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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018 
TAGS: KPRP PGOV PHUM PREL IS IR LE SY UK KR
SUBJECT: HORMUZ STRAITS INCIDENT: ALLEGEDLY AN IRGC 
INITIATIVE 
 
REF: A. 07 LONDON 3983 
     ¶B. 07 LONDON 3700 
     ¶C. 07 LONDON 3310 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills for reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
 ¶1.  (S/NF) Summary.  A long-time Embassy contact, reportedly 
relaying information from a close friend who is an active 
duty member of the Iranian military, told Poloff the Deputy 
Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Naval 
Forces) independently planned and led the January 6 feint by 
IRGC surface craft against US Navy warships in the Straits of 
Hormuz.  The IRGC Commander, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, 
reportedly was "the voice on the bridge" which made English 
language contact with the bridge of U.S. warships.  Fadavi is 
said to have a reputation for brilliance and ideological 
extremism, and to be professionally jealous of his immediate 
superior, IRGC (Naval) commander Abbas Safari.  After the 
incident, Fadavi was reportedly taken by former overall IRGC 
commander Rahim Safavi to Tehran to brief Supreme Leader 
Khamenei.  This account of what prompted the IRGC to confront 
U.S. Navy ships in the Straits, if true, may suggest that 
senior IRGC officers enjoy significant de facto autonomy and 
may in future be willing to stage further dangerous 
provocations of U.S. forces, perhaps without prior 
national-level guidance from Tehran.  End summary. 
 
Fadavi: The Bridge-to-Bridge Voice 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) A long-time Embassy contact, active in Iranian 
expatriate media, relayed to Poloff the gist of his exchanges 
since January 6 with an old friend of his inside Iran whom 
this contact says is an active duty officer in Iran's regular 
armed forces.  Embassy contact said his officer source 
generally described the January 6 incident in terms similar 
to U.S. Navy public statements and stated the IRGC operation 
was from start to finish conceived, ordered, and led by the 
Deputy Commander of IRGC naval forces, Ali Fadavi.  Rear 
Admiral Fadavi during the incident was, according to the 
officer source, in another IRGC vessel which stood off from 
and controlled those IRGC craft feinting at the USN ships. 
Fadavi, like many IRGC senior officers, is trained to speak 
some English, and reportedly was himself the voice which 
spoke bridge-to-bridge during what the officer source said 
was intended as a simulated attack on the U.S. warships.  The 
officer claimed that, had U.S. ships opened fire, Fadavi, in 
his stand-off command vessel, would likely not have been 
among the IRGC casualties. 
 
Claim: Confrontation Fadavi's Idea Alone 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) The officer source claimed that Fadavi's plan to 
confront U.S. warships had not been previously known to the 
Iranian Navy or to civilian authorities in Tehran, but that 
the foray did not surprise Iranian military circles, due to 
Fadavi's service reputation for brilliance, boldness, and 
anti-Western extremism and ideological fervor.  The source 
reported that it was widely assumed in IRI naval circles that 
Fadavi conceived of and planned the operation himself, 
without any senior authority or encouragement. (Embassy note. 
 The Embassy contact, a well-informed Iran observer, strongly 
seconded this version of events.  End note.)  Fadavi did so, 
according to this version of events, to bolster his 
reputation among senior officers for charismatic leadership 
and to inspire the rank and file.  The source further 
speculated that Fadavi also had in mind the broader, purely 
political goal of trying to deflect attention from President 
Bush's visit to the region.  The officer source later advised 
that some time after the attack Fadavi had been taken by 
General Rahim Safavi, former IRGC overall commander and 
currently military advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, to 
 
LONDON 00000132  002 OF 003 
 
 
Tehran to brief the Supreme Leader in person (Embassy 
comment: Such a briefing opportunity suggests Supreme Leader 
approval, vice disapproval, at a minimum after the incident. 
End comment) 
 
Possible Professional Jealousy 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Fadhavi reportedly has four years longer in 
service than the head of the IRGC Naval Forces, Abbas Safari, 
Fadhavi,s current immediate superior.  Khamenei this past 
fall reportedly tapped the younger Safari for overall command 
ahead of his chronological senior Fadhavi due to the elder,s 
personal extremism, a trait which Khamenei felt made the 
younger Safari the safer choice.  Fadhavi was reportedly very 
frustrated at having been passed over for command of his 
service in this fashion. 
 
Fadhavi Experience: Syria, Lebanon, DPRK 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) At the time of Fadhavi's appointment to be IRGC 
deputy naval commander, Khamenei reportedly also gave him a 
second, simultaneous post by way of consolation:  Shared 
command of a bi-national Iran-Syria military intelligence 
branch.  This branch is reportedly responsible for 
operational coordination between the two countries and is 
headquartered on Autobahn Mazeh in Damascus; Fadhavi,s 
appointment may be in part related to his reported presence 
in Lebanon during the summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and 
Israel.  Additionally, Fadhavi, an Iran-Iraq War veteran, was 
reportedly one of 70 IRGC officers sent to North Korea in the 
mid-1990s for submarine training. 
 
Comment: Confront USG to Boost 
Prestige, Isolate Moderates 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) It is impossible to infer with confidence from 
this limited, second-hand version of events alone whether 
top-level Iranian political leadership approved the January 6 
operation before the fact.  The officer source, again 
seconded by Embassy contact, argued that although most 
Iranian commanders recognize the realities of, and do not 
actively seek, all-out war with the United States, a limited 
armed clash producing some casualties would have been, for 
Admiral Fadavi, a very positive outcome of the Hormuz Straits 
confrontation.  This analysis is plausible to the extent such 
an outcome would have enabled IRI hard-liners to underline 
within Iran the irredeemable hostility of the U.S. 
Government, always a talking point for those who want to 
apply principles of the 1979 revolution to current policy, 
and would have boosted for many the IRGC's domestic image as 
Iran's leading defender.  Antagonism with the West, Iranian 
victimhood, and the need to aggressively defend the 
Revolution are the touchstones used by hard-liners to 
marginalize rivals and define and legitimize a militant, 
ever-vigilant IRGC.  This domestic dynamic appeared to 
operate during the March 2007 UK naval detainees stand-off, 
when Ahmedinejad initially used the crisis to bolster his 
visibility as a foreign policy leader and to show his ties to 
the IRGC naval units which had seized the UK personnel. 
 
Embassy Contact: Caveat 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Embassy media contact, though his name is withheld 
in this report at the request of other USG authorities at 
post, is well-known to Department (refs a, b and c); this 
contact has an interested view of events in Iran and has in 
the past been flagged by some USG observers for erroneous 
claims.  Poloff depends on context and informed conjecture to 
judge the relevance and plausibility of this contact's claims 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 
LONDON 00000132  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
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LeBaron