VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNT #0005/01 0021048
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021048Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8988
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USOSCE FOR ELIZABETH KAUFMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM OSCE UZ
SUBJECT: ODIHR LIMITED OBSERVER MISSION TO UZBEKISTAN WAS 
"WORTHWHILE" 
 
REF: A. TASHKENT 2115 
 
     ¶B. TASHKENT 2179 
 
Classified By: Poloff Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
(U) Corrected copy. Correction is in paragraph 3. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On December 26 Ambassador and DCM had an 
outbrief with Ambassador Walter Siegl, who headed the OSCE's 
 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
limited election observer mission for the Presidential 
elections in Uzbekistan.  Siegl reported that, although the 
complete picture of the elections was not observable, the 
ODIHR election mission "was worthwhile and we gained 
insights."  In a December 26 meeting between Siegl and MFA's 
Chief of International Organizations Section Durbek Amanov, 
the GOU objected to several points cited in ODIHR's official 
press release about the elections, which ODIHR will consider 
in its final report.  First Deputy FM Nematov elaborated on 
this in a December 27 meeting with the Ambassador.  Siegl 
noted that the GOU did not offer sufficient access to the 
Central Election Commission (CEC) and its subordinate 
offices, making it impossible to trace votes from the ballot 
box to the final tabulations.  He hopes commonly observed 
irregularities, such as heads of household casting ballots 
for entire families, can be raised with the GOU "at the 
appropriate time."  The final report will have "a political 
direction" in order to encourage dialogue and not slam the 
door shut on future elections cooperation with Uzbekistan. 
The press release was tougher than we expected.  The key 
questions are whether the Karimov regime brushes off 
criticism of its faulty election and relaxes in the wake of 
its victory, or whether it will take away something 
constructive from the criticism and implement election 
reforms before the scheduled 2009 Parliamentary elections, or 
whether it will just lash out at OSCE and/or others who were 
publicly critical of the election.  End summary. 
 
A Worthwhile Endeavor 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador and DCM met with Ambassador Siegl in 
Tashkent on December 26 to recap the limited election 
observer mission and discuss its initial findings.  Siegl 
said that, although the complete picture of the elections was 
not observable, the effort was "worthwhile, and we gained 
insights."  The final report will also be limited in scope, 
but Siegl noted it will be necessary to restate that 
Uzbekistan has not implemented ODIHR's recommendations from 
the 2004 elections unless the GOU can demonstrate otherwise. 
 
GOU Rebuttal 
------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Siegl also met on December 26 with MFA's Chief of 
International Organizations Section Amanov, who 
diplomatically presented the GOU's objections to several 
points highlighted in the December 24 ODIHR press release. 
The GOU insists that it has "completely" implemented the 
ODIHR recommendations that followed the 2004 Parliamentary 
elections and will provide specific written documentation of 
this, which Siegl will happily consider before issuing the 
final report.  Amanov also disputed assessments of the 
noncompetitive nature of the campaign, and explained that it 
is inconsistent with Uzbek cultural traditions "to get at 
each others' throats."  Amanov told Siegl that, unlike in 
some western countries, Uzbekistan does not want smear 
campaigns.  Concerning the candidates' public support for 
their incumbent opponent, Amanov stressed that "their 
opinions were close" because it is difficult to object to 
programs that "further the good of the country." 
 
¶4. (C) Amanov also gently pointed out to Siegl that the ODIHR 
team was the only observer mission that presented criticisms 
of the Presidential elections.  In contrast, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), select bilateral observers, and numerous 
GOU-invited individual observers had positive assessments of 
the elections.  The state-controlled media has, for the most 
part, made no mention of the ODIHR observation findings; 
although, in one website article (http://gzt.uz/rus/politika) 
the Director of the pro-government National Press Center 
rebuffed OSCE's criticism and accused the organization of 
remaining silent about "leading geopolitical players" 
interfering with the internal affairs of Central Asian states 
during elections.  (See reftel B for more about media 
coverage of the elections.) 
 
¶5. (C) Deputy FM Nematov elaborated on Amanov's objections in 
 
a December 27 meeting with the Ambassador.  Nematov stressed 
that the GOU did not agree with any of ODIHR's findings, and 
found it "paradoxical" out of all the international observers 
present, "only" OSCE found cause for concern.  This reflected 
OSCE's "double standard," Nematov said.  The Ambassador noted 
that U.S. Embassy observers had also spotted irregularities, 
including lack of transparency in the central vote count, but 
that our fundamental concerns centered less on the procedural 
aspects of voting day and more on the lack of genuine choices 
and debate in the overall campaign.  Nematov asserted that 
OSCE's statement had been prepared well in advance of voting 
day, and the ODIHR team had simply mouthed what was expected 
of it.  He claimed there had been genuine debate, and that 
unanimous lines between the various candidates simply 
reflected (as Amanov said) everyone's view that Karimov's 
programs had been good for the country.  However, when 
pressed, Nematov agreed that the door to OSCE would be kept 
open for a dialogue on election procedures ("as long as there 
are no double standards.") 
 
 
Mysterious Tabulations 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Siegl said the ODIHR team documented numerous 
instances in which one individual signed the registry 
multiple times, generally for family members at the same 
address.  He listened attentively to our accounts of emboffs 
separately witnessing multiple voting as a standard operating 
procedure, and hopes that this issue will be raised with the 
GOU "at the appropriate time."  However, his chief complaint 
was that the GOU provided insufficient access to the Central 
Election Commission and its subordinate offices, particularly 
with regard to computerized registries and voting records. 
The restricted access meant that it was simply not possible 
to trace a given vote from the polling station ballot box to 
the centrally-compiled tabulations.  This was not transparent 
and there was no way to compare final statistics with voter 
registries.  The ODIHR observers were also unable to 
continually track the ballots and individual polling 
stations' protocols in tabulating the votes, as they were 
transported from polling stations to the district center. 
 
Report Won't Slam the Door Shut 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Although there were numerous -- and unsurprising -- 
irregularities, Siegl said that he wants to give the final 
report "a political direction".  He does not want to "slam 
the door shut on Uzbekistan" entirely and will note positive 
elements such as the presence of a woman and a non-partisan 
candidate on the ballot.  He added that, just as it was 
important for his team to arrive without preconceived notions 
about Uzbekistan's past, "so it is important not to harbor 
preconceived notions about the future." 
 
OSCE/ODIHR Follow-Up? 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Asked if there is some process in place by which ODIHR 
can follow up its proposed recommendations to the GOU, 
particularly in the run-up to the scheduled Parliamentary 
elections in 2009, Siegl said it was likely that the Uzbek 
representative to the OSCE in Vienna would be queried 
informally about GOU reaction to ODIHR's recommendations. 
Emboffs also made the point to Siegl that a key political 
reform would be easing up the requirements for political 
parties/movements to register and then registering them, 
permitting them to field candidates in the 2009 parliamentary 
elections. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Although Siegl wants to keep the door open for future 
dialogue and engagement with the GOU on elections, the ODIHR 
press release was tougher than we expected based on initial 
conversations with the ODIHR team (reftel A).  The GOU may 
hope that the elections will quickly fade from the West's 
critical memory during the holidays, but the final ODIHR 
report will be issued in mid-January when interest may be 
rekindled.  A key question is whether the Karimov regime, 
secure in victory, will brush off criticism, learn from it 
and continue reengagement, or take offense to the criticism, 
sulk, and lash out at the critics. 
 
NORLAND