VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSW #0015/01 0091503
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091503Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4788
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0044

S E C R E T BERN 000015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2028 
TAGS: PARM IAEA KNNP IR IN SZ
SUBJECT: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE'S OCTOBER 15 
CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR SWISS OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: Poloff Chris Buck; reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  USUNVIE Ambassador Schulte met October 15 
with senior Swiss officials for consultations following 
Switzerland's appointment to the IAEA Board of Governors 
(BOG) in September.  The key Swiss interlocutors were Walter 
Steinmann, Director of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy 
(Switzerland's new Governor to the IAEA BOG), and MFA State 
Secretary Michael Ambuehl.  Main topics were Iran, India, and 
 
SIPDIS 
the Global Energy Nuclear Partnership (GNEP). 
 
¶2. (S) Summary Continued:  Ambassador Schulte outlined the 
P5 1's two-track policy for dealing with the Iran nuclear 
problem.  MFA State Secretary Ambuehl said that the GOS 
naturally agrees with the objective of this approach, but is 
not convinced that the P5 1 have developed a fully working 
strategy.  Ambassador Schulte disagreed, and he re-iterated 
the importance of like-minded states -- not least Switzerland 
-- demonstrating unity in support of the P5 1 approach. 
Ambassador Schulte provided Steinmann and Ambuehl updates on 
the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement.  Swiss 
MFA Arms Control Division Chief Andreas Friedrich, who joined 
Ambuehl in the meeting, said that, in order to make an 
informed decision about how to handle the India agreement 
within the NSG, the GOS needs to see the Safeguards Agreement 
that India was expected to conclude  with the IAEA.  Ambuehl 
said that the support of DG ElBaradei is very important to 
how the GOS views the India deal, as is the potential impact 
on nonproliferation, as well as Swiss-U.S. and Swiss-Indian 
relations.  Ambassador Schulte said that the USG would very 
much like to see Swiss participation in GNEP.  Steinmann said 
that the GOS would study the matter, and that the role of the 
IAEA in GNEP would be particularly important for Swiss 
decision-making.  End Summary. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶3. (S) Ambassador Schulte outlined the P5 1's two-track 
policy for dealing with the Iran nuclear problem, emphasizing 
the need to maintain pressure on Iran to suspend its 
enrichment activities and come to the negotiating table.  He 
underlined the importance of Iran demonstrating real progress 
by mid-November on the "Work Plan" it had agreed to with the 
IAEA Secretariat, as well as in talks with EU HighRep Solana 
-- above all, the need for the Iranians to meet their 
international obligation to suspend their uranium 
enrichment-related activities. 
 
¶4. (S) MFA State Secretary Ambuehl said that the GOS 
naturally agrees with the objective of this approach, but is 
not convinced that the P5 1 have developed a fully working 
strategy.  From a "negotiations theory" standpoint, he argued 
that "suspension" is the one strong card the Iranians have to 
play, and it "therefore is not likely that they will be 
willing to play that card at the very beginning" (i.e., prior 
to beginning negotiations with the P5 1).  Ambuehl assessed 
that the Iranians would need some "face saving" opportunity 
and would need to have a better idea of "what they would get" 
from negotiations, before making a decision to suspend.  He 
suggested the P5 1 engage in "pre-talks" with the Iranians in 
order to prepare the way for Iranian suspension and 
subsequent negotiations and that a "step by step" approach 
would allow Iran to save face.  Ambassador Schulte emphasized 
that negotiations without suspension were not on the table, 
noting the Iranians' history of using stalling tactics; he 
re-iterated the importance of like-minded states 
demonstrating unity in support of the P5 1 approach. 
Ambassador Schulte emphasized to both Ambuehl and Steinmann 
that Switzerland's voice is important in this context. 
 
¶5. (S) Ambuehl said that the June 2006 offer from the P5 1 
was important to Iran but was not sufficient. He said that 
former Iranian nuclear negotiator and Supreme Council for 
National Security Secretary Larijani had told him that Iran 
wants a package that includes a nuclear program, economic 
benefits including Western technology, security guarantees, 
and political gains including US recognition.  Ambuehl also 
said that neither Switzerland nor he personally is pursuing a 
separate Iran strategy or series of negotiations and that 
they have agreed to "do everything" through Solana. 
 
----- 
INDIA 
----- 
 
¶6. (S) Ambassador Schulte provided Steinmann and Ambuehl 
updates on the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation 
agreement, particularly with regard to IAEA safeguards and 
NSG cooperation.  He noted that the USG had carefully 
reviewed the pros and cons of the deal, and ultimately 
 
decided that it would contribute significantly to nuclear 
nonproliferation, as well as to helping India meet its vast 
and growing energy needs in a way less harmful to the 
environment.  Ambassador Schulte observed that IAEA DG 
Director ElBaradei had endorsed the agreement. 
 
¶7. (S) Steinmann and Ambuehl both expressed concerns about 
"double standards" they believe could be interpreted into the 
India deal.  Ambassador Schulte pushed back, reminding them 
that the case of India cannot be compared to others:  India 
had not signed the NPT, and therefore its nuclear program was 
not in violation of treaty obligations; moreover, the GOI is 
now prepared to bring major portions of its current and 
future nuclear program under IAEA safeguards -- again, 
something that will contribute to our nonproliferation goals. 
 
 
¶8. (S) Swiss MFA Arms Control Division Chief Andreas 
Friedrich, who joined Ambuehl in the meeting, said that the 
GOS was "uneasy" about the deal and that, in order to make an 
informed decision about how to handle the India agreement 
within the NSG, the GOS needs to see the Safeguards Agreement 
that India was expected to conclude with the IAEA.  He 
commented that discussion of the India Safeguards Agreement 
could risk "opening up" the 1995 Full-scope Safeguards 
provision, putting it at risk (as well as the indefinite 
extension of the NPT).  Friedrich also said that the GOS 
would like to know what is meant by "corrective measures" in 
the "1-2-3 Agreement".  He 
assessed that NSG members would not allow for a "blank check" 
for India, but might at least agree on fuel supply.  Ambuehl 
said that the support of DG ElBaradei is very important to 
how the GOS views the India deal.  He concluded that, if the 
Swiss senior political leadership can be convinced that the 
India agreement will strengthen nonproliferation, the GOS 
will agree.  In this context he said he expected that Swiss 
bilateral relations with the 
United States and India also would be important factors. 
 
---- 
GNEP 
---- 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Schulte outlined USG thinking with regard 
to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), explaining 
how we see it as an important initiative for meeting key 
nonproliferation and clean energy goals.  He said that the 
USG would very much like to see Swiss participation in the 
GNEP, given Swiss technical capacities and its international 
reputation.  Steinmann said that the GOS would study the 
matter, and that the role of the IAEA in GNEP would be 
particularly important for Swiss decision-making on whether 
to participate. 
CARTER