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S E C R E T BOGOTA 000337 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR MOPS VZ AR BH BR CI CS
CU, ES, HO, MX, NU, PM, PA, PE, UY, CO 
SUBJECT: CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN'S JANUARY 17 MEETING WITH 
PRESIDENT URIBE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) President Uribe's overwhelming concern during a 
January 17 meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) Admiral Michael Mullen, was Hugo Chavez' aggressive 
remarks and proposal to grant belligerent status to the FARC. 
 Uribe insisted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) must keep their 
terrorist designation, and the USG and GOC should work 
together to convince Latin American countries that Chavez' 
approach would harm Colombia and regional democracy.  Uribe 
said Chavez has committed to bring down Uribe and his 
government by using the FARC as his militia inside Colombia. 
The GOC's current plan of action on hostages consists of 
locating them, securing areas near the hostage groups, and 
calling on the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to negotiate their release.  Uribe would authorize 
Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela to arrest FARC 
leaders and bring them to justice in Colombia.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (U) Participants 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen 
Ambassador William Brownfield 
CJCS/EA CAPT James Foggo 
Defense Attach COL Mark Wilkins (notetaker) 
 
COLOMBIA 
 
President Alvaro Uribe 
Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos 
Armed Forces Commander General Freddy Padilla 
MFA U.S. and Canada Desk Officer Patricia Cortes 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Uribe Obsessed By Chavez Blasts 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) President Alvaro Uribe arrived late to the meeting, 
directly from a discussion with his cabinet on how to respond 
to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' latest inflammatory 
remarks, and the show of solidarity by the Venezuelan 
Congress on granting "belligerent" status to the FARC.  It 
was clear that he was still focused on Chavez and the GOC 
response. 
 
------------------------- 
GOC Progress, USG Support 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Uribe thanked the United States for its continued 
support, stressing its decisiveness in helping Colombia pull 
back from the brink of becoming a failed state.  While much 
work remains, Colombia has made great progress against 
terrorists and the GOC feels certain they can win this 
battle.  Uribe attributed a great portion of the credit for 
Colombia's success to the permanent assistance of the USG and 
 
its armed forces.  Chairman Mullen reaffirmed the strength of 
the bilateral relationship and assured Uribe of continuing 
USG commitment to defeating our common adversaries.  He 
admired Colombians' determination and leadership.  The 
Colombian military had transformed itself remarkably and 
performed the highest calling possible -- returning Colombia 
to its citizens. 
 
--------------------------- 
Chavez' Endorsement of FARC 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to Venezuela, Uribe said his neighbor's 
actions cause Colombia great difficulty.  The FARC and ELN 
must keep their terrorist designation, Uribe insisted, and 
there should be negative consequences for any country 
granting them belligerent status.  It was important to 
counter and challenge Chavez' rhetoric, especially on this 
point.  When France and Mexico granted that status to the 
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels in El Salvador 
in 1981, Uribe commented, they fought an unelected and brutal 
dictatorship.  By contrast, the FARC waged war on a duly 
elected democracy, they had no public support, and they 
financed themselves through narcotrafficking and extortion. 
 
¶6. (S) Asked by the Chairman how much help Chavez gave the 
FARC, Uribe replied that Chavez has a five to seven year plan 
to advance his Bolivarian agenda in Colombia.  He has created 
popular militias inside Venezuela (apart from the Armed 
Forces) to sustain his revolution.  The GOC believes Chavez 
thinks he could use the FARC as his militia inside Colombia 
to combat its democratic government.  Chavez remains 
committed to bring down both Uribe and his government, as the 
primary obstacles to his Bolivarian expansionist dreams. 
With no clear Colombian presidential successor, a well 
financed candidate favoring Chavez might find space in 2010. 
The best counter to Chavez, in Uribe's view, remains action 
-- including use of the military. 
 
---------------- 
Regional Support 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Uribe urged the GOC and USG to work together to 
convince Latin American countries that Chavez' approach to 
the FARC was wrong and would harm Colombia and regional 
democracy.  The USG, he said, ought to lead a public campaign 
against Venezuela and counter Chavez' progress through 
preferential oil offers.  The U.S. and Mexico, supported by 
Honduras, Panama, Belize, and Costa Rica (especially Oscar 
Arias in the latter) were natural leaders to counter Chavez. 
Even Cuba, which felt Chavez had crossed into dangerous 
territory, has exercised a restraining influence.  When the 
GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to 
roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated 
that it was "a difficult proposal." 
 
¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause.
 
----------------- 
Hostages and HVTs 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (S) Uribe listed rescue of hostages held by the FARC as 
one of his main goals for 2008.  He outlined a plan whereby 
the military would establish a "cordon sanitaire" around 
areas where hostages were held.  Then the GOC would 
temporarily open the area to outside interlocutors such as 
the ICRC to offer an international medical mission and 
conduct negotiations.  Under this umbrella, the GOC would 
focus on the 44 hostages the FARC had identified as 
"exchangeable."  Chairman Mullen assured USG support for 
GOC's efforts, but he cautioned that the USG wanted the 
hostages returned alive.  Uribe responded with his conviction 
that the FARC would not kill hostages at this stage.  The 
best course of action, he advocated, remains to locate the 
hostages, secure the positions, and then call in the ICRC to 
negotiate their release. 
 
¶10. (S) Uribe said the GOC also placed a priority on high 
value targets and that they had achieved great results in 
late 2007.  Finally, he said he was prepared to authorize 
Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela, arrest FARC 
leaders, and bring them to justice in Colombia. 
 
¶11. (U) CJCS Admiral Mullen cleared this cable. 
 
 
 
Brownfield