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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUANGZHOU 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM, EB/OMA 
STATE PASS USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON CH
SUBJECT: Shenzhen Development Bank Forging New Territory with 
Chinese Regulators 
 
(U) THIS DOCUMENT IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  IT SHOULD NOT BE 
DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE U.S. GOVERNMENT CHANNELS OR IN ANY PUBLIC FORUM 
WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONCURRENCE OF THE ORIGINATOR.  IT SHOULD NOT BE 
POSTED ON THE INTERNET. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB), the first company 
to list publicly in China, is working closely with Chinese 
regulators to clarify untested regulations governing China's 
financial system especially as they relate to proprietary 
information, according to the bank's American chairman.  He 
described a positive relationship with regulators and expressed 
satisfaction in helping raise professional standards of bank staff, 
but expects tight controls on lending to continue next year.  End 
summary. 
 
Breaking New Ground in Regulatory System 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) SDB has had to work closely with Chinese securities and 
banking regulators to clarify untested regulations in China's 
financial system, according to SDB Chairman and CEO Frank Newman. 
Newman told us December 18 that on several occasions bank executives 
have had to repeatedly question instructions from regulators to 
determine exactly what was required under Chinese regulations.  For 
example, Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) officials 
notified the bank that, according to Chinese regulations, it would 
have to publicize all resolutions reached at board meetings 
immediately after the decisions were made.  SDB executives raised 
concerns about releasing proprietary information that could give 
competitors an advantage.  After several discussions with 
regulators, the two sides agreed that SDB could fulfill its 
obligations by publishing a summary of board resolutions.  Newman 
said that SDB was currently engaged in a similar process with CSRC 
over the legality of board director elections after one of the 
board's independent supervisors had been disqualified by CSRC. 
Christina Bao, Newman's special assistant, noted that because SDB 
was the first company in China to list publicly (its ticker code is 
000001), it had often been the first to test securities regulations. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Newman explained that several discussions on the limits of 
Chinese regulations had revolved around the meaning of the word 
"advice."  On more than one occasion, regulators offered SDB 
"advice" on its operations when the "advice" was really intended as 
a requirement.  Newman first had to clarify the regulators' intent 
and then sometimes questioned the regulatory basis for the 
requirement. 
 
Shared Goal of Success 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Despite this series of discussions with regulators, Newman 
described SDB's relationship with them as positive overall.  Newman 
said that CSRC and the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
were both supportive of Newbridge Capital's equity stake in SDB and 
wanted the foreign investment venture to succeed.  He acknowledged 
that Newbridge is not in the banking business for the long haul.  It 
will sell its stake in SDB once the value of its investment has 
risen enough.  However, he emphasized that Newbridge's strategy was 
not to buy companies and flip them for a quick profit and the firm 
wanted to avoid that kind of reputation.  Instead, Newbridge plans 
to add substantial value to SDB before divesting its stake. 
 
Anticipating Tighter Controls 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) When asked about recent controls on bank lending, He 
Zhijiang, SDB's Treasurer, affirmed that they were currently very 
tight.  He complained of the difficulty banks face in turning a 
profit with such limited ability to issue loans.  Newman commented 
that he expected CBRC to give SDB a specific lending cap for 2008. 
He noted that in a conversation in Beijing, senior banking officials 
had expressed frustration with the limited range of tools at their 
disposal for controlling monetary expansion.  They told him they 
would prefer to use open market operations or other more 
sophisticated tools but lacked such options for now. 
 
IPO Problems 
------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Newman also complained about the effect of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) on China's financial sector.  He explained that 
every time there's a major IPO, SDB depositors withdraw large 
amounts of funds and transfer them to the four major banks that 
 
GUANGZHOU 00000001  002 OF 002 
 
 
handle IPOs in hopes of being able to purchase the undervalued 
shares.  He said the total value of the withdrawals from SDB can 
reach RMB 15 billion (US$2 billion) for high-profile IPOs -- much of 
which returns back to SDB after the IPO.  He also criticized the 
lottery-like impact of IPOs on income distribution in China, noting 
that they reward the well connected and the lucky.  He also pointed 
out the much of the same criticism could be made of IPOs in the 
United States. 
 
Lessons Learned After 2 1/2 Years 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Looking back on the accomplishments of his first two and a 
half years as Chairman of SDB, Newman underscored raising the 
professional standards of the bank's staff.  In particular, he noted 
a standardized code of conduct that was issued to all bank employees 
on his instructions.  Senior banking regulators have held it up as 
an example for banks all over China, according to Newman.  He also 
pointed to successful efforts to establish central financial control 
over bank branches, explaining that without such controls a single 
bad branch manager can bring down the whole bank. 
 
Newbridge and Newman - Background and Bio 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Newbridge purchased an 18-percent stake in SDB in 2004 for 
approximately US$150 million.  It controls four seats on the 
17-member board.  Bao Steel bought a 5.4 percent stake in SDB for 
US$571 million in December 2007 to become the second largest 
shareholder, controlling one board seat.   As of September 30, 2007, 
SDB held deposits totaling RMB 288 billion (about US$3.8 billion) 
and had a non-performing loan ratio of 6.41 percent, down from 7.98 
percent at the start of 2007.  The bank earned a net profit of RMB 
1.87 billion (US$250 million) during the first nine months of the 
year, up 110 percent from the same period a year earlier. 
 
¶8. (U) Frank Newman joined Shenzhen Development Bank as chairman and 
CEO in June 2005.  His banking career began at Citigroup in 1969 and 
included positions at Wells Fargo and Bank of America before Newman 
joined the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 1993.  He served first 
as Under Secretary for Domestic Finance and then as Deputy Secretary 
from 1994 to 1995.  Subsequently, he became Senior Vice Chairman and 
then President and CEO of Bankers Trust until 1999. 
 
GOLDBERG