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P 100329Z JAN 08
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3830
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER 
DEPT FOR EAP/CM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2033 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SOCI CH HK MC
SUBJECT: INTERNAL DISSENT HAMPERS HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
REF: A. HONG KONG 2855 
     ¶B. HONG KONG 1447 
     ¶C. HONG KONG 2949 
     ¶D. HONG KONG 3008 
     ¶E. HONG KONG 458 
     ¶F. HONG KONG 3118 
     ¶G. HONG KONG 3103 
 
Classified By: E/P Chief Laurent Charbonnet.  Reasons: 1.4(b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  "Reformist" members of the Hong Kong 
Democratic Party (DP) recently sent an internal memorandum to 
the party's leaders, expressing deep concern over the party's 
poor showing in the November 18 district council election 
(ref a) as well as its overall strategic and policy 
direction.  The reformers also were disappointed that they 
were not included in an internal review of the party's 
performance in the election.  Calling for a thorough review 
of "inadequacies" in the party, the group offered eight 
recommendations for recruiting young political talent, 
improving the organization of the party, and directly linking 
funds to community-oriented programs.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment:  The existence of the internal DP memorandum, 
and the fact that two members of the "reformist" group 
provided it to us, suggest that the party's poor showing in 
the district council election has sharpened internal, largely 
generational differences over strategy and tactics.  While 
the victory of independent pro-democracy candidate Anson Chan 
in the December 2 Legco by-election may have temporarily 
soothed some of Hong Kong's pan-democrats, that situation in 
many ways was unique and may not reflect any broader or 
longer term improvement in the ability of the democratic camp 
to coordinate and cooperate against their better organized 
and funded rivals in the DAB.  Indeed, the Democratic Party 
seems to have dissipated whatever momentum Anson Chan's 
election might have brought.  In the wake of the December 29 
National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) 
decision authorizing Hong Kong to move ahead toward universal 
suffrage (refs f, g), and concurrently the run-up to the 
hugely important September 2008 Legco general election, the 
ability of the DP to heal itself and to work with like-minded 
colleagues in the pan-democratic camp will be crucial. 
 
¶3. (S//NF) Comment, continued: The challenges to the 
pan-democratic camp are stark -- Beijing seems to have scored 
a public relations coup with the NPCSC decision ruling out 
universal suffrage in 2012 but establishing the possibility 
of full suffrage for the chief executive election in 2017. 
Chinese University conducted a public opinion poll shortly 
after the NPCSC decision and found that 72 percent of 
respondents found the decision "acceptable," even if a 
majority would have preferred 2012; 69 percent believed that 
Beijing is sincere about implementing universal suffrage and 
is responsive to Hong Kong's aspirations for democracy. 
Perhaps more telling for the pan-democrats, 56 percent of 
respondents did not support continued struggle for universal 
suffrage in 2012, in the aftermath of the NPCSC decision. 
(Septel will analyze this and other local reactions to the 
NPCSC decision.) 
 
¶4. (C) Comment, continued:  We are not certain of the 
reformists' motivations in revealing to us internal 
Democratic Party documents.  Clearly, they were trying to 
spin us and get us involved in the internal factional 
disputes of the Democratic Party -- which we have no 
intention of doing.  During a meeting in August, the same 
contacts appealed to the U.S. Government for help in "saving 
the party from its own demise," and explicitly asked that we 
speak well of them to DP Chairman Albert Ho and former DP 
Chairman and sitting Legislative Council (Legco) member 
Martin Lee.  Similarly, at our meeting in early December, 
they asked if we had met with party leaders following the 
district elections and if we could shed light on what the 
leadership's sentiments were following the party's widespread 
defeat, and asked that we convey or otherwise endorse their 
views when meeting with DP leaders.  Regardless of their 
motivations, the memorandum provides detailed insight into 
the divisions in the party organization and weaknesses of its 
policy approach which are widely seen in Hong Kong as 
damaging to the party's efforts to fight for increased 
democracy for the Hong Kong people. 
 
End comment. 
 
Reform or Bust 
-------------- 
 
 
HONG KONG 00000053  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (S//NF) Hong Kong District Councilor and Democratic Party 
(DP) member Jimmy Wong (strictly protect) and the party's 
public relations consultant Raymond Luk (strictly protect) 
recently told us that in the wake of the DP's failures in the 
district council elections on November 18 (ref a), reformists 
in the party -- led by Chan King-ming, founding member and 
former party vice chairman -- sent an internal memorandum to 
the party "central leadership" to express their deep concern 
over recent failures as well as the overall direction of the 
party.  (Note:  Wong and Luk passed a copy of the memo to 
poloffs at a lunch meeting.  End note.)  The following DP 
members drafted the letter and identified themselves as "The 
Reformist Faction of the Democratic Party":  Chan King-ming, 
Fan Kwok-wai, Ho Suk-ping, Kwan Wing-yip, Kwong Kwok-chuen, 
Lee Wai-man, Lo Yun-ming, Luk Yiu-man (Raymond), Wong 
Chun-wai (Jimmy), Yum Kai-bong, and Yung Ming-chau.  During 
our meeting with them on December 11, Wong and Luk also 
posited that a DP-Civic Party merger, which has been publicly 
suggested since the establishment of the Civic Party in March 
2005, would have certain merits. 
 
Background on DP Divisions 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S//NF) In recent years, the Democratic Party has been 
plagued by division into two main camps:  "the mainstreamers" 
and "the reformists," though smaller, yet divisive factions 
also exist within the party leadership.  Political pundits in 
Hong Kong often cite these divisions as the root cause of 
weakness in the DP.  In March 2006, responding to concerns 
that "PRC infiltrators" had penetrated the party in an 
attempt to gather information and possibly disrupt party 
activities, the Democratic Party's Central Standing Committee 
assembled a five-member "special panel."  After an 
eight-month investigation, the panel's report to the party 
(released internally in November 2006 -- see ref b) labeled 
Chan King-Ming, Jimmy Wong and Raymond Luk as "PRC 
infiltrators."  The report included copies of emails between 
Luk and contacts on the mainland, which it characterized as 
clear evidence that Luk was an "infiltrator."  For example, 
the report asserted that Luk had reported minutes of 
politically sensitive DP meetings to contacts on the mainland 
immediately after they were held.  Chan King-ming also was 
singled out for attending many meetings with mainland 
officials -- including from propaganda, public security and 
liaison departments/offices -- without properly reporting his 
contacts as stipulated in DP by-laws.  (Comment:  The DP 
report on infiltration, while compelling, does not provide 
completely solid evidence that mainland functionaries have 
infiltrated the DP.  It may have served as a tool for 
political jockeying within the DP, possibly in an attempt to 
deter efforts by reformists to oust the party's more 
"mainstream" senior leadership.  End comment.) 
 
Shape Up or Ship Out 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Among other concerns, the reformist faction, in its 
letter to central party leaders ("mainstreamers"), expressed 
"extreme disappointment" over not being invited to a DP 
meeting to review lessons learned after widespread defeats in 
the November 18 district council elections.  They claimed 
this lack of coordination reflected the leadership's 
"perfunctory attitude, and lack of sincerity and commitment." 
 The group also called for a thorough review of 
"inadequacies" in the party, and stressed that party leaders 
should be introspective rather than put blame on factors 
external to the party.  The document noted the steady decline 
in the "July 1 effect" (alluding to political momentum the 
pan-democratic camp enjoyed following widespread 
demonstrations held on July 1, 2003, protesting national 
security legislation and advocating universal suffrage): 
"Following the conclusion of the last district board 
election, we simply must not take a passive stance dreaming 
for such miracles as the 'July 1' incident to occur again. 
If the leadership had had vision, they would have been aware, 
three or four years ago, of the adverse battle scene today in 
the absence of the 'July 1 effect,' and they ought to have 
been a lot more cautious about the election."  The drafters 
also questioned whether the DP central leadership had ever 
seriously attempted to foster party development at the 
community level, especially in light of the magnitude of 
resources at the disposal of the pro-establishment parties in 
Hong Kong. 
 
¶8. (C) The authors argued that increasingly savvy Hong Kong 
voters will tend to cast their ballots in accordance with the 
actual attributes of individual candidates, rather than 
 
HONG KONG 00000053  003 OF 003 
 
 
strictly along party lines.  They provided a table showing 
the percentage of votes secured in select constituencies in 
the district council election and the Hong Kong Island Legco 
by-election held on December 2 (ref C), indicating that 
voters did not vote along party lines.  The average 
percentage of votes earned by the DP candidates in the 
district council elections was approximately 40 percent, 
whereas Anson Chan, the pro-democracy candidate in the Legco 
by-election, earned an average 57 percent in the same areas. 
 
A Way Ahead 
----------- 
 
¶9. (C) The authors suggested that the "rival camp" (Hong 
Kong's pro-establishment parties) has been successful largely 
because it has focused on recruiting young political talent, 
maturing the organization of the party, and directly linking 
funds to community-oriented programs.  They offered eight 
"concrete suggestions" for the DP leadership to consider. 
The party should: 
 
a) Begin a "rejuvenation" of party leaders and power 
decentralization; 
b) Not allow party members to hold concurrent seats in Legco 
and district council from 2011 onwards; 
c) Reconstitute a party school to attract and train young 
members; 
d) Set up a district strategic development task force to 
prepare for the 2011 DC election and fine tune the party's 
long-term election strategy; 
e) Allocate resources for overseas travel by district 
councilors to study campaign strategies in other democratic 
countries; 
f) Enhance communication with non-democrats; 
g) Strengthen the party's Youth Committee and enhance liaison 
with young students; 
h) Review the DP's district policies (especially in the areas 
of education, welfare, medical and conservation) to focus on 
community concerns. 
 
¶10. (S//NF) In August 2007, when Wong and Luk sought meetings 
with us to voice concerns over the leadership and direction 
of the party, Wong speculated that the pan-democrats stood to 
lose many seats in the district council elections (this came 
to pass), and that those losses together with the party's 
perceived failures over the Green Paper (electoral reform) 
consultation process would lead to huge losses in the 
September 2008 Legco election.  He also said he was satisfied 
with the substance and function of the Green Paper, and 
suggested that the Hong Kong people were more than capable of 
using it as a platform to decide how best to move forward 
with universal suffrage. 
Cunningham