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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR 
ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2028 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM LE SY QA SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  SLEIMAN SEES AOUN AS "DANGEROUS" AND 
SYRIA AS BEHIND PRESIDENTIAL STALEMATE 
 
REF: A. 07 BEIRUT 1959 
     ¶B. 07 BEIRUT 1979 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  001.4 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  In a 1/2 meeting with the Ambassador, LAF Commander 
-- and presidential front-runner -- Michel Sleiman came 
across as both bemused and exasperated by the presidential 
limbo.  While skeptical that elections would occur on 1/12, 
he denied rumors he would pull out of the race.  Dismissing 
positive signals he claimed to have received from Damascus, 
he believed the Syrians were behind Hizballah-Amal 
foot-dragging.  Michel Aoun, "a dangerous man," wants 
violence on the streets, but Sleiman expressed confidence in 
the army's ability to confront unrest and remain united. 
Sleiman was contemptuous of what he saw as Aoun's attempt to 
use BG Francois Hajj's assassination politically.  Yet he 
maintained that the USG should refrain from sanctioning Aoun. 
 Describing a March 8-Aounist call on him, Sleiman revealed 
that Elias Murr was a sticking point:  his visitors, calling 
Murr as a U.S. proxy, wanted Sleiman to veto Murr's 
participation in the next cabinet.  Sleiman dismissed all 
proposed conditions, arguing that a consensus president 
should have sufficient cabinet weight to force consensus on 
reluctant political players.  The French "made a big mistake" 
in playing with cabinet numbers with the Syrians.  Yet, 
ultimately, "someone" is going to have to persuade the 
Syrians somehow that it is in their interest to see the 
presidential vacuum filled.  Sleiman mused about a possible 
Saudi-Syrian understanding on the presidency, and he found 
Qatar's increased interest in him (that included an 
invitation to meet the Emir, which Sleiman turned down as 
inappropriate for a mere army commander) to be intriguing and 
promising.  End summary. 
 
"WHO MOVED MY CHEESE?" A GUIDE 
TO WOULD-BE BAABDA PALACE RESIDENTS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On 1/2, the Ambassador met one-on-one for 75 minutes 
with LAF Commander Michel Sleiman, who opened the meeting by 
joking about how "happy" the new year in Lebanon promises to 
be.  Sleiman acknowledged that, while he was ostensibly 
focused on his full-time job as army commander, this was not 
a particularly easy time for him.  Grabbing a note card from 
his desk, he read in French two hand-written sentences that 
he said were helping to inspire and guide him during this 
transitional period.  Both had to do with overcoming fear, 
and being guided by what one would do if one had no fear. 
Sleiman said that he jotted down these quotes from a French 
translation of the popular 1998 book by Spencer Johnson, "Who 
Moved My Cheese?  An Amazing Way to Deal with Change in Your 
Work and Your Life."  Read it, Sleiman urged; "I'll send it 
to you."  With fervor, he said that he was recommending the 
book to all of his top commanders. 
 
SLEIMAN NOT TO WITHDRAW HIS CANDIDACY 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  After the two reviewed the sadly familiar state of 
play regarding presidential elections -- with Sleiman 
doubtful that "short of a miracle" presidential elections 
would occur at the next parliamentary electoral session on 
1/12 -- the Ambassador asked about the rumors that he might 
withdraw his candidacy out of frustration over the political 
deadlock.  Sleiman acknowledged he had heard the rumors but 
denied them categorically.  "Why make it easy for them?" he 
asked (with the "them" clearly meant to be those blocking his 
election).  Moreover, he laughed, since he himself never 
declared his candidacy, he had nothing to renounce. 
 
HAJJ ASSASSINATION:  AOUN 
EXPLOITING IT "SHAMEFULLY" 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Expressing condolences for the loss of one of his 
key generals, the Ambassador asked about the investigation 
into the 12/12 assassination of BG Francois Hajj.  While 
noting that he had nothing new on the investigation, Sleiman 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
acknowledged that he had intended to propose Hajj as LAF 
Commander, if Sleiman were elected president.  Sleiman said 
that, undoubtedly, the assassination was meant as a message 
and warning to him.  In fact, he said, he wondered if Hajj 
had been picked as a substitute when Sleiman proved to be a 
hard target.  Sleiman noted that he had been traveling 
frequently to see commanders in their regions, going to south 
Lebanon only the day before Hajj's assassination.  He had 
intended to spend the night there, but his security advisors, 
nervous about the exposure Sleiman would have in a tent and 
after being in one place for an extended period of time, 
persuaded him to return unscheduled to headquarters on the 
night of the 11th rather than the following day, when Hajj 
was killed.  The army lost one of its best men, he lamented. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Sleiman said that he had to work hard to build up 
morale within the LAF after Hajj's assassination.  While the 
killing initially brought the army commanders closer together 
in shared grief, Michel Aoun, using some of his contacts in 
the LAF, had spread vicious rumors that, without 
countervailing work, might have divided the LAF.  Michel Aoun 
whispered that Hajj was the real power and brains in the LAF, 
and he wondered how an assassination could take place in the 
heart of Baabda, presumably a secure environment, given its 
proximity to the Presidential Palace and to the Yarze LAF/MOD 
complex.  The clear implication, spread within the LAF by 
some hard-line Aounists, was that Sleiman was negligent or 
maybe even involved. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Sleiman commented that it was "shameful" of Aoun, 
once a military commander himself, to try to use Hajj's 
killing politically to weaken or destroy Sleiman.  And 
everyone knows that Baabda is a "choufleur" ("cauliflower") 
region, he said pejoratively, with "all kinds of people" able 
to infiltrate the town from the nearby southern suburbs. 
Aoun "seems to have forgotten" that he was victim once of an 
assassination attempt in Baabda.  In any case, Sleiman 
expressed belief that LAF unity remained strong, with even 
the Shia officers disgusted by Aoun's attempts to block and 
weaken Sleiman.  As an aside, Sleiman asked the Ambassador 
whether he had seen Aoun's "disgusting" New Year's Eve 
remarks about Maronite Patriarch Sfeir (in which Aoun 
admonished the Church to stay out of politics). 
 
AOUN, A "DANGEROUS MAN," 
INTENDS VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  Warming up to his theme, Sleiman then declared Aoun 
a "dangerous man."  While saying that we needed to monitor 
what Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah will signal 
in his televised address tonight (1/2), Sleiman said that he 
believed Aoun's intentions were to spark street 
demonstrations that Aoun intended to become violent.  "He is 
crazy," Sleiman said, wondering why anyone would want to 
throw a match into the puddle of gasoline that is Lebanon 
today.  Answering his own question (and using the example of 
potential violent protests against the U.S. Embassy), Sleiman 
said that Aoun believes that, by destroying Sleiman's 
reputation by putting the army in an untenable position 
(i.e., protection of the Embassy at the cost of attacking 
demonstrators), he promotes his own presidential ambitions. 
Sleiman expressed confidence that LAF unity would remain 
strong and that the LAF would respond decisively and 
effectively to any violent protest, including against the 
Embassy.  "Don't worry," he said.  Moreover, if Hizballah 
(worried about Sunni-Shia clashes) is not enthusiastic, then 
Aoun will not be able to pull off any significant 
demonstrations, since Aoun's Christian followers will not 
want to clash with the army. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Ambassador noted that he would see Aoun this 
week.  What was Sleiman's advice in dealing with him, given 
his dangerous and irrational inclinations?  Sleiman said to 
be "firm" about our views of destructive street behavior, but 
(as he has before) he advised against explicit threats. 
While the USG might respond to actual provocation with 
sanctions, Sleiman suggested passing such warnings via Aoun's 
MPs and advisors rather than to Aoun himself, lest he 
publicly claim U.S. blackmail.  "He has, what do you call 
it?" Sleiman asked, searching for a phrase but resorting to 
French, "complex de persecution" that he uses to build 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  003.4 OF 005 
 
 
populist support. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Sleiman suggested as well that the Ambassador 
attempt to make Aoun squirm a bit by talking of how much Aoun 
and Sleiman have in common -- army background, concern over 
the Christian future in Lebanon, desire to stop corruption, 
etc. -- in an attempt to get Aoun to articulate why he 
wouldn't trust Sleiman to hold the cabinet balance in his 
hand and to decide who should be the next army commander. 
Those details are all smoke, Sleiman argued, disguising the 
fact that Aoun can't accept Sleiman as president.  Isn't it 
strange, Sleiman mused, how much in common arch-rivals Samir 
Geagea and Michel Aoun actually have:  both of them see 
Sleiman as the biggest risk to their own popular standing, 
since Sleiman, more than lackluster candidates like Michel 
Edde, will attract Christians who are looking for a third-way 
political leader.  (See ref B for Sleiman's discussion with 
A/S Welch and DAPNSA Abrams about his thinking about how the 
Christians need someone else besides Geagea and Aoun as 
leaders.) 
 
MARCH 8-AOUNIST MEETING WITH SLEIMAN: 
RED LINE AGAINST ELIAS MURR 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Sleiman noted that March 8-Aounist delegation had 
recently visited him, including Marada leader Suleiman 
Franjieh, Aoun's advisor (and son-in-law) Gebran Bassil, 
Amal's Ali Hussein Khalil, and Hizballah's Hussein Khalil. 
While claiming to support and like the commander, the group 
had tried to impose conditions on a Sleiman presidency. 
Sleiman claimed to be shocked by the attempted veto, 
articulated most forcefully by Franjieh, against the return 
of Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr to 
any cabinet position.  They argued that Murr is too close to 
the Ambassador and has become a tool for the implementation 
of U.S. policy in Lebanon.  Sleiman said that he pushed back, 
challenging the group to say whether they had a problem with 
the army's performance over the last two and a half years. 
When told no, Sleiman said that the army's performance is 
linked to Murr's direction. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Franjieh persisted, asking for a commitment from 
Sleiman that he would veto a new Murr appointment.  Sleiman 
asked Franjieh what his reaction would be, should Saad Hariri 
ask Sleiman now for a commitment that he would veto any 
Franjieh ministerial slot.  The Ambassador noted that what 
Franjieh says is usually thought to reflect policies in 
Damascus, given the close relationship between Franjieh and 
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.  Nodding, Sleiman said that 
the Syrian-Aounist-Hizballah concern about Elias Murr is 
linked to their fear that Murr could become Minister of 
Interior overseeing the next legislative elections.  Given 
that March 8 and Michel Aoun intend to destroy the March 14 
majority once and for all in those elections, they will 
insist on having the Ministry of Interior.  As for Murr, the 
March 8-Aounists would probably accept Murr remaining in the 
cabinet, Sleiman speculated, as long as his position was not 
important. 
 
REJECTING THE BLOCKING THIRD 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Asked what other conditions his visitors had tried 
to impose, Sleiman said that they had insisted on at least 11 
ministers in a 30-member cabinet (giving them the blocking 
third).  Sleiman repeated his arguments that he will not 
agree in advance to yield on the presidential prerogatives to 
decide, with the PM-designate, on the composition of the 
cabinet.  But he also asked his visitors why they needed the 
blocking minority, if Sleiman had a significant share of 
ministries himself.  "Don't you trust me?" he claimed to ask 
his visitors.  Gebran Bassil ("an awful man!") argued that 
the Hariris have the habit of bribing ministers to get them 
on their side, a comment that caused Sleiman to "explode": 
"If I have five, six, or seven ministers, you think I'll only 
pick people who can be bought?"  Sleiman said that he told 
Bassil that he would appoint his son, son-in-law, and 
daughter to ministerial slots in that case, and he dared 
Bassil to accuse the Sleiman family of corruption.  Bassil 
was taken aback but did not retreat, Sleiman said. 
 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  004.4 OF 005 
 
 
¶13.  (C)  As he had with NEA A/S Welch and DAPNSA Abrams (ref 
B), Sleiman said that he envisioned a cabinet with 13 
ministers for March 14, ten ministers for March 8, and seven 
ministers for him.  If people want a consensus president, 
they need to allow the president to have the tools, by 
cabinet weight, to force consensus.  The Ambassador noted 
that, assuming a split between March 14 and March 8 on a 
decision, March 8 would need the support of only one of 
Sleiman's ministers to block major decisions, whereas March 
14 would need to get all seven Sleiman ministers on its side 
to get major decisions approved.  Even for minor decisions 
requiring a simple majority, March 14 must persuade three of 
Sleiman's ministers to agree.  The Ambassador asked Sleiman 
whether Saad Hariri agreed with a formula that seemed to lean 
in March 8's direction.  Smiling, Sleiman said that it was 
his opening position.  For now, he was sticking with his 
basic position that all of this can be decided only after 
presidential elections, lest presidential powers be weakened. 
 
FRENCH "MISTAKEN" IN DISCUSSING CABINET WITH SYRIA, 
YET SYRIA BEHIND THE CURRENT IMPASSE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  The Ambassador asked Sleiman what, in his analysis, 
was the core of the problem.  Six months ago, the Ambassador 
noted, most people assumed Syria would be thrilled with 
Sleiman as president:  what happened?  Sleiman laughed, "you 
didn't trust me then, and they did."  Now, Sleiman said, the 
Syrians do not trust him, in part because of Nahr al-Barid: 
no one in Damascus thought the LAF sufficiently capable or 
the LAF leadership sufficiently courageous to pursue the 
Fatah al-Islam fight to the end.  Now the Syrians look at the 
LAF and at Sleiman differently, even though during the 
battles Sleiman pointed out publicly that the connections 
between Fatah al-Islam and the Syrian regime were far more 
modest than March 14 argued.  Although friends in Damascus as 
recently as ten days ago sent him assurances that he would be 
president, Sleiman, initially encouraged, now believes that 
they were lying. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Regarding Syria, the French "made a big mistake" in 
engaging the Syrians on cabinet allotments, Sleiman said.  If 
the French wanted to engage Syria, fine, but they should not 
have given the Syrians the impression that Damascus has 
control over cabinet composition.  Asked what a constructive 
policy toward Syria would be, Sleiman said that "someone" 
needs to talk to the Syrians.  The Syrians need to see either 
from pressure or from reassurances that filling the 
presidential vacuum is in their interest; now, the Syrians 
see more advantages to the vacuum.  Maybe, Sleiman mused, the 
Saudis could talk to the Syrians about the presidency.  That 
would give the Syrians something -- a dialogue, however 
limited -- with the Saudis, in return for presidential 
elections in Lebanon.  The Ambassador expressed skepticism, 
noting that the Saudis seemed to be in no mood for such a 
dialogue.  "Don't be so sure," Sleiman said; "I've heard 
something is going on (in Arabic) 'under the curtains.'"  If 
so, the Ambassador predicted, the same thing could easily 
happened as occurred with the French:  the Syrians seduce the 
Saudis into talking of things that should be left exclusively 
to the Lebanese. 
 
¶16.  (C)  In closing the meeting, Sleiman noted that the 
Qataris have recently increased contacts with him, 
unexpectedly.  This gave him some hope that the presidency 
might be resolved, since the Qataris are presumably acting in 
coordination with the Syrians.  The Qataris extended him an 
invitation to meet with the Emir, he said, but he turned it 
down as inappropriate for an army commander.  Seeing the 
Ambassador's quizzical look, Sleiman claimed that his 
audience with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak a couple of 
months ago was different:  he wasn't then anyone's nominee 
for president, and he was on an official visit to Egyptian 
security officials who then set up the Mubarak meeting. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  A growing number of people -- Elias Murr, Walid 
Jumblatt, Fouad Siniora, Nayla Mouawad -- are expressing 
concern that Michel Sleiman's candidacy is doomed.  They cite 
the increased difficulties (now that the parliamentary 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  005.4 OF 005 
 
 
legislative session has ended) in getting through the 
necessary constitutional amendment, and they fret about the 
conditions March 8-Aounists are trying to impose on a Sleiman 
presidency.  Nevertheless, March 14 is sticking with Sleiman, 
in hopes of finding a solution before the January 12 
legislative session.  Sleiman himself seemed relatively 
relaxed, and we did not have the impression that he has given 
up.  While his speculation about the possibility and benefits 
of a Saudi-Syrian rapprochement was a bit off, his analysis 
struck us as otherwise sensible and balanced.  Whatever 
reservations we had about his role as army chief, he has 
impressed us in his role as a presidential candidate.  In a 
sense, what initially struck us and others as a strange idea 
-- that March 14 nominate Michel Sleiman -- seems to have 
worked almost too well:  while Aoun's problem is always his 
own ambitions, Syria's Lebanese allies no longer seem to 
trust someone long considered to be one of their own.  Given 
his political desires to forge a new Christian alliance 
between Aoun and Geagea, Sleiman personally is in a win-win 
situation (assuming he's not eliminated physically):  he 
either becomes president somehow, or, even if he does not, he 
enters political life with lots of popular support and 
respect as well as heightened political profile. 
FELTMAN