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DE RUEHUL #0139/01 0240051
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8166
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3744
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8460
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3880
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2439

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017 
TAGS: PROG PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: A/S HILL'S JANUARY 9 MEETING WITH GNP'S PARK 
GEUN-HYE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: In an upbeat January 9 lunch, former GNP 
Chairperson Park Geun-hye and EAP A/S Hill discussed the 
latest developments in North Korea and prospects for the 
future of U.S.-ROK relations.  EAP A/S Hill said he hoped 
that North Korea would make a complete and correct 
declaration of its nuclear programs and conclude Phase II of 
the denuclearization process soon.  Park said she expected a 
Lee Myung-bak presidency would mean better cooperation 
between the U.S. and the ROK and therefore promote progress 
in solving the DPRK nuclear problem.  Park said she would 
continue to work from her seat in the National Assembly -- 
rather than from within the Lee administration, where she is 
not expected to take a post -- to ensure that relations with 
the U.S. deepened and that the KORUS FTA passed so that our 
two countries could build on our strong friendship and 
alliance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------- 
Bright Future 
------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Former GNP Chairperson Park Geun-hye predicted that 
with the impending change in government, U.S.-ROK relations 
would improve.  Park said she would work to deepen trust 
between the U.S. and Korea and build on common values by 
supporting ratification of the KORUS FTA and the universal 
values of democracy and human rights.  A/S Hill said the DPRK 
had learned that the U.S. and ROK could not be split.  Park 
agreed that the DPRK had tried hard to drive a wedge between 
the U.S. and the ROK but had failed.  If South Korea handled 
its foreign policy well and on the basis of a trusting 
U.S.-ROK relationship, more collaboration on shared strategic 
principles would be possible.  Many issues -- including the 
DPRK nuclear issue -- could be solved. 
 
----------- 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
¶3.  (C) A/S Hill said that the U.S. had worked well with 
Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and the professionals at 
MOFAT, adding that it had often been difficult to coordinate 
the Six-Party process with the Ministry of Unification's 
efforts on the North-South relationship.  In the future, it 
was important to better calibrate North-South exchanges with 
progress in the Six-Party Talks.  Park agreed that when 
dealing with North Korea, it was important to have aid and 
economic cooperation as a bargaining chip.  If too much was 
given through the North-South channel, the Six-Party process 
could become more difficult.  This would not be a problem in 
the Lee Myung-bak administration, Park said. 
 
¶4.  (C) Representative Chin Young clarified that humanitarian 
aid would continue, but that any economic cooperation would 
be connected to the DPRK's progress toward denuclearization. 
A/S Hill said that the U.S. had recently held unsuccessful 
discussions with the DPRK about delivering 500,000 tons of 
USG food aid to North Korea.  The DPRK refused to allow the 
food to be delivered through the World Food Program (WFP). 
Park noted that this reflected the sad fact that the regime 
was willing to withhold food from its own people for 
political and bureaucratic reasons. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador asked Park what President-elect Lee 
Myung-bak's policy would be toward North Korea.  Park said 
that Lee would adhere to the GNP's following clear 
principles: nuclear weapons were unacceptable; international 
cooperation was needed for the DPRK to denuclearize; and both 
carrots and sticks should be used in negotiations with North 
Korea.  Representative Chin said that the basic policy goals 
include "denuclearization, opening, USD 3,000 GDP per capita 
in 10 years."  But denuclearization is a prerequisite for 
proceeding with the other two, Chin said. 
 
--------------------- 
Travel to North Korea 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) A/S Hill said he was shocked by what he saw during 
his two trips to North Korea in June and December 2007.  Park 
said she went to North Korea in 2002 and advised the DPRK 
that, given the U.S. population's role in selecting the 
country's leaders, it is important to take positive steps to 
influence U.S. public opinion.  Doing so would reduce the 
political risks for a president wanting to productively 
engage with North Korea.  This was perhaps a new message for 
the DPRK, Park said.  Ambassador Vershbow observed that 
 
unfortunately the message had not sunk in as the DPRK tended 
to do the opposite of what would engender good will on the 
part of the American people. 
 
------------------------- 
Declaration State of Play 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Park asked for an update on the status on North 
Korea's commitment to provide a complete and correct 
declaration of its nuclear programs.  A/S Hill stressed that 
for the declaration to be complete and correct (and therefore 
acceptable to the other five parties), it must address 
uranium enrichment programs as well as North Korea's past 
nuclear cooperation with other countries.  Once North Korea 
submits a complete and correct declaration and completes 
disablement, the Six Parties could move to the third phase of 
denuclearization. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) A/S Hill noted that in the ROK, the progressives did 
not want to mention North Korean human rights, whereas in the 
U.S. both liberals and conservatives were equally vocal about 
the issue.  Park agreed, lamenting that the left in South 
Korea talked about human rights issues only in South Korea 
but not in North Korea.  Hill said it was ironic since the 
progressives had benefited so much from international 
pressure to improve human rights conditions in South Korea. 
Park said that the basic goal was to have the North Korean 
people enjoy the same freedoms that South Koreans do and, of 
course, to establish peace on a reunified Peninsula.  Park 
reasoned, however, that North Korea's leaders were likely 
afraid of too much openness because they feared their regime 
could not survive an onslaught of outside influences. 
 
----------------- 
Domestic Politics 
----------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador asked if there would be a peaceful 
solution of the internal GNP struggle over the selection of 
candidates for the April 9 National Assembly elections.  Park 
said that it all depended on the President-elect.  The GNP 
had made many reforms during her tenure as GNP Chairperson 
from 2004 to 2006; the party had established a more 
transparent nomination system, and she had given up much of 
the power that former party Chairmen enjoyed.  Therefore, the 
most important thing was that Lee not reverse the progress 
the party had made in recent years, because those reforms, 
after the party had almost disappeared in 2004, had 
contributed to his electoral victory. 
STANTON