VZCZCXRO6131
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0142/01 0181405
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181405Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6213
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000142 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR H 
H PASS FOR CODEL LUGAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNDP ECON OVIP RS
SUBJECT: SENATOR HAGEL'S MEETING WITH FM LAVROV 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary: In his January 16 meeting with Senator Hagel, FM 
Lavrov stressed Russian interest in strengthening bilateral 
relations, but said U.S. efforts to "contain" Russia could undermine 
constructive engagement and underscored unhappiness over 
congressional failure to lift Jackson-Vanik.  Describing post-START 
discussions as at a "dead-end," Lavrov called for reinvigorated 
efforts to strengthen the NPT framework.  Lavrov underscored Russian 
objections to U.S. missile defense plans, interest in cooperation, 
and disappointment over the perceived "walk back" in the Secretary 
and SecDef's October 2007 proposals.  Pointing to Georgia, he 
accused the U.S. of double-standards in democracy promotion, but 
identified energy cooperation as a promising area of cooperation. 
While praising the ability of Putin and the President to engage 
bluntly but effectively, Lavrov argued that American hegemony had 
robbed its diplomacy of creativity.  Lavrov said the March 2 
presidential elections and Putin's decision to become prime minister 
promised foreign policy continuity "in every sense."  End Summary 
 
State of U.S.-Russian Relations 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Foreign Minister Lavrov opened his hour-long meeting with 
Senator Hagel (R-Nebraska) on January 16 by underscoring the 
importance that Russia attached to congressional ties, which it 
viewed as an essential channel in the U.S.-Russian relationship. 
Commending the Senator for his activism in foreign policy and 
interest in Russian affairs, Lavrov stressed the need to make the 
bilateral relationship a constructive partnership.  Lavrov seconded 
the Senator's praise for the Ambassador and welcomed the Senator's 
positive assessment of Russian Ambassador Ushakov's efforts to 
advance mutual interests. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  When the reporters left the room, Lavrov turned more 
somber, noting that Russia's "sincere efforts" to promote bilateral 
relations had to be on the basis of equal treatment, mutual respect, 
and with the proviso that one country's security could not come at 
the expense of its partner.  Russia was worried by trends in the 
U.S., the perception of Russia prevalent in the media and ruling 
circles, and a U.S. national security strategy premised on Russia's 
"containment."  Referring to the 2006 National Security Strategy, 
Lavrov said it was unacceptable to emphasize containment except in 
those areas where Russia was seen as useful to U.S. interests.  This 
strategy, he warned, could undermine otherwise constructive 
engagement on issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation, the 
promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and drug trafficking. 
Acknowledging that differences would remain, Lavrov stressed that 
"friendly advice," presented in a businesslike way, was the most 
effective persuasion -- as well as the willingness of the U.S. to 
also be persuaded.  Lavrov contrasted the sharp U.S. rhetoric on 
democratic development and energy security (digressing to add that 
Russia had never failed to meet its contractual obligations) with 
polls of Americans and Russians that indicated generally positive 
views of one another. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Lavrov questioned the Senator on the tenor of 
congressional bills and resolutions that struck Russia as unfair, 
"to put it mildly," highlighting legislation that mandated the 
Ambassador to report on undemocratic practices and "to take 
corrective actions" as well as legislation on UN financing that 
grouped Russia and North Korea in the same category.  "Is this 
really the mood in the U.S.?"  Lavrov reiterated Russian unhappiness 
over the fact that Jackson-Vanik remained in force, despite 
commitments made by Senators Lugar and Frist, as well as House 
International Relations Chairman Lantos, to secure its abolishment, 
noting that the lack of progress was "difficult to understand."  The 
Senator stressed that he did not speak for his colleagues, but had 
frequently and publicly criticized Jackson-Vanik as outdated and 
useless, and agreed that it had become more than just an irritant in 
the relationship. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Lavrov welcomed the Senator's analysis of the post-9/11 
environment in Washington and necessity of a new 21st century 
framework of relations based on strengthened alliances to confront 
the common challenges of radicalism, terrorism, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  He agreed with the 
Senator that U.S.-Russian relations were of critical importance and 
required moving beyond zero-sum calculations.  While the Senator 
noted that mistakes had been made on both sides on issues such as 
missile defense, he urged Lavrov to focus on the future of 
U.S.-Russia relations.  The political transitions underway in both 
Russia and the U.S. inevitably would lead to policy reassessments 
and fresh opportunities on long-term security interests, including 
energy cooperation, terrorism, economic diversification and Russia's 
WTO membership.  Noting his meeting with U.S. business 
representatives, who described a worsening business environment, the 
Senator urged the GOR to look for ways to facilitate foreign 
investment.  Pointing to the intersecting interests on issues such 
as North Korea, Iran, the Balkans, and Security Council, the Senator 
 
MOSCOW 00000142  002 OF 003 
 
 
stressed that the U.S. and Russia could not afford to have 
disjointed relations. 
 
Reinvigorating Non-Proliferation and Post-START 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Lavrov seconded the Senator's concern over the lack of a 
workable nonproliferation regime, with India and Pakistan outside 
the framework, and Iran an increasing threat.  He commented that the 
time was fast approaching when bilateral frameworks for arms control 
would need to be expanded to other nuclear states.  Russia was 
worried about the viability of the NPT, but agreed that it was 
unwise to open the NPT to amendments, focusing instead on other 
instruments, such as the Additional Protocol and economic incentives 
for those states that forego the full fuel cycle.  Lavrov argued 
that the U.S. and Russia needed to take additional steps towards 
full nuclear disarmament, although recognizing that it was a goal 
unlikely to be witnessed in several generations, in order to ease 
the concerns of non-nuclear states. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Lavrov described post-START negotiations as at a 
"dead-end," and placed the blame on a U.S. approach that rejected 
any limitations on its nuclear options. Any agreement, he stressed, 
would need to be legally binding and further reduce the size of 
nuclear arsenals.  As a practical matter, this would lessen the 
chance of nuclear mishaps; at a geopolitical level, it would 
strengthen the NPT regime.  Noting that Congress played a far 
greater role in foreign policy than its Russian equivalent, Lavrov 
urged the Senator and his colleagues to pay greater attention to 
this aspect of bilateral relations. 
 
Missile Defense: U.S. Breaks Rules of the Game 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Recalling the presidents' meeting  at Camp David in 2003, 
Lavrov argued that U.S. missile defense plans broke the agreed-upon 
"rules of the road" concerning preliminary consultations, 
partnership, and "no surprises."  Describing missile defense as 
"basically unstoppable," Lavrov warned of Russian countermeasures in 
the event that the U.S. moved an "integral part of its nuclear 
arsenal" toward Russian borders.  Lavrov traced U.S.-Russian 
engagement on missile defense, flagging Putin's objection to the 
abrogation of the ABM Treaty and his forewarning of Russian 
countermeasures.  He described as "not ideal, but promising" the 
October 2007 proposals made by the Secretary and SecDef -- 
specifically, what both he and Putin understood to be offers to keep 
the Czech radar inactive and leave the Polish silos without 
interceptors until the U.S.and Russia agreed that an Iranian missile 
capacity had materialized, while having a permanent U.S. and Russian 
presence located at both sites.  Lavrov underscored that the Russian 
request for the proposals in writing produced a six-week delay and a 
watered down version that did not include a permanent Russian 
presence, and left the assessment of the threat entirely in American 
hands.  Lavrov reiterated that everyone should understand there 
would be consequences to the development of missile defense sites 
without Russian cooperation.  He welcomed the recent GOR 
consultations with the Polish government, noting that the Russian 
objective was not to dissuade the Tusk government, but to inform the 
GOP of Russia's strong views. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Lavrov called into question the U.S. motivations behind 
missile defense.  If the issue was security-driven, it should have 
been discussed with NATO, the EU, and Russia.  If the concern was 
Iran, then the Russian proposal for sharing Qabala and the radar 
under development in southern Russia -- coupled with JDEC sites in 
Moscow and Brussels -- should have been accepted.  Clarifying that 
the Russian proposal was conditioned on the U.S. foregoing its 
European deployment, Lavrov insisted that the Russian offer provided 
a 5-7 year window in which to further pursue joint options in the 
event Iran deployed long range missiles.  When Czech and Polish 
officials justified the radar and missile interceptors as providing 
a defense against Russia, the logic of the U.S. deployment was 
further called into question.  Lavrov reiterated that the GOR was 
ready to cooperate, noting that in the event further consultations 
did not produce an agreement, each country could act according to 
its own national security calculus.  On major issues, Russia 
believed in consulting first, "but not forever." 
 
Democracy and Double Standards with Georgia 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Preemptively arguing that "no one is perfect," Lavrov 
pointed to the 2000 U.S. elections and the "anarchic system of the 
electoral college" as evidence that each country had to manage its 
own democratic development.  As in Soviet times, he noted, Russian 
laws were generally good, but implementation poor.  The GOR 
understood that reality, but would address deficiencies on its own 
terms.  Lavrov contrasted U.S. criticism of the Russian Duma 
 
MOSCOW 00000142  003 OF 003 
 
 
elections with its praise for Georgia's presidential elections as 
proof of double standards.  Despite the strategic importance of the 
bilateral relationship, Russia came in for severe criticism.  "What 
is so important about Georgia that Washington closes its eyes to 
blatant electoral violations?"  The conclusion of many, Lavrov 
noted, was that Georgia was of greater strategic interest to the 
U.S. than Russia, feeding conspiracy theories that the U.S. sought 
to encircle Russia through basing and NATO membership extended to 
Georgia and Ukraine.  Acknowledging that the U.S. had strategic 
interests in the Caucasus, Lavrov commented that "those interests 
need to be understandable to us." 
 
Energy Cooperation 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Lavrov described energy cooperation as a promising area 
in the bilateral relationship, pointing to Lukoil and Conoco's 
agreement to work jointly in Iraq.  LNG sales to the U.S. were on 
the horizon, with U.S.-Canada-Russian cooperation also under 
discussion.  Acknowledging the Senator's concerns over Russian red 
tape, Lavrov said both foreign and Russian investors were frustrated 
by the bureaucratic hoops; the government understood this, and Putin 
had made a commitment to streamline practices.  The 50 percent 
increase in U.S. direct investment in 2007 reflected the positive 
trendline.  Lavrov commented that U.S.-Chinese relations 
demonstrated to the Russian leadership the importance of a strong 
economic foundation in order to weather the ups and downs in the 
relationship generated by "subjective elements."  Maintaining that 
he did not want to "dramatize" the situation, Lavrov contrasted 
Russia's acceptance of American support for the Baku-Jehan pipeline 
(at a time of Russian weakness) to active American lobbying against 
Russian efforts to diversify its pipelines (at a time of Russian 
resurgence).  American behavior was at odds with the cooperative 
approach of Germany, Denmark, and Italy, and its focus on a Russian 
energy "weapon" ignored Russia's dependency on the oil and gas trade 
for its own economic survival. 
 
U.S. Diplomacy 
------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Noting the Senator's focus on the need for the U.S. to 
better understand international perceptions of American foreign 
policy, Lavrov commented that relations between countries were 
similar to relations between people.  When children grew up 
together, they remembered the older and stronger kid who treated 
them badly; when they became older and stronger, they still 
remembered the slight.  Based on his 17 years in the United States, 
Lavrov judged that America's long tenure as the world's dominant 
power had robbed its diplomacy of incentives to think creatively and 
to find diplomatic solutions. Lavrov praised the chemistry between 
Putin and the President, emphasizing their ability to bluntly spell 
out their respective interests and concerns; this style needed to 
trickle down into the bureaucracy.  Senator Hagel agreed with Lavrov 
that the diffusion of power, inherent in a globalized world, meant 
that other centers of political power were emerging, and reiterated 
the need for the U.S. and Russia to seek ways to strengthen their 
partnership during the political transition ahead. 
 
Russian Foreign Policy Continuity 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Reiterating Russia's openness to partnership with the 
U.S., Lavrov stressed that the Russian presidential elections would 
not change the priority placed by the GOR on relations with the 
U.S., provided that there was a "paradigm of mutual respect."  The 
outcome of the December 2 Duma elections reflected this continuity, 
as did the expected victory in the March 2 presidential elections of 
First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev, who enjoyed the endorsement of 
Putin and the support of a constitutional majority in the Duma. 
Assuming that Putin takes up the mantle of Prime Minister, Lavrov 
concluded that "there will be continuity in every sense." 
 
¶14.  (U)  The delegation cleared this message. 
 
BURNS