VZCZCXRO2625
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #0071/01 0281058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281058Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6181
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018 
TAGS: PREL PBTS OSCE RU UK MD
SUBJECT: SOVA: READY FOR NEXT STEPS AFTER VORONIN'S MEETING 
WITH PUTIN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Apparently, no major Transnistria (TN) 
initiatives flowed from the January 21-22 Putin-Voronin talks 
in Moscow.  Minister Sova recently talked twice with 
Transnistrian "Foreign Minister" Litskai, who confidentially 
warned Sova that Smirnov or his inner circle may stage a 
provocation to take back central government-controlled 
villages near Dubasari.  Litskai told Sova that he would 
welcome TN participation in working groups, but Smirnov had 
prohibited such cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
Russian Says No Transnistrian Breakthrough 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Russian Ambassador to Moldova Valeriy Kouzmin hosted 
an informal get-together at his home on January 23 to review 
the Putin-Voronin Moscow meetings.  Invites included all of 
the 5 2 parties as well as the Belarussian, British, French 
and Hungarian Ambassadors.  Kouzmin explained that we had no 
firm details of the Putin-Voronin meeting which took place as 
only four were in the meeting.  (Yuri Zubakov for the 
Russians and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration Andrei Stratan for the Moldovans were the only 
two who joined the presidents.)  However, Kouzmin said he was 
certain that Putin gave Voronin no/no framework or document 
that would move a Transnistria settlement forward. 
 
¶3. (C) During the dinner, Litskai and Sova spoke one-on-one. 
In addition, the 5 2 parties (Ukrainian Ambassador Serghiy 
Prizhkov, EU Special Representative Kalman Mizsei, OSCE Chief 
of Mission Philip Remler, Ambassador Kouzmin, Ambassador 
Kirby, Litskai and Sova) talked about the future of 
settlement talks.  All agreed on the need to keep talks 
moving, building on the momentum started in Odessa in October 
¶2007.  While neither Litskai nor Sova thought that much would 
come immediately from talks -- be they formal or informal -- 
they would provide some assistance to any parallel talks. 
Remler took the task of calling the Finns (as OSCE Chairman) 
to move the date of the next 3 2 meeting from late April to 
mid-late February. 
 
The West Would Not Guarantee MD's Neutrality 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) On January 24, Ambassador Kirby met with Minister for 
Reintegration Sova to see if he knew more about the summit 
than did Kouzmin.  Sova said he did not know the details of 
Voronin's private conversation with Putin, but pointed to the 
Kommersant newspaper article describing Moscow's position. 
Sova said his experience had shown that one should not 
underestimate Kommersant's accuracy.  Russian Ambassador 
Kouzmin earlier had downplayed the Kommersant article. 
 
¶5. (C) One of the Russian conditions for a TN settlement 
cited in the Kommersant article was an internationally 
binding agreement signed by Russia, Ukraine, the EU and the 
U.S. to guarantee Moldova's permanent neutrality.  The 
Ambassador explained to Sova that the 1955 Austrian State 
Treaty and the Zimbabwean Lancaster House Agreement provided 
international guarantees under various conditions, but that 
those conditions did not apply to Moldova.  Moldova could 
undertake not to change certain constitutional provisions for 
a specified period, perhaps 10 or 15 years.  Demilitarization 
and the creation of a gendarmerie might be a serious step 
towards reassuring Russia on neutrality.  Regarding Russia's 
fear of possible Moldovan membership in NATO, the Ambassador 
noted that Moldova was not ready for NATO nor was NATO ready 
for Moldova.  However, we would like Moldova to continue to 
contribute to international peacekeeping and humanitarian 
missions through NATO's Partnership for Peace program. 
 
Litskai and Sova Discuss Possible Provocation, 
Working Groups, Railroad 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (C) In the last two weeks Sova met with Litskai twice 
under Russian aegis.  Litskai shared with Sova his concern 
that Smirnov's actions were increasingly unpredictable as 
Smirnov feared losing power.  Litskai alerted Sova that he 
feared TN security forces might try to take control of 
Chisinau-controlled villages in the security zone around 
Dubasari.  Litskai told Sova that Smirnov's inner circle had 
been discussing such a plan to put pressure on Chisinau, 
suggesting that Russian peacekeeping forces in the security 
zone might permit such a move.  Litskai planned to travel to 
Moscow this week to ascertain whether this idea was a local 
initiative or ordered by Moscow.  According to Sova, Litskai 
said that Shevchuk also planned to visit Moscow soon. 
Litskai noted that he did not want any security provocations, 
and discussed with Sova ways to prevent such incidents. 
 
CHISINAU 00000071  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Sova said he and Litskai had also discussed Voronin's 
proposal for working groups.  Litskai said he would be 
willing to cooperate, but Smirnov had prohibited 
participation.  Sova noted that the working group on 
demilitarization would require bringing together Moldovan and 
Transnistrian military experts, perhaps with the 
participation of Russian, European and American specialists. 
 
¶8. (C) Sova told us that a third key issue he discussed with 
Litskai was TN's railroad initiative, which, Sova said, was 
structured such that Chisinau authorities could not accept 
it.  Sova stated that Chisinau would not allow two separate 
railroad companies to exist in Moldova though the central 
government was willing to compromise on sharing railroad 
revenues and profits.  He noted that during Kalman Mizsei's 
recent visit to Tiraspol, Shevchuk had also presented the 
same plan to reinstate railroad traffic to the EU. 
 
Ukrainian Help on Transnistria is Key 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Sova suggested that Transnistria would be included on 
the agenda when Ukrainian President Yushchenko visits Moscow 
on February 23.  Sova complained that the Ukrainians had been 
too passive on TN and were more interested in resolving other 
issues in Ukrainian-Moldovan relations.  Sova insisted that 
these issues (property, border demarcation, a hydro-electric 
dam, railroads and Giurgiulesti port) be resolved as a 
package.  The Ambassador agreed that by keeping them as a 
package it allowed Moldova to show flexibility.  He also 
encouraged Sova to conclude a deal with Ukraine to (1) show 
that Moldova could have good relations with at least one 
neighbor and (2) so that Ukraine might become more disposed 
to taking a more dynamic and constructive role in the TN 
settlement process. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Only Voronin knows the contents of his closed-door 
meeting with Putin.  The Ambassador is seeking a meeting with 
Voronin to discuss the meeting.  Chisinau is buzzing with 
speculation about Russia's current position on TN settlement. 
 Litskai's comments to Sova indicate surprising frankness and 
willingness to criticize Smirnov directly to the Chisinau 
side.  Litskai's willingness to have TN participate in 
working groups and discussions of demilitarization suggest 
that Smirnov is the main obstacle to confidence-building 
talks.  The unanswered questions are, to what extend does 
Smirnov represent Moscow's position and what interests in 
Moscow does he represent.  We should capitalize on the 
momentum generated by Finnish FM Kanerva's January visit to 
have the OSCE call for 3 2 talks in mid-February and 5 2 
meetings soon thereafter. 
KIRBY