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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017 
TAGS: PROG PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: NEVER SAY DIE -- UNIFICATION MINISTER ARGUES FOR 
3-PARTY SUMMIT ON HIS WAY OUT OF OFFICE 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a January 8 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Unification Minister Lee Jae-jung stressed the need for a 
three-party summit between the U.S., DPRK and ROK, to declare 
an end to the Korean War and provide the necessary incentive 
for Kim Jong-il to give up his nuclear weapons.  Lee listed 
joint rail links, Mt. Paekdu tours, and easing border 
restrictions to the Kaesong Industrial Complex as his top 
three North-South cooperation project priorities for his 
final two months in office.  Lee also gave his thoughts on 
the future of the ministry under the new Lee Myung-bak 
administration, as well as what he believed was a positive 
DPRK silence concerning the new administration. END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------- 
3-Party Summit 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Speaking with near-religious fervor, Lee stressed the 
need for a three-party summit between the U.S., DPRK, and 
ROK, claiming that such a summit to declare the end of the 
Korean War was what was needed to propel the Six Party Talks 
into the third phase.  Lee said that Kim Jong-il himself had 
proposed such a summit to President Roh at the October 
summit, but that the intended audience was actually President 
Bush.  Kim had expressed interest in President Bush's Hanoi 
and Sydney statements, and Lee believed that Kim would convey 
a personal assurance to President Bush guaranteeing North 
Korea's denuclearization.  Lee claimed that, while the U.S. 
wanted to pursue denuclearization before normalization, the 
DPRK wanted normalization before denuclearization.  Lee 
mentioned that 2012 was the 100th anniversary of Kim 
Il-sung's birth, and speculated that the DPRK might attempt 
to complete denuclearization and normalization with the U.S. 
by that point. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted that the U.S. would want the 
situation on the Korean peninsula to evolve to a point where 
such a summit would be possible, but that the time for such a 
measure had not yet arrived.  At this point, the Ambassador 
said, such a summit would suggest that U.S. acceptance of the 
DPRK's nuclear status, which the U.S. was emphatically 
opposed to.  While a "kickoff statement" for negotiations on 
a peace regime was possible once a complete and correct 
declaration of the DPRK's nuclear programs had been provided, 
the summit would have to wait. 
 
--- 
6PT 
--- 
 
¶4. (C) Lee suggested that the U.S. move first on DPRK's 
removal from the Trading with the Enemies Act (TWEA) and the 
State Sponsors of Terror list, after which the DPRK would be 
given a 45-day window to provide its declaration.  If it did 
not deliver, the U.S. would keep the DPRK on both lists.  The 
Ambassador replied that the DPRK had been informed of the 
U.S.'s own internal political constraints, and that the 
October 3 agreement of synchronized actions had been the 
result.  The DPRK could not unilaterally rewrite the rules 
now in their favor.  Furthermore, while a declaration was 
sensitive for the DPRK, we were only asking for the type of 
transparency that is expected of countries with IAEA 
safeguards agreements, said the Ambassador. 
 
¶5. (C) Lee claimed that suggesting that the North Koreans 
uphold their "morality" by keeping their Six Party agreements 
would be more likely to achieve results on the declaration 
than appealing to a "profiteering" mentality with "carrots," 
such as delisting from TWEA. 
 
---------------------- 
Lee's Final Two Months 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Developing joint rail links, modernizing the Mt. 
Paekdu tour site, and improving communications, customs 
procedures, and access for entry into the Kaesong Industrial 
Center (KIC) were the top items left to be implemented on the 
Minister's agenda for his final two months.  North and South 
Korea agreed at the October summit to send a joint cheering 
squad to Beijing for the 2008 Summer Olympics via a 
North-South railway line.  In order to prepare for this, the 
two sides had finished two site surveys on North Korea's rail 
lines from Kaesong to Sinuiju.  They found that there were no 
 
serious problems, and that even allowing for very 
conservative estimates on repair time, the railway link 
should be ready in time for the Olympics. 
 
¶7. (C) Lee mentioned that a portion of the proposed joint 
railway line included the construction a commuter rail link 
between the city of Kaesong and the KIC.  With 65 factories 
at the KIC, 21,000 workers were already commuting to the KIC 
via bicycle or bus; 1000 more employees were being added each 
month.  The need for such a commuter line was obvious, said 
Lee. 
 
¶8. (C) Two major sets of repairs to the Mt. Paekdu site 
needed to be taken, said Lee.  The first was the airfield and 
control tower at the site, and the second pertained to the 
tourism facilities.  Lee stated that May 2008 was the target 
date for the opening of the site. 
 
¶9. (C) The Ministry of Unification was negotiating with the 
DPRK to ease the costs of doing business at the KIC. 
Specifically, this included installing internet and phone 
communications at the KIC, easing the customs requirements to 
cross the DMZ, and gaining less restricted access to the KIC, 
especially after business hours.  Beginning the construction 
of shipyards in North Korea, particularly in Haeju, was also 
a priority.  A site survey team was planned within the next 
few weeks, Lee said.  As for another Minister-level meeting 
with the DPRK, Lee said he did not expect one for him before 
he left office, though he did say that 2-3 meetings on a 
lower level could take place. 
 
------------------ 
Lee's Views on LMB 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Lee did not believe the Ministry of Unification was 
about to be eliminated altogether, but a downsizing or 
restructuring of the ministry was possible.  Lee expressed 
concern that the new government would attempt to make 
inter-Korean relations merely one part of South Korea's 
broader foreign policy, and that MOFAT would thus absorb many 
of the functions of MOU.  Making North-South engagement 
contingent upon progress in the Six Party Talks was a 
"dangerous idea," said Lee, and instead the two processes 
should augment each other in a mutually-reinforcing, 
"virtuous" cycle. 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador replied that while the U.S. and the 
ROK had minor differences during the last year over the 
relationship between the Six Party Talks and North-South 
engagement, these differences tended to be over the 
sequencing of events rather than any end goal.  Coordination 
and cooperation between the two governments, and particularly 
between the Embassy and MOU, had remained strong.  Still, it 
made sense to focus the combined leverage of both governments 
on denuclearization first, as the DPRK's nuclear program 
remained the main impediment to improvement in North-South 
relations, said the Ambassador. 
 
¶12. (C) Lee believed that, while North Korea had yet to 
signal its view of Lee Myung-bak, its silence on Lee 
Myung-bak's victory in the Presidential election was a 
positive sign.  (NOTE: President-elect Lee Myung-bak also 
expressed a similar sentiment during a meeting with Assistant 
Secretary Hill on January 10.  END NOTE.)  The remarks that 
 
SIPDIS 
North Korea had made emphasized cooperation, Lee noted.  As 
for the incoming President, Lee said he was still optimistic 
about North-South engagement, but that the new government had 
made it clear that North Korean denuclearization was its 
central policy with respect to North-South relations. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) While still a strong advocate of the Sunshine Policy, 
Lee appeared resigned to both a decreased role for MOU and a 
reduction in the pro-engagement policies and programs of the 
Roh administration once the Lee Myung-bak government takes 
office.  Wistful that peace on the peninsula was not achieved 
during his tenure, Lee requested that the Ambassador endeavor 
to achieve that during his remaining time in Seoul.  It is 
likely that Lee believes that the Roh government would have 
succeeded had it not run out of time, and had it persuaded 
the U.S. to agree to an early summit with Kim Jong-il.  END 
COMMENT. 
VERSHBOW