about the nature, quality, 
size, and marketability of Mongolia's deposits remain unanswered. No 
matter, a few in the GOM rhapsodized about its titanic reserves, 
officially claiming that a vast, wide belt of at least 170-billion 
exquisite tons of coking and high-Btu thermal coal stretches from 
the Altai Mountains in the west to the south eastern wastes of the 
Gobi desert.  Add to these deposits substantial coal reserves in the 
eastern steppe provinces..  However, in their private moments many 
GOM officials concede that they really do not know how much they 
have or much about its quality-let alone how it might be mined and 
marketed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) (Note: During a recent meeting with executives from U.S. 
coal miner Peabody Energy, a senior Mongolian official noted that 
everyone was enthusing about Mongolia's wonderful coal reserves. 
The official recounted how the former Minister of Industry and Trade 
¶B. Jargalsaikhan told him that Mongolia had over 170 billion metric 
tons of coal.  "Really? So much?" said the official.  Then 
Jargalsaikhan hesitated -- well, perhaps, more like 100 billion 
tons, may be less.  It seemed, noted the official, "that 
Jargalsaikhan wanted to negotiate the amount of coal in the ground, 
but the truth is that we really don't know how much we have got." 
For reference and comparison, the Department of Energy's 
International Energy Outlook 2007 report put the world's recoverable 
coal reserves estimate at 998 billion tons, including U.S. reserves 
of 207 billion tons. End Note.) 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000002  002 OF 006 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) What is known is not discouraging, however.  All but two of 
Mongolia's 21 provinces have coal deposits, which locals mine.  As 
to the actual amount in the ground, it might be the fabled 170 
billion tons, but in any case conservative estimates based on the 
activities of western exploration firms and current coal miners 
suggest that proven or inferred coal resources currently reach some 
15 billion tons. While most western miners privately tell us they 
believe that actual deposits are substantially higher.  While these 
miners say the 170 billion ton figure is not out of the ballpark, 
they are unwilling to go on record beyond what their respective 
assessments have revealed.   Most of Mongolia's deposits are "brown" 
(brown meaning dirty, high-sulfur), low thermal value coal, which 
can be economically mined and shipped short distances for winter 
heat. Basically, Mongolia's known coal deposits range from dirty, 
high-sulfur, low (3,000-5,000) Btu coal to fine thermal and coking 
(metallurgical) coals of 7,000 Btu and above. Approximately four out 
of approximately eight million tons of brown coal annually produced 
from local mines goes to domestic use, the remaining four million 
tons is exported, primarily from mines located in Omengobi province 
near the China-Mongolia border (Little Tavan Tolgoi, see ref; and 
Naran Sukhat). About half of domestic production, most of which 
powers Ulaanbaatar and its satellites, the state-owned copper mine 
at Erdenet, and the city of Darkhan, comes from two mines, 
Sharyn-Gol and Baganuur, both privately held but with substantial 
GOM interaction. Incidentally, both mines are part of discrete coal 
basins that fall well out of the fabled coal belt. 
 
They're Dreaming of a Black Christmas 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Coal's ubiquity has led GOM boosters to latch on to the 
notion of a coal belt.  GOM mining experts have discreetly explained 
that in an effort to promote Mongolia and, out of willful ignorance, 
their appointed colleagues as well as some politicians, have assumed 
and asserted that the presence of coal in most provinces reflects a 
certain sort of deposition of the resource in Mongolia. 
Specifically, because it's everywhere in Mongolia, they surmise that 
coal must have been laid down in one monstrous slab during a single 
geological epoch, and that this hydrocarbon mother-load must be of 
the best quality -- good enough quality to make companies throw 
economic realities to the wind and strike any sort deal the GOM 
demands. 
 
¶6. (SBU) One concept, broached before industry by former Ministers 
of Industry and Trade Jargalsaikhan and Davaadorj respectively, had 
the GOM reclaiming (expropriating?) many of the coal exploration and 
mining rights, consolidating these tenements into lots, and 
tendering those lots to strategic investors, who would join with the 
GOM in joint venture companies in which the GOM maintained majority 
positions. That now largely discredited breath-stealing vision -- 
requiring a large investment in a small piece of a very big pie -- 
would see mining conducted along the entire length of the coal belt 
to the tune of one (1) billion tons a year, with western, Chinese, 
Russian, Korean, and Japanese firm each tending their own gardens of 
coal, with their respective state-owned Mongolian JVC.  This vision 
was proffered without reference to the lack of infrastructure in the 
coal-bearing regions, the quality of coal in each region along the 
so called belt, the economics of getting to a viable market, or any 
other consideration that should attend embarking on such ventures. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000002  003 OF 006 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) These ministers have gone, but their concepts persist in a 
somewhat less-fevered incarnation. They certainly inform the model 
the GOM is considering for Tavan Tolgoi.  According to the new 
Minister of Industry and Trade Narankhuu, the new government has 
already begun steps to take back the privately held TT licenses 
(reftel) in preparation for GOM exploitation of TT in some sort of 
JVC arrangement with a private strategic investor (and maybe 
operator) expert in coal mining. 
 
We Won't Dance, GOM, With You 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Publicly, the local and foreign mining industry has 
responded coolly to the coal belt concept, reserving most of their 
heat for promoting their respective prospects.  There is no question 
that firms from all over the world of various sizes are actively 
exploring Mongolia--from smallish Mongolian, Canadian and Hong Kong 
juniors with small market caps, to huge private and state-owned 
giants-BHP Billiton (BHPB), Rio Tinto (RT,) Peabody Energy, Chinese 
SOE Shenhua, and the Russian public-private consortium of Renova, 
Severstal, and Basic Element. Beyond expressing interest in 
developing Mongolia's large deposits in concert with the GOM, the 
major players keep their own counsel about what the GOM does and 
says.  The smaller players, fearing that GOM talk of re-claiming or 
expropriating coal licenses will drive share prices down, focus on 
the prospective size of their respective holdings and the possible 
markets for them. 
 
¶9. (SBU) For example, the Mongolian Energy Corporation (MEC) is 
listed on the Hang Seng Index, and is primarily owned by a shadowy 
set of Hong Kong and Chinese investors out of Urumqi, Xinjiang. 
Prior to the listing, the primary shareholders announced that their 
exploration site in Khovd Province was situated on over a billion 
tons of high quality coking and thermal coals, or so they claimed 
they had been told by the Mongolians who sold the tenement to them. 
 This initial public enthusiasm has cooled, following the hiring of 
an American team to manage exploration and mining operations.  The 
American team down-graded the deposit to about 200 million tons of 
low-end coking coal, which the Chinese steel industry could use, 
though the Americans note that western steel firms would reject it 
in foundry operations. Although MEC's owners plan to mine no later 
than summer 2008, the American managers have told us that 2009 is 
more likely, but they're hardly sanguine, noting that the decision 
to mine still has to overcome such issues as lack of roads and rail, 
water supply, power generation, and the fact the coal is perhaps too 
far (over 500 km) from any viable market to be economically shipped. 
RT, which also has a coking and thermal coal prospect deposed a 
discrete basin in a remote northern corner of the western province 
of Gobi-Altai, shares MEC's concerns about lack of infrastructure, 
transport costs, and marketing. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Technical specialists at a Canadian firm, South Gobi 
Energy resources (SGER), also echo the MEC Americans' conservative 
view. SGER was spun off by Canadian Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia Inc 
(IMMI) to serve as an operations, management, development, 
exploration company for IMMI's coal holdings in Mongolia. Relative 
to other coal exploration firms, SGER has the single largest holding 
of exploration rights for Mongolian coal prospects. SGER possess 54 
exploration tenements. All located in Omengobi province, these 
holdings cover some 2.2 million hectares, and currently cost SGER 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000002  004 OF 006 
 
 
some US$4.4 million a year in fees and exploration costs. (Note: 
IMMI also holds controlling interest in the giant Oyu Tolgoi 
copper-gold project. Rio Tinto is IMMI's partner in this venture. 
BHPB is a minority partner in SGER.) 
 
¶11. (SBU) SGER has rejected GOM claims about a coal belt. Combining 
Soviet-era data with their own studies, SGER concluded that 
Mongolia's best thermal and coking coal deposits were in the South 
Gobi, particularly in Omengobi Province. They believe that the South 
Gobi has world class deposits rivaling in quality and quantity 
similar deposits found any where else; and so, have focused on that 
region exclusively.  Because they can find no evidence for its 
existence, SGER experts reject the notion of a "coal belt;" rather, 
arguing for a series of discrete basins separated from each other 
geographically and geologically. This conclusion is shared by every 
professional miner with whom we have spoken, including experts from 
RT, BHPB, Peabody, and the American management team at MEC, as well 
as other Canadian firms actively exploring Mongolian coal and GOM 
sources from the Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of 
Mongolia (MRPAM). 
 
¶12. (SBU) But the situation presents something of a conundrum for 
SGER and others exploring for coal. Many of SGER's exploration 
rights lie along the supposed "coal belt," but SGER doesn't believe 
such a feature exists.  However, not wanting to lose a potential 
mother-load, SGER will conduct drilling throughout these holdings 
over the next three years to ascertain just what might be present. 
In most cases no previous data for coal exists on these holdings, 
which were explored for metals but not coal.  If nothing shows up on 
drill cores, the tenements will be relinquished.  SGER anticipates 
spending US$10 million over the next three years. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Cold economics also drives SGER's Gobi fixation. SGER 
knows about MEC and RT's respective prospects but asserts that 
market forces render both of these and any other western coal 
deposits long shots at best.  For SGER, Gobi coal-and Gobi coal 
alone-is commercial because it is close to a market - China. Based 
on this concept, SGER has recently converted an exploration license 
on its Ovuut Tolgoi prospect, in south western Omengobi province, to 
a mining license.  Ovuut Tolgoi has some 150 million tons of thermal 
and coking coal, with 100 million tons economically recoverable 
through opencast operations. For SGER economically recoverable means 
that the firm will derive a minimum return of 10% for each dollar of 
coal mined, washed, and exported.  The plan is to wash the coal in a 
facility that will cost between US$50 to $100 million depending on 
the volume of coal to be processed. SGER forecasts annual production 
to peak at approximately 5 million tons. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The target market for Ovuut Tolgoi's coal is China's north 
central region, primarily but not limited to the provinces of Gansu 
and Inner Mongolia. SGER argues that it cannot economically ship 
thermal coal from Mongolia to Chinese markets more than 500KM from 
the mine.  Coking coal can be economically sent to Japan (or any 
other global location for that matter) from Ovuut Tolgoi, but SGER 
will have to mine thermal seams for 5-7 years before reaching the 
coke seams; and so, must consider China for its thermal coal. 
Although the Chinese border provinces have vast thermal coal 
reserves, much of this coal needs to go south to meet PRC planning 
requirements, leaving Inner Mongolia and other North central 
industrial regions with a coal deficit.  Mongolian coal, therefore, 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000002  005 OF 006 
 
 
fits into PRC develop plans.  42 km from the Chinese-Mongolian 
border, Ovuut Tolgoi will have a rail link built to it that can feed 
into Gansu's Jiayuguan industrial complex and Inner Mongolia's 
Hohhot and Baotou industrial centers. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Peabody Energy shares SGER's Gobi focus, and is primarily 
seeking exploration and mining rights on deposits within 300 km of 
the Chinese provinces that border Mongolian provinces.  Although 
Mongolia does have substantial deposits of coal outside of the Gobi 
and in certain border provinces, so far exploration has shown these 
deposits as low to middle quality thermal coal, which cannot be 
shipped profitably to any international market.  Current holders of 
rights in Mongolia's central provinces, among them the Canadian 
junior exploration firm Redhill Energy Ltd., talk of mining coal for 
export to Russia, or for domestic consumption, or for conversion to 
liquids or fuels.  But Peabody, SGER, and the MEC American team 
dismiss such possibilities. Russia with its own substantial coal, 
hydro, and petroleum reserves-along with a power generation 
infrastructure-is not a customer for Mongolian thermal coal but a 
competitor, although it could be an investor as well. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Coal to liquids (CTL) or coal to fuels (CTF) might be 
possible but transport costs still apply as do economies of scale, 
which may not exist for CTL/CTF in Mongolia.  Peabody, with its 
experience as a power generator, certainly considers converting 
Mongolian coal to electricity a viable option but notes that doing 
so is a long way off, and believes that generating electricity from 
mine mouth power plant should be done from border provinces because 
of lower infrastructure development costs entailed in establishing 
power grids linked to China. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Japan' is also a driver in the overall development of 
Mongolian coal. Japanese foundries need coking coal badly and are 
talking with SGER (and other Gobi coal deposit holders as well) 
regarding Ovuut Tolgoi and SGER's other prospects.  Unnamed Japanese 
investors would acquire Ovuut Tolgoi and send it into China, 
swapping it for coking coal produced nearer to China's coast.  As 
coking coal is worth more than thermal coal, Japan would pay a cash 
premium to offset the added value of the coke. No decision has been 
reached yet.  But the key point is that Mongolian coal offsets 
demand elsewhere in China and Asia, making it a very fungible 
asset. 
 
Let's Misbehave! 
---------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) SGER states that the central government -- not provincial 
or local governments -- prevent Ovuut Tolgoi's start-up. First, the 
Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (MRPAM) must 
approve the mining plan before activity can begin; however, MRPAM 
has set out no process for doing this; and so, seems to have a wide 
discretion over how a mine might be run.  There are as yet no 
regulations, standards, guidelines, etc., for SGER to follow, and 
SGER is concerned that MRPAM might very well apply some socialist 
era model of mining production to a 21st Century commercial 
activity.  So having a mining license does not mean that one can 
mine; rather, it means that one can proceed on to another permitting 
phase. 
 
¶19. (SBU) However, another Canadian coal junior, QGX has had a 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000002  006 OF 006 
 
 
somewhat different experience.  QGX's prospect is located slightly 
north and west of TT, and holds in excess of 500 million tons of 
high quality thermal and coking coal, which has attracted the 
interest of several U.S. equity investment firms, among them Oaktree 
Capital.  However, QGX's ability to access its rights have been 
muddied by the local soum's (county) surprise re-categorizing a 
large swath of the exploration tenement as special use area.  There 
is no legal basis for this claim, according to QGX, especially as 
the soum is asserting the right quite late in the game.  QGX 
believes that the local is using its special use powers to attempt 
to extract some extra legal payment and plans to go to court. 
However, as reported in post's 2008 Investment Climate Statement, 
the arbitrary taking may stick as the neither the courts nor the 
central government may be willing to support QGX's recourse to the 
law. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Another problem is how the GOM registers coal resources. 
SGER says that it can economically recover coal in seams as thin as 
a third of meter; however, the GOM, using a Soviet-era calculus 
based on outmoded technology states that a seam must be two meters 
wide or more to be considered recoverable.  This ruling has lead to 
SGER, which claims that other firms do the same, to file two sets of 
resource estimates.  One estimate consistent with Canadian 
requirements is higher than the one prepared for the GOM, which 
requires that the firm explain the discrepancy to investors who are 
given both sets of estimates. 
 
Minton 
 
 
 
 
10