VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #0095/01 0301750
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301750Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5882
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0506
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0414
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T KINGSTON 000095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS CENTRAL AMERICAN CARIBBEAN BASIN COLLECTIVE FOR INFO 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/FO (TSHANNON), WHA/FO (KMADISON) WHA/CAR (JTILGHMAN), 
WHA/EPSC (VDEPIRRO) WHITE HOUSE/NSC FOR DAN FISK 
 
TREASURY FOR SARA GRAY 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR ADMIRAL STAVRIDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2028 
TAGS: PREL PINR SOCI ETRD ENRG ECON EINV XL JM
SUBJECT: (S) JAMAICAN-VENEZUELAN RELATIONS: AN INSIDE VIEW 
         FROM THE MFAFT (PART I) 
 
REF: 07 KINGSTON 1793 
 
Classified By: DCM James T. Heg for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (S) The text below is taken directly from an internal 
briefing document drafted by the Jamaican Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade (MFAFT)'s Bilateral Relations 
Department.  The document was dated October 1 2007 and 
prepared for the then-newly elected Prime Minister Bruce 
Golding.  PM Golding provided Ambassador Johnson a copy of 
the document during a recent private meeting (see reftel). 
 
(BEGIN TEXT)

--------------------------------------------- --- 
Historical Review of Jamaica/Venezuela Relations 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶1. (C) Jamaica and Venezuela traditionally have enjoyed 
friendly and mutually beneficial relations, since the 
establishment of diplomatic ties on 25 March 1965. Jamaica's 
historical relations with Venezuela, however, date back to 
the early 19th Century when Simon Bolivar, the architect of 
the independence of Venezuela and several Latin American 
countries, took refuge in Jamaica in 1815. It was then that 
he penned his now famous Jamaica Letter, in which he wrote of 
his grand vision for the integration of the Americas; "More 
than anyone, I desire to see America fashioned into the 
greatest nation in the world, greatest not so much by virtue 
of her area and wealth as by her freedom and glory. Although 
I seek perfection for the government of my country, I cannot 
persuade myself that the New World can, at the moment, be 
organized as a great republic". This historic link is well 
known and appreciated in Venezuela, and represents a 
fraternal bond between the two countries. 
 
¶2. (C) Despite successive changes in political 
administrations of both countries, the close governmental 
relationship has remained uninterrupted. This has facilitated 
the smooth development of bilateral relations, which are 
characterized by frequent exchanges of high-level visits and 
a steady expansion of economic and technical cooperation. 
Jamaica and Venezuela have also collaborated closely at the 
regional, hemispheric and international levels. 
 
¶3. (C) Economic cooperation between the two countries has 
been and remains a strong feature of the relationship. The 
major component currently is in the area of energy, even 
though agreements have also been signed in several other 
areas. Jamaica's reliance on financial assistance from 
Venezuela has remained constant, and successive 
administrations have sought and received significant support. 
 
¶4. (C) The 1980s was a period of intense economic cooperation 
between the two countries, with the government of Luis 
Herrera Campins providing some USD 350 million in financial 
and technical assistance to the Edward Seaga administration. 
This amount was roughly equivalent to the combined sums 
offered to Caribbean and Central American countries by US 
President Ronald Reagan, in his significant speech before the 
Organization of American States (OAS). 
 
¶5. (C) At the beginning of the 1990s, the Michael Manley 
administration, as it had done in the 1970s, sought the 
assistance of the Carlos Andres Perez administration in 
Venezuela to assist Jamaica to deal with increases in global 
oil prices. This was done through the San Jose Accord, which 
provided a special facility for oil importing countries of 
the region. Venezuela also continued to provide Balance of 
Payment support to Jamaica. 
 
----------------- 
Current Relations 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Jamaica and Venezuela continue to enjoy excellent 
relations at various levels. Jamaica,s current relations 
continue to be driven largely by its economic interest, 
evidenced by an increasing reliance on Venezuela as a source 
of energy supplies, as well as financial and technical 
assistance. 
 
¶7. (C) Since his election in 1999, President Hugo Chavez 
Frias has shown a determination to strengthen relations with 
the Caribbean, and Jamaica in particular, as part of his 
grand vision of hemispheric integration. A watershed in 
Jamaica/Venezuela relations was therefore celebrated in 
Montego Bay on 23rd August 2005, with the Official Visit of 
President Chavez for the signing of the historic PetroCaribe 
Energy Cooperation Agreement. 
 
¶8. (C) The Venezuelan opposition has voiced concerns about 
President's Chavez's keen interest in Jamaica, sometimes 
observing that the President is willing to spend money in 
improving infrastructure in other countries (Jamaica) which 
could have instead been spent on programs within Venezuela. 
The Venezuelan media have expressed similar concerns. 
 
¶9. (C) In fact, Forbes magazine reported on 26th August, 2007 
that the Chavez government is currently offering more direct 
state funding to Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries 
than the US. It stated that Venezuela had provided a total 
USD 8.8 billion to LAC in aid, financing and energy funding 
up to mid-2007, compared to US grants and loans to the region 
of USD 3 billion in 2005. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Current State of the Venezuelan Economy 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Venezuelan economy grew by 8.9 percent during the 
second quarter of 2007, the fifteenth consecutive quarter of 
significant growth. 
 
¶11. (C) According to the Finance Minister, Rodrigo Cabezas, 
overall growth this year will be at least 8 percent compared 
with an average for Latin America of 3.5 percent. This level 
of growth, the Minister argues, is being translated into 
greater social well-being for the population through a 
variety of social policies which by year end should be 
reduced to 7 percent. Venezuelan expectations about the 
economy and polling company Datanalysis, which says that over 
80 percent of Venezuelans are cheery about the country, 
although there is still a lot of caution among businessmen 
and among potential foreign investors. 
 
¶12. (C) In relation to inflation and liquidity (the country 
is awash with petrodollars) Cabezas has said that there is 
pressure on prices but that the 12 percent target for FY 2007 
was still within reach through the application of a policy of 
fiscal responsibility, but that this did not suggest the 
adoption of neo-liberal policies as is being recommended by 
the IMF. 
 
¶13. (C) Regarding the Balance of Payments (BOP), according to 
the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV), income derived from oil 
exports declined during the second quarter 2007 at the same 
time that expenditure on imports climbed steeply. Petroleum 
exports declined 9.2 percent in Q2 2007 to USD 15.092 
billion, while imports rose 38.7 percent from USD 7.85 
billion to USD 10.89 billion. This shows that compared to Q2 
2006 when 43 cents of every petrodollar earned was spent on 
imports, Venezuelans in Q2 2007 spent 72 cents. The Central 
Bank's view is that the increase in imports is associated 
with the growth the economy is experiencing and that much of 
the imports are accounted for by capital goods. Another view 
is that the overvaluation of the Bolivar (the parallel rate 
is twice the official rate), is driving the surge in imports. 
Nonetheless, there is a surplus on the BOP and the NIR 
picture is still rosy. 
 
There are several implications to the above economic 
scenario, including the following, which may have some 
relevance for Jamaica: 
 
¶A. A growing economy suggests the sustainability of 
Venezue1an technical assistance; 
 
¶B. With oil production and export volumes falling, meeting 
quotas may become more difficult while dependence on high 
prices may become greater; and 
 
¶C. Financing the Jamaican Embassy in an inflationary, fixed 
exchange rate regime presents some challenges. 
 
------------------------- 
Main Areas of Cooperation 
------------------------- 
 
PetroCaribe Energy Cooperation Agreement 
---------------------------------------- 

¶14. (C) The Agreement came into effect on 29th June 2005 and 
replaces the Caracas Energy Agreement. The San Jose Accord, 
to which Mexico is also a party, is still in effect.  Under 
the Agreement, Venezuela undertakes to supply Jamaica with 
23,500 barrels per day of crude oil, refined products and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) or its energy equivalents. This 
occurs via a price formula that is based on the current 
purchase prices (FOB-VZLA) of a barrel of oil. 
 
¶15. (C) The financing scheme for Jamaica's supply quota of 
23,500 bpd includes a grace period of up to 2 years for 
capital repayments, as well as an annual interest rate of 2 
percent on applicable volumes, where prices are less than USD 
40 per barrel. When the price of a barrel of oil exceeds USD 
40 the interest rate is reduced to 1  percent and the 
repayment period extended from fifteen to twenty three years, 
plus the two-year grace period for a total of twenty five 
years. The portion of the supply quota that can be financed 
under the deferred payment scheme is related to the per 
barrel price of oil and detailed on a scale that ranges from 
5 percent to 50 percent. Should the price of oil reach USD 
100 per barrel then as much as 50 percent of the total value 
of Jamaica's oil purchases can be deferred, for a period of 
twenty five years at 1  percent interest. 
 
¶16. (C) Although the Agreement requires the GOJ to pay the 
full market price for crude oil and petroleum products  it 
also provides for a portion of the deferred payment 
obligation to be paid for with goods and services. 
Furthermore, the deferred financing loan provisions of the 
Agreement eliminate the GOJ's immediate need for foreign 
exchange for repayment, thereby easing the pressure for 
currency devaluation which would trigger inflation. In 
addition, the loan comes without the conditions usually 
attached by international lending agencies. 
 
¶17. (C) The portion of the crude oil and petroleum product 
imports that can benefit from the deferred payment scheme is 
convertible into a concessionary loan at interest rates of 
between 1 and 2 percent. In keeping with the philosophy of 
the Venezuelan Government, resources in the Fund are 
available to support social and economic development 
programs, in order to improve the quality of life of the 
poor. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for managing the 
Fund and Cabinet approves the various programs and projects 
that are undertaken. 
 
¶18. (C) Within the price of oil on the world market currency 
hovering in the USD 70 to USD 80 per barrel range, the 
PetroCaribe Agreement has enabled Petrojam to forego having 
to purchase approximately USD 4.6 million per week in foreign 
exchange, in order to source crude on the spot market. In 
this connection, the value of the Agreement to the stability 
of the Jamaican dollar, which is oftentimes overlooked, is of 
immense macro-economic significance to the country. 
 
¶19. (C) An issue that has arisen and which is currently being 
negotiated relates to the amount of crude oil that was 
imported by Petrojam in 2006, which was in excess of 
Jamaica's quota under the Agreement. The amount imported last 
year was 24,600 bpd, which is 1,100 above quota. Petrojam and 
 
PCJ contend that Jamaica should be entitled to carry-over 
this excess quantity, as a charge against the current year's 
quota. The Venezuelan authorities (PDVSA) however, argue that 
no agreement was reached between the two countries to permit 
this type of flexibility to be applied in the operation of 
the quota.  It is to be noted that although operational, the 
renewal of the Agreement for the current period, i.e. 29 June 
2007 to 28 June 2008 remains outstanding. (COMMENT: Minister 
of Energy, Mining and Telecommunications, Clive Mullings told 
the Ambassador and Econoff on January 23that the agreement 
was renewed after the December 2007 PETROCARIBE conference in 
Cuba. END COMMENT). 
 
Petrojam Upgrading and Expansion 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) The governments of Jamaica and Venezuela through the 
Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica (PCJ) and Petroleos de 
Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) have entered into a Joint Venture 
Agreement to partner on an expansion and upgrading project 
for the Petrojam refinery. The project is slated to be done 
in two phases; Phase 1 is currently underway, and is expected 
to be completed by the end of 2009, at an estimated cost of 
approximately USD 250 million. 
 
¶21. (C) Shares in the joint venture are allotted on a 51/49 
percent basis, with Petrojam holding majority shareholding. 
The end result of the upgrade will be to expand the capacity 
of the refinery from 36,000 to 50,000 bpd and through the 
introduction of new processing technology, to increase the 
proportion of higher quality fuel produced from crude 
supplies. 
 
¶22. (C) The capital requirements of the project will be met 
by both parties as equity partners, through a combination of 
debt and equity financing. There will be joint ownership of 
existing Petrojam assets by the Joint Venture partners in the 
first instance. Subsequently, the expanded refinery will be 
owned and operated under a common ownership structure. 
 
¶23. (C) It should be noted that to date, PDVSA has not 
provided payment for its 49 percent equity shareholding, 
which is valued at USD 63.7 million. The resolution 
authorizing payment is awaiting the signature of the PDVSA 
Board of Directors. The latest official word (as of 1st 
October, 2007) is that the signature of the Minister of 
Energy and Petroleum, Rafael Ramirez, is the only one that 
remains to be affixed. 
 
¶24. (S) (COMMENT: Jamaica has yet to be paid by Venezuela for 
the 49 percent stake, which has been an issue of concern for 
the cash strapped GOJ.  In December 2007, Golding told 
Ambassador Johnson he hoped to receive a USD 70 million 
payment from Chavez, see reftel.  However, Minister of 
Energy, Mining and Telecommunications, Clive Mullings told 
the Ambassador and Econoff on January 23 that the money still 
had not been paid.  Mullings said the GOJ hoped the funds 
might come by the end of the month, but he did not appear 
confident of this.  The GOJ is in serious need of these 
funds, the 2007-08 GOJ budget is already expected to miss its 
targets.  Government expenditures will surpass revenue 
collection by about six percent, which is above the 4.5 
percent target.  At the same time the inflation rate for 2007 
was 16.8 percent which is well above the GOJ target of 6 to 7 
percent.  Failure by the GOJ to collect these funds would 
further exacerbate the budget deficits.  END COMMENT). 
 
Highway 2000 Refinancing 
------------------------ 

¶25. (C) Venezuela's development bank BANDES undertook to 
refinance USD 260 million worth of loans secured since 2005 
to undertake the Highway 2000 project. A Heads of Agreement 
for funding the project was signed by both parties in 
Venezuela in January 2006. 
 
The main features of the agreement are as under: 
Borrower - Development Bank of Jamaica (DBJ) 
 
Lender - Venezuelan Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BANDES) 
Loan Amount - USD 260 million equivalent 
Current - EUROS 
Interest Rate - Fixed 7.5 percent (indicative swap rate in 
Euros, using as a reference the International Bond Rate of 
9.25 percent) 
Maturity - 2005 
 
The loan represented savings on interest costs charged to the 
project of approximately JAD 1.8 million per working day. 
 
The transactions for the final tranche of the loan payment by 
BANDES were finalized on August 15, 2007. 
 
Liquefied Natural Gas 
--------------------- 

¶26. (C) Negotiations have been on-going between PCJ and PDVSA 
Gas regarding the sourcing by Jamaica of LNG from Venezuela. 
Discussions had also centered on the possibility of securing 
LPG or Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) supplies. However, PDVSA 
Gas has recently taken LPG and CNG off the table. Having 
analyzed the situation, they claim they would not have enough 
extra LPG to supply to Jamaica as an interim to LNG. In terms 
of CNG they have expressed concerns about both its 
availability and the technology that is required. As such, 
the discussions now solely revolve around the possible supply 
of LNG. 
 
¶27. (C) Despite the mention of larger volumes earlier in the 
discussions, PDVSA Gas' current position is that it can only 
commit to 1.2 million tones of LNG per annum at this time, 
although the possibility of negotiating a greater amount in 
the future will remain open. The 1.2 million tones would 
represent 25 percent of PDVSA Gas' total LNG production. 
 
¶28. (C) One point of contention is that PDVSA Gas wished to 
make the supply commitment an annual one, i.e. renewable each 
year. This is the type of structure it uses in the oil 
industry and applies to the PetroCaribe Agreement, for 
example. The Jamaican negotiating team pointed out that this 
structure would not work in the LNG industry and that Jamaica 
was looking for a 20-year supply commitment. PDVSA Gas does 
not yet have any proposals regarding pricing, but it has been 
agreed that there should be some language in a MOU that 
signals the intention to supply gas to Jamaica on a favorable 
pricing basis. 
 
¶29. (C) Despite not having sufficient supplies of LPG to 
substitute for LNG, PDVSA Gas has demonstrated great interest 
in going after the existing LPG market in Jamaica and are 
keen to have discussions in this regard. 
 
¶30. (C) PDVSA Gas' current development schedule is for its 
LNG facility to be commissioned in the last quarter of 2012, 
so effectively Jamaica could not expect supply before 2013. 
The company has completed pre-FEED studies, but the FEED for 
its LNG facility is not expected to be finished before 
end-2008. It is likely, therefore, that Jamaica would have to 
wait a fairly long time to secure supplies of LNG from 
Venezuela. 
 
Simon Bolivar Cultural Centre 
----------------------------- 
 
¶31. (C) The project is designed to commemorate Simon 
Bolivar's sojourn in Jamaica, as well as to celebrate the 
strength of relations between Jamaica and Venezuela.  The 
Centre will comprise an exhibition hall and theatre, to be 
housed in a renovated two-storey Georgian building (the old 
Jamaica Agricultural Society building at the corner of North 
Parade and Church Street). The development plan for the Simon 
Bolivar Exhibition Hall represents the construction of a new 
280-300 Repertoire Theatre, and the restoration to their 
former glory of two structures of historic architectural 
significance from the Georgian period. 
 
¶32. (C) The UDC has completed the acquisition of the property 
from the Jamaica Agricultural Society that will serve as the 
location for the Centre. The GOJ has received grant funding 
from the Government of Venezuela in the amount of USD 2 
million to undertake the project. An amount of USD 640,000.00 
is being provided by the GOJ as counterpart funding. 
 
¶33. (C) Although the architectural designs have been 
completed, the UDC is awaiting the go-ahead from the 
Venezuelan government, which has yet to authorize the payment 
to be made to the Venezuelan architects. The completion of 
the designs were severely delayed, as a result of 
modifications that had to be undertaken in order to bring 
them into compliance with the requirements of the Jamaican 
planning authorities. Design approval is still being awaited 
from the KSAC. 
 
Jamaica,s Request for Emergency Fertilizer Supplies 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 

¶34. (C) Prime Minister Simpson Miller met at Vale Royal on 
2nd August, 2007 with a Special Envoy dispatched by President 
Chavez, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Rodolfo Sanzo. The 
purpose of Vice Minister Sanz's visit was to encourage Prime 
Minister Simpson Miller to personally attend the 3rd 
PetroCaribe Summit, which took place in Caracas on 9th-10th 
August, 2007. Prime Minister Simpson Miller had previously 
indicated that she was unable to attend the Summit, due to 
the imminence of the General Elections. In the event, the 
Special Envoy was unable to persuade the Prime Minister to 
change her decision in this regard. 
 
¶35. (C) Prime Minister Simpson Miller used the opportunity of 
her meeting with Vice Minister Sanz to make an urgent request 
for the Government of Venezuela's assistance in the provision 
of fertilizer, which she indicated Jamaica was willing to pay 
for on a normal commercial basis. She explained that the cost 
of fertilizer was exorbitant and that Jamaican farmers had 
complained loudly that they could not afford it. Vice 
Minister Sanz promised to communicate the request to 
President Chavez and provide a response as soon as possible. 
 
¶36. (C) Since the meeting, contact has been made with the 
Venezuelan company PEQUIVEN, which has advised that it has 
instructions "to supply Jamaica with fertilizer in the most 
economical and efficient way possible." It has proposed two 
options: a) physically mix the three basic components in 
Venezuela and ship the product to Jamaica; or b) ship the 
components to Jamaica and have the blending done there. 
PEQUIVEN advises that the second option is preferred, as a 
blended product is altered on being transported (some 
possible separation) and in addition, a recently blended 
fresh product is more efficacious. Option two is also likely 
to bring other benefits to the importer, in terms of price 
and transport costs. 
 
¶37. (C) The Ministry of Agriculture had advised that as the 
GOJ did not have any blending facilities available, its 
preference was to import blended and bagged fertilizer. This 
had been communicated by the Mission in Caracas to PEQUIVEN. 
 
PEQUIVEN has recently been in touch with Fersan, a firm from 
the Dominican Republic based in Jamaica, which advised that 
it could do the blending. PEQUIVEN is willing to work with 
Fersan to supply it with the components, subject to GOJ 
agreement. 
 
Proposed Construction of Children,s Hospital in Western 
Jamaica 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 

¶38. (C) In mid-July 2006, the Ministry of Health submitted a 
Concept Paper to the Foreign Ministry on the establishment of 
a Children's Hospital in Western Jamaica. This followed a 
request that was made by Prime Minister Simpson Miller to 
President Chavez, during his visit on 12th March, 2007 when 
an MOU on the Development and Expansion of Gas in Jamaica was 
signed. 
 
¶39. (C) Jamaica's Mission in Caracas informed on 15th August, 
2007 that the Concept Paper had been provided to the 
Venezuelan health authorities. The Mission noted, however, 
that what would now be needed is a decision to be taken at 
the highest political level. It also noted that the initial 
Concept Paper was short on technical details, which would be 
required in order to move the project forward, once the 
political decision had been taken by President Chavez. 
 
Politically Sensitive Issues 
---------------------------- 

¶40. (C) Jamaica has become increasingly reliant on Venezuela 
as a source of energy supplies and of financial and technical 
assistance.  It may, therefore, be asked to pay an 
ideological price for the support it has received, viz. to 
subscribe to President Chavez,s dream of creating a 
strategic anti-imperialist alliance of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. 
 
¶41. (C) Jamaica needs to be fully cognizant of the economic 
threat that a fall in oil prices could pose to Venezuela's 
ability to continue to fund its development programs and 
projects. Political changes in Venezuela could also adversely 
affect Jamaica's active bilateral cooperation program with 
Venezuela. 
 
¶42. (C) There is the possibility that Jamaica's relations 
with the US, and to an extent the UK and Canada, may be 
negatively affected as a result of the perception that it is 
forging closer political, ideological, economic, and trade 
ties with Venezuela. This comes against the background of 
strained US/Venezuela relations. The US views Chavez as a 
"negative force in the region", and has been mobilizing 
political support for a "united front" of Latin American and 
Caribbean nations. This has caused increased scrutiny to be 
placed on Jamaica's relations with Venezuela and 
consequential pressure to reduce the level of bilateral 
interaction. 
 
¶43. (C) The US mounted vigorous efforts to lobby against 
Venezuela's bid last year to secure a nonpermanent seat on 
the UN Security Council, which saw the US Ambassador in 
Kingston meeting with the Jamaican Prime Minister to urge 
support for Guatemala's bid. 
 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas ALBA 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶44. (C) The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) 
trade block was created a little over two years ago by 
Venezuela and Cuba as an alternative to the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) promoted by the US. The governments of 
Bolivia and Nicaragua later joined the ALBA project, and 
Ecuador has evaluated the possibility of joining as well. It 
represents the first attempt at regional integration that is 
not based primarily on trade liberalization but on a new 
vision of social welfare and equity. 
 
¶45. (C) The countries that make up the ALBA trade block met 
in Venezuela on 6th June, 2007 for a meeting of the ALBA 
Foreign Ministers. The meeting set forth future integration 
projects, the initiative's organizational structure, and the 
countries agreed on the formation of an ALBA development 
bank. 
 
¶46. (C) Upon closing the meeting President Hugo Chavez 
emphasized the importance of the ALBA program as a 
counterforce to the FTAA, which he labeled imperialist and 
hegemonic. 'We must go on visualizing a federation or 
confederation of ALBA states" he said, emphasizing the need 
to free the region of the old types of integration that there 
have been in Latin America. President Chavez stated that they 
had to pay special attention to not turn the ALBA integration 
project into a project "with the same vices of the 
integration models that we have had since a long time ago. 
ALBA has to be distinct," he concluded. 
 
¶47. (C) President Chavez has been pressing Jamaica to join 
the ALBA and emphasized this to Prime Minister Simpson Miller 
during his last visit to Jamaica on 12th March 2007 to 
conclude an MOU on the Development and Expansion of Gas in 
Jamaica. On that occasion he pointedly juxtaposed his 
invitation for Jamaica to join ALBA with his offer of 
economic and technical assistance. For example, in confirming 
his government's intention to supply the natural gas that 
Jamaica needed to expand its bauxite industry, he pointed out 
that, via ALBA, Jamaica could go further and develop the 
process towards aluminium, aluminium oxide and various 
alloys. He remarked that "whatever Jamaica decides on it 
(i.e. to join ALBA), we would look for resources within ALBA 
to develop that chain, as we are currently doing with Cuba 
with steel, for instance." 
 
Benefits of the Relationship to Venezuela 
----------------------------------------- 

¶48. (C) The Chavez Administration has provided significant 
levels of support to Jamaica, both in financial and economic 
terms. The question that therefore arises is, "What does 
Venezuela wish, or expect to receive, in return?" 
 
¶49. (C) In point of fact, the Venezuelan government has not 
requested a quid pro quo for the support and assistance it 
has rendered to Jamaica thus far. This, however, may point 
more to the subtlety of the modus operandi adopted by the 
Chavez government's relations with Jamaica, than a genuine 
lack of expectation for a future pay-off. If this is the 
case, it would reflect a deftness of approach not witnessed 
in Chavez's relations with other countries in the hemisphere. 
 
¶50. (C) The two areas in which the Chavez administration 
would mostly benefit, in terms of support from Jamaica are: 
 
¶A. International Support 
¶B. Ideological endorsement 
 
¶51. (C) These two areas bear some relationship to each other 
as the position adopted by Venezuela internationally, 
together with the support it seeks from its international 
partners have become more conspicuous as a result of the 
strong ideological beliefs espoused by President Chavez. A 
vote cast in support of Venezuela within multilateral fora is 
very closely scrutinized, precisely because of the 
ideological positions adopted by its President. 
 
International Support 
--------------------- 

¶52. (C) Venezuela, as is the case with most countries, places 
a priority on gaining the backing of those countries within 
its regional ambit. This includes the candidatures it puts 
forward for seats on international bodies. That it would 
court Jamaica's vote for its bid to secure a non-permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council is therefore unsurprising. 
One can reasonably assume that, given the level of assistance 
provided to Jamaica and in view of the traditional strong 
bonds of friendship between the countries, Venezuela 
harboured a reasonable expectation that it would have 
received Jamaica's support. 
(END TEXT PART ONE SEE SEPTEL FOR PART II) 
JOHNSON