VZCZCXRO7734
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHCP #0022/01 0221120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221120Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4018
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 000022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2028 
TAGS: MOPS NATO PGOV PREL PTER AF DA
SUBJECT: DENMARK: GOVERNMENT FIRM, PUBLIC NERVOUS ON 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James P. Cain, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Denmark's participation in ISAF enjoys broad 
parliamentary support, and the Danish government is looking 
to do more in Afghanistan.  Danish public support regarding 
NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, however, is slipping, 
jarred by continuing casualties and the perception that other 
Allies are unwilling to share the risks and dangers of 
fighting in Afghanistan's restive south.  Denmark's 
government is moving to shore up public opinion to seal fault 
lines in an otherwise solid parliamentary foundation. The USG 
needs to acknowledge Denmark's contribution in Afghanistan, 
while helping with the success stories Denmark needs to 
convince an increasingly skeptical public that NATO can 
prevail against the Taliban. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Denmark's robust engagement in Afghanistan has from 
its beginning in 2002 enjoyed broad parliamentary support, 
including among the largest Danish opposition parties. 
Indeed, the Danish military presence in Afghanistan, part of 
the British-led Task Force Helmand, increased from 
approximately 290 soldiers to a total at the close of 2007 of 
roughly 550 soldiers (250 of whom were redeployed from Iraq 
when Denmark ended its military engagement there in summer 
2007).  Official Danish support has held even through nine 
casualties in Afghanistan, a significant number for Denmark. 
Five of those casualties have come in the last four months 
alone, raising fears here that Denmark's growing presence in 
Helmand is providing a larger and easier target for the 
Taliban. 
 
¶3. (C) Those casualties, and a spate of negative press 
questioning strategy and the effectiveness of military and 
civilian engagement, are eating into public support for 
Denmark's participation in ISAF.  A poll released in the 
closing weeks of 2007 showed 48 percent of Danes want troops 
brought home from Afghanistan, while 43 percent continue to 
support engagement.  The Danish Defense Command has also, for 
the first time and within the last six months, encountered 
some difficulty in attracting new recruits to serve in 
Afghanistan. 
 
¶4. (C) The Danish government says its commitment to 
Afghanistan is firm.  In fact, Danish officials tell us they 
want to do more in Afghanistan.  Danish MFA Security Policy 
Department Chief Lone Wisborg insisted January 15 that 
Denmark "has the momentum we need" to continue in 
Afghanistan.  Still, officials recognize the need to shore up 
public support. Lisbet Zilmer-Johns, foreign policy advisor 
to Danish PM Rasmussen, told us recently it was no mistake 
the PM had focused on Afghanistan and Danish engagement there 
in his annual televised New Year's address.  Danish officials 
note all of Denmark's political parties supporting the 
Afghanistan deployment know they need to engage with an 
increasingly skeptical Danish public. Wisborg said the Danish 
MFA and MOD will organize an Afghanistan-themed conference in 
late February, focusing on Denmark's contribution and 
including some Afghan ministers.  The Danish parliament will 
hold public meetings in the spring to highlight the 
importance of Danish support. 
 
¶5. (C) The Danish government also recently released a 
"Helmand Plan," a series of recommendations for increasing 
the effectiveness of Danish reconstruction efforts in the 
south and focusing on more effective military and civilian 
cooperation.  Wisborg explained that the Helmand Plan is part 
of a broader Danish government policy review of its overall 
engagement in Afghanistan.  The plan has been well received 
by Danish policy makers and politicians. 
 
¶6. (C) Both MFA and PM's office note the "Helmand Plan" and 
broader strategy review are designed not just to build public 
support but to identify areas where Denmark could offer 
additional contributions to ISAF.  Wisborg and other contacts 
in the Danish MOD tell us that Denmark is keeping an open 
mind on OMLTs, but experts are concerned that Denmark's 
limited resources and experienced military officers might be 
spread too thin if asked to take on this additional mission. 
Moreover, the MFA does not consider F-16s a "foreign policy 
priority" for Denmark, but Wisborg acknowledged there are 
some in the Danish MOD and Defense Command who feel 
otherwise.  MFA and the PM's office clearly prefer the focus 
of any new Danish resources should be on training the Afghan 
National Army. 
 
¶7. (C) The Danish government is looking at other means to 
strengthen public and parliamentary support.  MFA is 
gathering examples of reconstruction "success stories" that 
 
COPENHAGEN 00000022  002 OF 002 
 
 
can be passed to politicians for use with wavering 
constituents.  MOD continues journalist visits to 
Afghanistan.  Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller this 
past week authored an op-ed piece arguing that success in 
Afghanistan is not merely a question of Alliance solidarity, 
but is also critical to Denmark's own security. Danish Chief 
of Defense Staff Tim Sloth Joergensen recently stated 
publicly that he believes Danish troops will be in 
Afghanistan for at least another five years, as part of a 
reconstruction effort that could still last another 10-15 
years. 
 
¶8. (C) The PM's office, meanwhile, is closely tracking public 
opinion and its impact on the political coalition backing the 
deployment.  Here, said Zilmer-Johns, the government is 
particularly focused on dual themes of security and 
reconstruction, since different parties in the parliamentary 
coalition supporting the ISAF mission could, if public 
support continues to erode, split along these two lines. 
Denmark's minority government depends on the rightist Danish 
People's Party (DPP), and the DPP has been deeply skeptical 
of civilian reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, 
emphasizing instead the importance of counter-terrorism and 
combat missions directed at the Taliban. 
 
¶9. (C) In contrast, the Danish Social Democratic Party, 
Denmark's largest opposition party, supports the ISAF mission 
but has frequently complained that the government has 
neglected civilian reconstruction in Afghanistan. 
Emphasizing that military and reconstruction efforts are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing (stressing the 
"comprehensive approach"), the Danish government remains 
optimistic it can address the concerns of both groups.  The 
MFA has also begun to consult more frequently with the Social 
Democrats on strategy, and the Danish parliament's Foreign 
Policy Committee is considering a trip to Afghanistan later 
this year. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment:  While official Danish support for 
engagement in Afghanistan is built on a strong foundation of 
cross-party support, we cannot take Denmark for granted.  If 
trends continue and the Danish public grows more insistent in 
its questioning of strategy, we could see a split within 
parliament.  The USG can help by continuing to provide Danish 
policy makers and politicians with success stories, and by 
being careful not to inadvertently slight the Danish 
contribution.  The Danes are particularly grateful whenever 
our senior policymakers note their contribution publicly, as 
Secretary Gates did January 17, listing Denmark as one of the 
 
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Allies the U.S. values most in southern Afghanistan.  With 
the resolute support of the Danish government and some help 
from us in ensuring that the public knows its forces are both 
needed and valued, we believe we can continue to count on 
Denmark in Afghanistan. 
CAIN