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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7938
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3672
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8417
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3807

UNCLAS SEOUL 000020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PROG PREL ECON KS KN
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT-ELECT LEE'S ADVISORS REPUDIATE SUNSHINE 
POLICY ON TV TALK SHOW 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Providing what might be a preview of 
President-elect Lee Myung-bak's North Korea policy during a 
KBS roundtable broadcast on January 1, 2008, two of Lee's 
foreign policy advisors, Park Jin, foreign policy lead on the 
transition team, and North Korea specialist Nam Sung-wook 
declared that the Sunshine Policy was, in Park's words, a 
"failure," and that the incoming government would evaluate 
the DPRK "realistically" rather than through the "idealized" 
view taken by the current administration.  In place of 
unqualified aid, the incoming administration would offer 
action-for-action economic cooperation as incentives for 
concrete goals achieved by the DPRK in the Six Party Talks, 
though such aid could be considerable.  Park said that the 
next administration would not shy away from "tough love" in 
the form of healthy criticism directed at the DPRK.  Overall, 
both Park and Nam emphasized that only the DPRK could make 
the choice to denuclearize, thereby putting the onus for the 
success or failure of the Six Party Talks squarely on the 
DPRK.  Two of President Roh Moo-hyun's foreign policy 
advisors, Professors Moon Chung-in and Kim Keun-sik, defended 
the Roh legacy, pinned the blame of DPRK nuclear testing on 
the U.S., and criticized the North-South economic cooperation 
ideas of the incoming team as both impossible to implement 
and similar to the Roh government's policies.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------- 
Blaming Roh 
----------- 
 
¶2. (U) Sunshine Policy Failure: Park and Nam both pointed out 
that, while the Sunshine Policy had been well-intended, it 
was a failure on multiple levels.  While the ROKG had 
obtained a number of joint statements with the DPRK, concrete 
results were lacking, said Park.  Peace had definitely not 
been achieved, despite Moon's suggestion, said Park.  Most 
glaring was the fact that the DPRK had tested a nuclear 
weapon during the ten years of pro-engagement liberal 
administrations.  Furthermore, the Sunshine policy had failed 
to guarantee that the DPRK would denuclearize in the future. 
In the process, the progressives had severely damaged the 
U.S.-ROK alliance while placating the DPRK.  Overall, the 
security situation on the peninsula had deteriorated, not 
improved, during the ten years of progressive rule.  During 
this time, the DPRK's economy had shrunk and its human rights 
record remained poor.  While having achieving some opening of 
the DPRK's closed society was positive, overall, the Roh 
administration had failed to maintain a "balanced" policy by 
assuming an "idealized" version of the DPRK instead of the 
reality, said Nam. 
 
¶3. (U) U.S.-ROK Alliance Damaged: Both sides agreed that the 
most important factor to successful DPRK denuclearization was 
U.S.-DPRK relations.  However, the progressives used this 
statement to shift the blame for the DPRK's nuclear test to 
the U.S., while Lee's advisors pinned the blame for the 
failure squarely on the Roh and Kim Dae-jung administrations. 
 Nam said that the Roh government's logic of playing the 
Northeast Asia "balancer" role had led to "the OPCON transfer 
controversy," which in turn had caused "unnecessary friction" 
with the U.S.  The incoming government would conduct its 
diplomacy on a "more balanced logic" that would emphasize 
pragmatic and actionable items, Nam said. 
 
--------- 
NK Policy 
--------- 
 
¶4. (U) "We Will Not Tolerate a Nuclear DPRK" (Park): Park Jin 
categorically ruled out the possibility of recognizing a 
nuclear North Korea.  "As an iron-clad rule, we will not 
tolerate a nuclear North Korea," he said.  Nam, addressing 
Kim Jong-il directly, said, "Since Kim Jong-il might watch 
this show, I have a message for him: I expect you to be 
agonizing between whether to choose the 'Ukrainian model' or 
the 'Pakistani model.'  As you know, Ukraine gave up its 
nuclear arsenal, and in return was richly compensated by the 
international community through various assistance packages. 
On the contrary, Pakistan has held on to its nuclear 
capability thus far.  I suspect that you might be tempted to 
follow the latter path.  But I advise you to get over that 
temptation.  The new government is ready to set forth a 
policy vision, and I ask you to consider it seriously.  We 
will be ready to talk with you, and explain it to you 
 
further.  We strongly recommend the Ukraine model." 
 
¶5. (U) LMB's USD 3000 GNI DPRK Plan: The Lee advisors 
appeared serious about advocating LMB's campaign promise to 
raise the DPRK's annual per capita income to 3,000 USD within 
a decade.  The USD 3,000 marker was important, Nam said, 
because it was when South Korea reached a per capita income 
of USD 3,300 in 1987 that a consumer base and civil society 
became commonplace.  Once the DPRK followed through with its 
declaration, a USD 40 billion fund for North Korean 
assistance programs would be set up.  To reach the USD 3,000 
marker, Lee's advisors made it clear that a campaign promise 
to turn the triangular area between Kaesong, Haeju and Seoul 
into a special economic zone was being taken seriously as a 
policy initiative.  Displaying a map of the area between 
Kaesong and Seoul, Park suggested that the first step that 
could be taken was to create a new industrial complex at the 
mouth of the Han River on a man-made island, which they 
referred to as Nadeul Island. 
 
¶6. (U) "DPRK Needs Tough Love" (Park): Park Jin made it clear 
that the Lee administration did not intend to hold back 
criticism of the DPRK over its human rights record, even if 
the DPRK did not want to hear it.  After all, Park noted, the 
ROK itself did not appreciate hearing criticisms from the 
international community during its own democratization 
movement, but in hindsight had needed it.  Both aides 
suggested that humanitarian aid in the form of fertilizer and 
rice could continue, but that the DPRK would have to justify 
this aid by reciprocating on POWs and family reunions. 
Without greater reciprocation, such aid would have to be cut. 
 
 
¶7. (U) All of the conservative and progressive advisors 
agreed that the Kaesong Industrial Complex had made 
significant progress, and that it should continue to grow in 
the future.  Park suggested that creating a number of such 
industrial complexes in the DPRK would be a "win-win" 
situation for both North and South Korea. 
 
¶8. (U) 6PT Results by Inauguration Date Key: Both advisors 
suggested that if the Second Phase of the 6PT could be 
finished by the time of the February 25 inauguration, it 
would positively impact the North-South engagement policies 
of the incoming administration.  Specifically, the 
declaration and disablement portions needed to be finished. 
 
------------------- 
NLL, OPCON, PSI, MD 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The NLL was a maritime border, said Park, indicating 
that the Lee administration would continue to "defend that 
territory."  Concerning the OPCON transition, Park mentioned 
that, as the agreement was officially made between the 
governments of the U.S. and the ROK, it should be "respected 
for now."  However, the exact timing could be "fine-tuned" 
depending on the developing security situation. 
 
¶10. (U) Nam suggested that the ROK would view the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Missile Defense 
(MD) issues with greater flexibility, but would not make a 
firm commitment to either.  "The new government will make 
decisions as needed, based on national interest and the 
security situation at a given point." 
 
------------ 
Peace Regime 
------------ 
 
¶11. (U) A peace regime was necessary, but peace would not be 
realized by a "mere declaration," said Park.  Four-party 
discussions about the end of war could begin after the 
declaration and disablement phases had been concluded. 
 
--------------- 
Outgoing Advice 
--------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Moon said that he had learned two things about the 
DPRK during the October 2007 North-South Summit.  First, they 
did not like the words "opening" and "reform," instead 
preferring "modernization" (hyun-dae-hwa) to express the 
 
changes occurring in their economic system.  Second, while 
South Korean CEOs of large conglomerates had no interest in 
investing in North Korea until denuclearization had been 
achieved, medium and small business owners had a strong 
desire to invest, and had pressed their DPRK counterparts for 
more rapid expansion of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) While Lee's presidential campaign only briefly 
addressed the North Korean issue, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that his foreign policy advisors want to take a "tough 
love" stance towards the DPRK.  This does not appear to be a 
moderate foreign policy team that is attempting to bridge the 
gap between the conservative and progressive camps.  Rather, 
this is a conservative foreign policy team that appears 
resentful of what it perceives as ten years of what Park Jin 
called "blind engagement" through liberal "appeasement" of 
the DPRK.  At one point, Moon Chung-in lamented what he 
perceived as an "anything-but-Roh" attitude from the 
conservative advisors.  The Lee transition team, therefore, 
appears eager to demonstrate its willingness to take a harder 
line toward the DPRK, and to reward the DPRK only after solid 
results in the Six Party Talks.  However, President-elect Lee 
has not yet spelled out his North Korea policy in detail. 
VERSHBOW