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FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8788
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8886
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1421
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0205
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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9352
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2893
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 4846
RUEHPT/AMCONSUL PERTH 3134
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 3028
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0726
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 000004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2032 
TAGS: PREL AF IN PK AS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS AT 12/5 TSD SOM - AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, 
INDIA 
 
CANBERRA 00000004  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge Dan Clune, Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Burns met with his Trilateral 
Strategic Dialogue (TSD) counterparts Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Secretary Michael 
L,Estrange and Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
Deputy Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka December 4-5, 2007 in 
Canberra, Australia, at the TSD Senior Officials Meeting 
(SOM).  The wide-ranging talks covered regional and global 
issues, as well as TSD initiatives.  This cable is three of 
four and covers discussion of South Asia-related issues 
including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.  Septels report 
on TSD initiatives, EAP and NEA issues.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Afghanistan: Concern about Faltering Support in NATO 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2. (C) Secretary L,Estrange confirmed the new Australian 
government was committed to the long-term success of 
Afghanistan; they were under no illusions as to the 
difficulty of the challenges and were looking at options to 
develop further support.  However, Australia was concerned 
about the insufficient and diminishing international 
commitment to Afghanistan in terms of military and 
development assistance, as well as the capacity of the Afghan 
government to maintain security and deliver assistance.  He 
gave a critical assessment of efforts in Afghanistan, noting 
the training of the army was behind schedule, many in the 
police force were corrupt, and Pakistan,s current 
preoccupation with domestic political matters distracted it 
from dealing with insurgents along its border with 
Afghanistan.  L,Estrange further argued the desire of the 
Afghan government to engage elements of the insurgency was of 
concern; we needed to avoid any perception of weakness. 
Handled in the wrong way, this situation could undermine the 
coalition. 
 
¶3. (C) In spite of the dour picture he painted, Secretary 
L,Estrange said the Australian government was not deterred 
from the task at hand; in fact the new government,s 
commitment was even stronger perhaps than former PM 
Howard,s.  L,Estrange expressed appreciation for the recent 
Dutch decision to remain in the lead role in Uruzgan province 
for another 24 months; he lamented that the Dutch had merely 
postponed their withdrawal date instead of making a 
commitment to condition-based rather than time-based 
engagement. 
 
¶4. (C) In response to Secretary L,Estrange,s inquiry into 
Japanese efforts to extend legislation underpinning refueling 
efforts in the Indian Ocean, DFM Yabunaka claimed the 
Japanese government was working hard to generate public 
support for  refueling operations.  Yabunaka also highlighted 
Japanese work with Afghanistan,s police.  He reported Japan 
had spent $200 million in Afghanistan with another $200 
million in the pipeline, and it was considering adding more 
funding for refugees.  While the Japanese were experiencing 
some difficulties implementing programs including the Ring 
Road project, Yabunaka pledged Japan,s PRT work would 
continue. 
Qcontinue. 
 
¶5. (S) U/S Burns agreed with Secretary L,Estrange,s 
assessment of the problems in Afghanistan and thanked him for 
the bipartisan support for Afghanistan in Australia.  On the 
faltering will and political commitment in Western Europe, 
U/S Burns said Afghanistan had become an existential crisis 
for NATO, at odds with the &one for all and all for one8 
credo.  However, he argued, the ISAF Regional Command South 
Ministerial meeting December 13-14 in Edinburgh offered the 
opportunity to keep countries in the fight.  U/S Burns 
outlined three needs: to convince France, Germany, Italy, and 
Spain to work in southern Afghanistan and NATO in general to 
&toughen up;8 to more effectively coordinate the 
 
CANBERRA 00000004  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
international civilian efforts; and to work more with 
Pakistan on the sanctuary enjoyed by the Taliban along the 
border. 
 
¶6. (S) U/S Burns briefed on U.S. efforts to recruit Paddy 
Ashdown to coordinate international civilian efforts; he 
requested Australia and Japan reiterate to Afghanistan,s 
President Karzai and UNSYG Ban the need for a strong leader 
on international civilian efforts in Afghanistan.  Both 
Secretary L,Estrange and DFM Yabunaka agreed to do so.  U/S 
 
SIPDIS 
Burns also asked Australia and Japan to join with us in 
pressing Spain, Italy, and France to increase their troop 
contributions to operations in Afghanistan.  L,Estrange 
noted the former Australian government had been outspoken on 
this issue and expressed conviction the new government would 
be similarly assertive once they had time to work through the 
issue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Pakistan: Domestic Politics and the Fight Against Terrorism 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7. (S) Secretary L,Estrange expressed concern about 
uncertainty in the political outlook in Pakistan.  While we 
needed credible elections and the state of emergency lifted, 
opposition leader Sharif was recently banned from running in 
the upcoming elections, and it was unclear if the opposition 
would boycott the entire process.  The second issue of 
concern was Pakistan,s capacity to address radicalization 
and take on the Taliban and al Qaida in the tribal regions, 
while it was focused on these domestic issues.  Third, 
regardless of the outcome of the current crisis, Australia 
was concerned about internal divisions in Pakistan and how 
the military, which U/S Burns confirmed still supported 
President Musharraf, would continue to maintain security. 
L,Estrange argued the international community needed to 
engage more with Pakistan. 
 
¶8. (S) U/S Burns noted that Deputy Secretary Negroponte,s 
November visit to Pakistan focused on the question of whether 
there was still a center in Pakistani politics.  Our capacity 
to have an impact was limited, but we supported a moderate 
center if possible.  U/S Burns argued the northern frontier 
provinces had been ungovernable for decades; the difficulties 
along the border negatively affected our troops in 
Afghanistan.  However, he said, Pakistan was our number one 
partner in the fight against al Qaida, and we supported the 
Musharraf government.  Therefore, what happened in Pakistan 
was fundamental to our national security.  U/S Burns also 
noted we are also paying attention to the Pakistan-India 
Composite Dialogue; while a hoped-for movement on Kashmir had 
been &put on ice8 by recent developments in Pakistan, the 
situation was markedly better than 1998 or 2001-2002. 
 
¶9. (S) DFM Yabunaka expressed concern about command and 
control of Pakistan,s nuclear arsenal.  Musharraf had waited 
too long to resign from the military, he claimed, and made a 
huge mistake in confronting the Supreme Court and declaring 
the state of emergency.  Yabunaka shared his personal 
judgment that Musharraf was out of touch with the rest of 
Pakistan.  He expressed the same concern about Bhutto, 
QPakistan.  He expressed the same concern about Bhutto, 
arguing her strong positions against Musharraf were a result 
of her difficulties with the people. 
 
----------------------------------- 
The Rise of India as a Global Power 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S)  Delivering an intelligence assessment, Australian 
Office of National Assessment Director General Peter Varghese 
said India was undergoing a historic transition, especially 
in regards to economic policy.  Politically, while the nation 
had some sense of its intentions vis-a-vis China and South 
Asia, it had yet to articulate a strategic worldview.  Much 
of India,s future would be defined by its competitive 
relationship with China, which would shape its relations with 
the rest of East Asia.  India would probably be less patient 
in its diplomatic relations than China, Varghese noted, but 
 
CANBERRA 00000004  003 OF 003 
 
 
believed its ultimate interests lay with the forces of 
democracy and democratic change.  India, Varghese concluded, 
viewed democracy as both a values-based and strategic asset. 
 
¶11. (S) U/S Burns observed the U.S-India relationship was far 
more advanced in the private sector than government.  India 
was not an ambivalent power, but one without a clear sense of 
global identity, with one foot still in the non-aligned camp 
and the other foot in the global actor camp.  Burns agreed 
with Varghese,s conclusion that India was defined by its 
democratic system.  U/S Burns also noted the U.S.-India 
relationship should not be defined through the prism of 
China.  Predicting that India would be a priority for the new 
U.S. president in 2009, as it had been for President Bush, 
Burns listed a second green revolution, energy, 
military-to-military cooperation, and space as areas of 
potential cooperation.  Accordingly, the TSD members should 
discuss areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
 
¶12. (S) DFM Yabunaka noted he was very pleased with the 
evolving intelligence cooperation taking place in the TSD, 
said India served as an important counterbalance to China, 
and noted an Indian official had asked him: wasn,t it true 
that two nuclear powers in East Asia was better than one?  On 
the other hand, DFM Yabunaka noted India was hampered by 
creaky infrastructure and a glacial bureaucratic 
decision-making process.  The pace of change, development, 
and improvisation was far slower in India than in China, 
Yabunaka said, giving the Chinese a comparative advantage. 
 
¶13. (U) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary Burns. 
 
 
Y