VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6686 0222233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 222230Z JAN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000

UNCLAS STATE 006686 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CTR PARM PREL RS
SUBJECT: APPLICATION OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA CTR AND MPC&A 
AGREEMENTS TO  DOE,S SLD AND RTR PROGRAMS 
 
REF: 04 STATE 239807 
 
 ¶1. This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 3. 
Reference B is a letter dated January 23, 2003 (sic 2004) 
from V. Kuchinov, director of MINATOM's Department for 
International and Foreign Economic Cooperation to David 
Huizenga, (DOE/NNSA). 
 
¶2.    BACKGROUND:  By diplomatic note transmitted to Post per 
Reference A, the USG requested that the Government of Russia 
(GOR) confirm the application of the U.S.-Russia Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) Umbrella Agreement and Materials 
Protection Control & Accounting (MPC&A) Agreement to three 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security 
Administration programs:  Second Line of Defense (SLD), 
Materials Consolidation and Conversion (MCC), and 
Radiological Threat Reduction (RTR).  The GOR has not 
responded formally to the USG proposals. Informally, the 
GOR,s Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom; now the Federal 
Atomic Energy Agency, or Rosatom) advised DOE that while the 
SLD and RTR proposals were generally acceptable, the USG 
proposal concerning MCC was unacceptable.  More recently, in 
February 2007 the USG proposed a separate U.S.-Russia 
agreement for the MCC program (Reference B); and Rosatom 
indicated in April 2007 to DOE,s Moscow office that 
re-submission of the 2004 USG requests concerning SLD and 
RTR, without the proposal to bring MCC under the CTR and 
MPC&A Agreements, would facilitate approval within the GOR of 
the USG,s proposals concerning SLD and RTR.  Accordingly, 
the proposed USG note in paragraph 5 seeks to replace the 
November 2004 note for this purpose.  END BACKGROUND 
 
¶3.    Action Request:  Drawing on Background as appropriate, 
Post is requested to deliver to the GOR,s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, with a courtesy copy to Rosatom,s Vladimir 
Kuchinov, the USG diplomatic note in paragraph 5 and the 
suggested GOR reply note in paragraph 6.  Post may also draw 
upon talking points in paragraph 4. 
 
¶4.    Begin talking points: 
 
--  DOE/NNSA has been cooperating for several years with the 
GOR,s State Customs Committee (GTK) to equip Russian sites, 
including border crossing control points, seaports and 
airports, with fixed portal monitors, in order to assist the 
GOR in preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear material. 
 
--  DOE/NNSA, GTK, and Rosatom are interested in solidifying 
the legal foundation for this cooperation, which has been 
conducted under the auspices of the MPC&A Agreement. 
 
--  Article I, paragraph 2.d. of the MPC&A Agreement 
explicitly provides for cooperation between the U.S. and 
Russian Federation governments in the area of "prevention of 
illicit trafficking in nuclear materials".  Accordingly, we 
believe that DOE/NNSA's current and proposed assistance 
activities under its Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, 
whose focus is preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear 
material, is expressly encompassed within the existing MPC&A 
Agreement. 
 
--  Although we do not believe any amendment of the MPC&A 
Agreement is necessary to cover DOE/NNSA's SLD activities, we 
acknowledge, as Mr. Kuchinov pointed out in his January 23, 
2004, letter to NNSA,s David Huizenga (Reference B), that 
responsibility for countering the illicit trafficking in 
nuclear material within and across the borders of the Russian 
Federation is shared by a number of GOR state bodies, 
including Rosatom and GTK.  Therefore, we propose in our 
exchange of diplomatic notes to confirm our governments' 
understanding that the activities contemplated by Article I, 
paragraph 2.d. of the MPC&A Agreement include preventing 
illicit trafficking in nuclear material both at Russian 
Federation border crossing points and within the Russian 
Federation. 
 
--  The objective of DOE/NNSA's Radiological Threat Reduction 
(RTR) program is to mitigate the threat posed by radioactive 
materials that could be used in radiological dispersal 
devices (RDDs).  DOE/NNSA is cooperating with the Russian 
Federation to identify, recover, store, and secure high-risk 
radioactive sources.  This work also includes facilitation of 
the disposition of RDD-usable radioactive sources. 
 
--  The CTR Umbrella Agreement (which governs the MPC&A 
Agreement) refers to safe and secure transportation, storage 
and destruction of "nuclear, chemical, and other weapons," 
and the establishment of additional verifiable measures 
against the proliferation of such weapons that pose a risk of 
proliferation.  In addition to the proposed confirmation of 
the understanding of our two governments concerning 
DOE/NNSA's SLD program under the MPC&A Agreement, the U.S. 
diplomatic note states the understanding of the United States 
that the provisions of the CTR Umbrella Agreement also apply 
to RDDs and radioactive material, including but not limited 
to radioactive sources, suitable for use in RDDs. 
 
--  Since the subject of the MPC&A Agreement is "nuclear 
material," we concur with Mr. Kuchinov's proposal, in his 
January 23, 2004, letter to Mr. Huizenga, that it is 
appropriate to amend the MPC&A Agreement to bring our 
assistance activities related to radioactive sources 
expressly within the ambit of the MPC&A Agreement. 
 
--  In summary, our diplomatic note states the understanding 
of the U.S. Government that the MPC&A Agreement applies to 
the Department of Energy,s SLD assistance activities and 
that the CTR Umbrella Agreement applies to RDDs and 
radioactive materials that can be used in RDDs; and proposes 
to amend the MPC&A Agreement to bring RDDs and related 
radioactive materials expressly within the terms of the MPC&A 
Agreement. 
 
 
¶5.    Begin text of U.S. Diplomatic Note 
 
      The Embassy of the United States of America presents 
its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation and has the honor to refer to the 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Russian Federation 
Regarding Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Material 
Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of October 2, 
1999 ("MPC&A Agreement"), which is subject to and governed by 
the Agreement between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure 
Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the 
Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of June 17, 1992 ("CTR 
Agreement"), as amended and extended by the Protocols of June 
15 and 16, 1999, and June 16, 2006 ("Extension Protocols"). 
 
      The Embassy wishes to express the understanding of the 
Government of the United States of America ("United States 
Government") that the provisions of the MPC&A Agreement apply 
to activities between the United States Government and the 
Government of the Russian Federation ("Russian Federation 
Government") in the area of the prevention of illicit 
trafficking in nuclear material within and across the 
international borders of the Russian Federation. 
 
      The Embassy wishes to express the further understanding 
of the United States Government that the provisions of the 
CTR Agreement apply to radiological dispersal devices and 
radioactive materials, including but not limited to 
radioactive sources, suitable for use therein.  The Embassy 
requests that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm, in the 
Ministry,s reply to this note, that the Russian Federation 
Government shares these understandings. 
 
      The Embassy also has the honor to propose amending 
Article I paragraph 2 of the MPC&A Agreement as follows:  (1) 
deleting the word "and" at the end of subparagraph 2.d.; (2) 
adding a new subparagraph 2.e. to read "Physical protection, 
control, and accounting of radioactive materials, including 
but not limited to radioactive sources, suitable for use in 
radiological dispersal devices; and"; and (3) changing the 
designation of subparagraph "2.e." to "2.f.". 
 
If this proposal is acceptable to the Russian Federation 
Government, it is further proposed that this note, together 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' affirmative note in 
reply, shall constitute an agreement between the United 
States Government and the Russian Federation Government, 
which shall be applied provisionally from the date of the 
Ministry,s reply note and shall enter into force upon entry 
into force of the Extension Protocols. 
 
      The Embassy of the United States of America avails 
itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation the assurances of 
its highest consideration. 
 
Embassy of the United States of America 
Moscow,                                , 2008 
 
End text of U.S. Diplomatic note 
 
¶6.    Begin text of suggested GOR reply note 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States 
of America and referring to the U.S. Embassy,s Note No. xxx 
of                        , 2008, has the honor to inform of 
the following: 
 
      The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is pleased to confirm 
that the Government of the Russian Federation ("Russian 
Federation Government") shares the understanding set forth in 
the Embassy,s note that the provisions of the Agreement 
between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the United States of America Regarding 
Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Material Physical 
Protection, Control and Accounting of October 2, 1999 ("MPC&A 
Agreement"), apply to activities between the Russian 
Federation Government and the Government of the United States 
of America in the area of the prevention of illicit 
trafficking in nuclear material within and across the 
international borders of the Russian Federation. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also pleased to confirm 
the understanding of the Russian Federation Government that 
the provisions of the Agreement between the Russian 
Federation and the United States of America Concerning the 
Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of 
Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of June 
17, 1992 ("CTR Agreement"), as amended and extended by the 
Protocol of June 15 and 16, 1999, and the Protocol of June 
16, 2006, ("Extension Protocols") apply to radiological 
dispersal devices and radioactive materials, including but 
not limited to radioactive sources, suitable for use therein. 
 
The Ministry is pleased to accept, on behalf of the Russian 
Federation Government, the agreement proposed in the 
Embassy,s note to amend Article I, paragraph 2 of the MPC&A 
Agreement, which amendment shall be applied provisionally 
from the date of this reply note and shall enter into force 
upon entry into force of the Extension Protocols. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of 
the United States of America the assurances of its highest 
consideration. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Moscow,                        , 2008 
 
End text of suggested GOR reply note 
 
¶7.    FYI:  (For Embassy's use only)  As previously noted in 
Reference A, State L has concluded that Circular 175 
procedures are not required to negotiate and conclude an 
amendment to the MPC&A Agreement to include expressly within 
its coverage RDDs and radioactive materials suitable for use 
therein. 
 
¶8.    Washington greatly appreciates Embassy assistance and 
prompt action on this request.  DOE contact is Dave Huizenga 
at 202 586-0899; David.Huizenga@nnsa.doe.gov.  State 
Department point of contact is Anita Friedt at 202 647-9903; 
FriedtAE@state.gov.  Copies of the diplomatic notes should be 
faxed to the Department of State, L/T (Attn: Lois Allder), at 
202 647-9844; and the original of the GOR note and a 
certified copy of the U.S. note pouched to the Department, 
also marked for the attention of L/T, in accordance with 11 
FAM 723.6-723.9. 
RICE