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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 
TAGS: PROG PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ROH DISCUSSES KIM JONG-IL, THE SIX-PARTY 
TALKS AND RECIPROCITY WITH A/S HILL 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: In a January 9 meeting with Assistant 
Secretary Hill, Roh thanked President Bush, Secretaries 
 
SIPDIS 
Powell and Rice, and A/S Hill for their efforts with respect 
to the bilateral alliance and in keeping the Six Party Talks 
(6PT) on track, and said he remained encouraged about the 
future of the 6PT after hearing A/S Hill's status report. 
President Roh said he found himself hoping for the continued 
health of Kim Jong-il, as without him the DPRK would have no 
"responsible" negotiators.  Instead of rational thinkers 
capable of making bold decisions, the DPRK, Roh said, was 
filled with officials who were only concerned about proving 
their loyalty to the regime by taking a hard line.  Roh 
believed that Kim Jong-il has sufficient control of his 
military to press through his policies over their objections. 
 Roh also expressed surprise that, while a recent Korean poll 
showed a majority of South Koreans supporting engagement with 
North Korea, a majority also supported basing such engagement 
on a policy of reciprocity (the guiding principle for 
President-elect Lee Myung-bak).  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------ 
THANKING USG 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Roh began the 45-minute meeting by expressing special 
appreciation for A/S Hill's efforts to move the Six-Party 
process forward.  He commented that history showed that 
individuals had the capacity to create positive change. 
After hearing A/S Hill's update on the status of the talks, 
Roh said he remained encouraged about the prospects for 
Six-Party success. 
 
¶3.  (C) Roh stated that, while there was sometimes discord in 
the U.S.-ROK relationship, he was "very grateful" for 
President Bush's efforts to find ways to bridge the 
differences in opinions between the two sides.  Confessing 
that he felt a "certain fondness for his U.S. counterparts," 
Roh praised President Bush for his "considerate 
understanding" and Secretaries of State Powell and Rice for 
"their thoughtful and positive approach."  Roh said that, 
while the different backgrounds and interests of the two 
countries often produced different foreign policy positions, 
the U.S. and the ROK had worked together successfully in the 
Six-Party Talks to forge a common approach. 
 
----------------------------- 
ROH GLAD KIM JONG-IL ALIVE... 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Claiming that "rationalism" outside of Kim Jong-il 
had collapsed in the DPRK, Roh said that he took comfort in 
the fact that Kim Jong-il was still alive to negotiate on 
behalf of the DPRK.  Other North Korean leaders might be 
worse, Roh claimed, and without Kim, all channels of 
negotiation might disappear.  In Roh's opinion, Kim was the 
only North Korean leader who was flexible and capable of 
making bold decisions during negotiations.  Kim's advisors 
and officials, on the other hand, appeared interested only in 
demonstrating their loyalty to the regime, avoiding 
responsibility, and taking a hard line.  In this context, Roh 
said he found it ironic that he was hoping for the continued 
health of Kim Jong-il. 
 
¶5.  (C) Asked by A/S Hill whether Kim Jong-Il controlled the 
military, Roh stated that he believed Kim could maintain 
control over the North Korean military even in cases where he 
had to override their opposition.  North Korean military 
tradition provides that the military could advocate their 
point of view, but that ultimately it could not question 
Kim's authority after he made a political decision.  This 
boded well for the Six-Party Talks, Roh said. 
 
¶6.  (C) Roh cited three reasons for North Korea's behavior 
toward the outside world.  First, there was the rigidity of 
North Korean society.  Second, the peculiar nature of North 
Korea's negotiating tactics made brinksmanship their most 
common approach to any negotiation.  Third, an enormous sense 
of mistrust toward the outside world colored their 
perspective.  As a result, North Korea did not like to 
resolve all of the outstanding issues during a single 
meeting, but instead preferred to divide up the problems into 
smaller parts, and thus obtain more concessions while 
preserving their leverage for future negotiations.  Roh said 
that he believed the North Koreans were the toughest 
 
negotiators in the world.  In response, A/S Hill said that he 
was pleased to have similarly tough South Korean negotiators 
on his side for the 6PT. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
...PUZZLED BY SK SUPPORT FOR NK RECIPROCITY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Roh expressed surprise that, while polls showed that 
a majority of South Korean citizens supported engagement with 
North Korea, a majority also backed a policy of reciprocity 
in engaging with the DPRK.  (NOTE: Reciprocity is the 
watchword of President-elect Lee Myung-bak's approach to 
North Korea, whereas President Roh has consistently rejected 
the concept. END NOTE)  While reciprocity was a fine idea in 
an abstract sense, Roh said, practically speaking it was 
difficult to implement.  North and South Korea had different 
situations and measured reciprocity by different yardsticks. 
Timing for reciprocal actions could also be problematic: 
reciprocal actions could be measured in either months or 
years, Roh noted. 
STANTON