VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKB #0044/01 0170852
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 170852Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4598
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2569
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0745
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2025 
TAGS: PREL MARK MASS PBTS NATO AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S INTENTIONAL AMBIGUITY TOWARD NATO 
 
REF: A. BAKU 1408 
 
     ¶B. BAKU 1384 
     ¶C. BAKU 1383 
     ¶D. BAKU 1382 
 
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ) has not 
publicly defined its ultimate goal with respect to NATO 
membership, nor do we expect it to do so.  Azerbaijan's NATO 
policy appears to be movement toward the organization while 
intentionally remaining silent on the question of ultimately 
seeking NATO membership.  This policy of intentional 
ambiguity toward NATO is consistent with Azerbaijan's broader 
foreign policy of regional balance, which favors 
Euro-Atlantic integration, while at the same time seeking to 
maintain good relations with Russia and Iran.  While, in some 
respects, Azerbaijan has been successful in moving closer to 
NATO, the GOAJ's reluctance to disclose the content of its 
NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) has prevented 
the true purpose and utility of NATO integration from being 
fully understood by the general public.  The Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict further complicates Azerbaijan's relationship with 
NATO, leading many to believe that Azerbaijan will never be 
able to join NATO until the conflict is resolved.  Georgia's 
accelerated NATO membership plans have sparked intense 
interest from Azerbaijani officials and, if successful, could 
cause them to rethink their current, intentional ambiguity 
toward NATO.  End summary. 
 
PARSING THE GOAJ RHETORIC 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The GOAJ's policy toward NATO can be most accurately 
described as one of intentional ambiguity.  GOAJ statements 
on Azerbaijan's relations with NATO tend to focus on movement 
toward and integration with the alliance organization, but 
Azerbaijan's intended end goal seems to be deliberately vague 
-- and often contradictory -- in public statements.  In a 
typical, recent example, Deputy Prime Minister Yaqub Eyyubov 
told the press on November 20 that Azerbaijan "plans to join 
the alliance."  Eyyubov's statement was then flatly 
contradicted by Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev who, in 
widely reported remarks at the CIS Defense Ministers, 
conference, on 27 November said that 
Azerbaijan has "no intention" to join NATO.  The Foreign 
Minister recently told the Ambassador behind closed doors 
that Azerbaijan's goal is eventually to join NATO.  He has 
never, however, voiced this position publicly.  Working-level 
MFA and MOD officials in both official and unofficial 
conversations regarding potential NATO membership often 
quickly dismiss the idea as something that is neither 
necessary nor important for Azerbaijan. 
 
¶3.  (C) The public statements of Deputy Foreign Minister Araz 
Azimov, one of the strongest GOAJ proponents of Azerbaijan's 
engagement with NATO, reflect the GOAJ's unwillingness to 
clarify its intentions toward the question of whether 
Azerbaijan seeks NATO membership.  In public statements 
carried by Interfax in December, Azimov emphasized the themes 
of cooperation and integration, while  skirting the 
membership issue.  Azimov observed that "Azerbaijan is one of 
the nations most actively cooperating with NATO and we are 
ready to continue our activity in terms of Euro-Atlantic 
integration," while remaining elusive about membership: 
"Whatever or positive assessment of NATO, if this membership 
does not correspond to our interests, we shall not advance 
toward it.  On the other hand, if we see that it corresponds 
to our interests and in fact our membership in NATO will 
contribute to the solution of potential Azeri problems, then 
a different situation will emerge." 
 
¶4.  (C) President Aliyev, who regularly affirms that 
Azerbaijan's overall foreign policy goal is Euro-Atlantic 
integration, in his public comments has firmly cast 
Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO as that of partnership. 
In February 2007 comments about possible NATO membership, 
Aliyev said, "It is clear both to us and to NATO that our 
country is not yet prepared for this.  Therefore, we need to 
continue working as partners."  Aliyev's apparent 
unwillingness to publicly declare a more clear position on 
NATO membership reflects Azerbaijan's broader goal of 
pursuing a balanced approach in its foreign policy.  Aliyev 
and his closest advisors regularly tell us that Azerbaijan's 
geopolitical location requires it to pursue a foreign policy 
of balance that allows the GOAJ to protect its interests 
vis-a-vis its more powerful neighbors, Russia, Turkey and 
Iran.  At the same time, this need for balance -- 
particularly with regard to Russia and Iran -- makes 
Euro-Atlantic integration, albeit within certain bounds, a 
priority for Aliyev's government. 
 
GEORGIA ENVY 
------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Georgia's changing relationship with NATO could prove 
a catalyst for Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO.  In the 
past, Azerbaijan has viewed Georgia's "all in" approach 
toward NATO, the EU, and the WTO with a great deal 
of skepticism, accusing the Georgians of intentionally 
pursuing a provocative approach toward Russia, which will 
yield little result.  The more cautious Azerbaijanis, who 
actively seek stability and balance in their foreign policy, 
say that they "do not want to be like Georgia" and that while 
this may be "fine for Georgia" it is not a good policy for 
Azerbaijan.  In general, GOAJ officials seem to believe that 
Georgia's reforms have moved too fast, too soon and that the 
subsequent disruption of political stability is something 
that Azerbaijan will not accept.  GOAJ officials say that 
they desire to keep their relations with Russia, at the very 
least, on a cordial and non-confrontational basis, a factor 
that most certainly affects Azerbaijan's approach toward 
NATO. 
 
¶6.  (C) Yet Georgia's recent decision to pursue accelerated 
NATO membership seems to be promoting at least some 
Azerbaijani officials to rethink their approach toward NATO. 
Some Azerbaijani officials appear to have a confused view of 
NATO's position toward Georgia, and believe that Georgia and 
Azerbaijan (and in some cases the South Caucasus in general) 
are linked in the eyes of NATO.  GOAJ officials frequently 
make statements such as "once NATO accepts Georgia, they will 
accept us" or "if NATO gives Georgia a MAP (Membership Action 
Plan), they should give us a MAP."  The basis and logic for 
such views is not clear, but it seems to show a lack of 
understanding that comprehensive political and military 
reforms need to be carried out prior to deepening ties with 
NATO. 
 
¶7.  (C) The GOAJ is watching the development of ties between 
Georgia and NATO very closely, and the success or failure of 
Georgia's "all in" policy will likely have a trickle down 
effect on both the GOAJ and the general population's 
perceptions of NATO.  Azerbaijani officials also seem to be 
paying careful attention to NATO's handling of Georgia's 
territorial integrity issues, given the implications for 
Azerbaijan's own relationship with NATO.  Yet, lurking behind 
Azerbaijan's intense interest in Georgia's NATO accession is 
a constant feeling of "Georgia envy."  Azerbaijani officials 
routinely complain that 
Georgia -- which they believe faces equally difficult 
corruption and political reform problems -- is held to a 
different standard than Azerbaijan.  As such, key officials 
such as Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, believe that 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashviili was manipulating the 
NATO accession process to bolster his domestic standing (ref 
b). 
 
GOAJ OFFICIALS, UNDERSTANDING OF NATO 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Our experience with a wide range of working-level MFA 
officials, both from the Americas section and the Security 
Affairs department -- almost all of whom can be described as 
pro-American and pro-reform -- indicates that there is still 
a general lack of understanding about what NATO is and does, 
and what NATO membership would mean for Azerbaijan.  In 
addition to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) (see paragraph 
10), most GOAJ officials' personal opinions seem to be in 
line with Azerbaijan's broader foreign policy goal of 
"balancing" Iran and Russia.  They seem to agree that 
Azerbaijan's carefully calibrated relations with NATO should 
simultaneously afford the GOAJ some protection from Russia 
and Iran and refrain from provoking these two regional 
powers.  As such, GOAJ officials appear to view their 
relationship with NATO more as a strategic tool than as a 
vehicle by which reform could be implemented. 
¶9.  (C) In both everyday conversations and in official 
ministerial-level meetings with senior USG visitors, there 
seems to be a general misunderstanding in the MOD about the 
difference between NATO "standards" and NATO "structures." 
Often Ministry of Defense (MOD) officers and Minister Abiyev 
himself will comment that the MOD has integrated "all its 
units" to "NATO standards".  In reality, this means that the 
MOD has changed the names of various units from Soviet to 
NATO structures.  In general these changes are nothing more 
than cosmetic, and have little do to with units being up to 
NATO "standards."  However, Azerbaijani MOD officers have 
told Embassy officers that the simple integration to NATO 
structures has had a positive psychological effect on the 
mindset of mid- and junior-level officers, as they move away 
from the Soviet model. 
 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) As with almost any public policy issue, the NK issue 
permeates any discussion of Azerbaijan's relationship with 
NATO.  Many in the GOAJ view NATO through the prism of the 
conflict, specifically NATO's position toward NK and any 
peacekeeping role NATO could play in the conflict.  It is 
clear that GOAJ officials, especially those in the MFA and 
MOD, believe that NATO would not seriously consider accepting 
Azerbaijan into NATO until the NK issue is resolved.  Once 
Azerbaijanis are told that NATO simply supports the Minsk 
Group process and wants to see the peaceful settlement of NK, 
the sentiments toward NATO turn much more pessimistic, with 
the interlocutor generally throwing their hands up and saying 
that "NATO would never take us until NK is solved" or that 
NATO was only interested in Azerbaijan's energy resources. 
NATO's neutral stance toward the NK issue does not endear it 
to the general public, which seems increasingly to believe 
that the international community -- and the Minsk Group in 
particular -- holds Azerbaijan to a double standard. 
 
PUBLIC OPINIONS AND DISCUSSION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO is a frequent 
topic of discussion in newspapers, radio and television. 
Information about NATO appears in both the official and 
opposition press, and ranges from official press releases 
about Azerbaijan-NATO cooperation, and the visits and press 
conferences of visiting NATO international staff (which often 
includes NATO's criticisms of Azerbaijan), to persistent 
rumors as to who may be appointed the first civilian Minister 
of Defense as a result of NATO-related reforms.  Azerbaijan 
also hosts a semi-annual NATO International School, which 
attracts wide coverage in the media. 
 
¶12.  (C) In spite of this wide coverage of NATO-related 
issues, the media alost never touches upon the specific, 
fundamental eforms -- political, economic, and military -- 
tat must be undertaken as part of the NATO accessio 
process.  The GOAJ, which insists on treating is NATO 
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) as classified 
documents, is largely to blame.  As a result, the general 
public seems entirely unaware of the real changes -- and real 
benefits -- that would result from a serious NATO accession 
effort.  This skewed coverage of NATO also appears to have 
created the mistaken impression that Azerbaijan's potential 
acceptance into NATO depends solely on NATO member states, 
not on any reform steps taken by the GOAJ.  As such, public 
discussion of NATO focuses on broader political-military 
issues, such as missile defense and the international 
community's standoff with Iran, and how these issues might 
affect Azerbaijan's chances of NATO membership. 
 
COMMENT:  PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Given Azerbaijan's carefully structured pursuit of 
balance in its foreign policy, its ultimate goal with NATO 
may be very similar to its goals with respect to the EU.  As 
President Aliyev recently told a senior U.S. official, the 
GOAJ recognizes that it has no possibility of actually 
entering the European Union any time soon.  Yet the 
structures and values of the EU, according to Aliyev, offer a 
model and system that the GOAJ can strive to achieve as part 
of its political and economic reform agenda.  Given the 
GOAJ's concerns about Russia and Iran, and the leading role 
that Soviet-era relics such as Minister of Defense Abiyev 
continue to play in Azerbaijan's national security policy, 
our best hope seems to be that the GOAJ will look to NATO, 
like the EU, as a model that the GOAJ can strive to replicate 
in its ongoing reform efforts, rather than as the ultimate 
goal of its national security policy.  While this 
relationship with NATO -- pursuing reform while at the same 
time refraining from embracing future membership -- will 
prove beneficial in some key areas, the GOAJ should pursue a 
more open public discussion of its NATO IPAP goals in order 
to maximize the reforming impact of NATO.  Unfortunately, to 
date the serious structural reforms, consistent with a EU or 
NATO aspirant, have not been put forth.  The GOAJ's 
close-hold treatment of its IPAP commitments may indicate 
that the senior levels of Azerbaijan's political-military 
structure are not yet ready to embrace the far-reaching 
reforms required for true NATO integration. 
 
¶14.  (C) Some have started to suggest that, in the lead up to 
the April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit that there may be a 
internal debate taking place within the Azerbaijani 
government regarding going further in stating their desire to 
become a NATO member or that Azerbaijan may present more 
defined objectives.  There is certainly increased attention 
to NATO in the media, as well as a series of comments by 
senior officials suggesting the possibility of an internal 
dialogue.  However, given our initial reading of Azerbaijan's 
second proposed Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP-2), 
it does not appear to be any more ambitious, and in some 
respects less so, than IPAP-1, which included goals for the 
upgrading of an airbase and toward civilian control of the 
military.  Additionally, it would be difficult to expect that 
any serious movement would be made during an election year 
(the Azerbaijani presidential elections are in October 2008). 
 During a November 2007 meeting with the Ambassador, DFM 
Azimov raised the prospect of an "intensified dialogue" but 
he was quick to point out that there may only be the 
possibility for such a move in a few years, and at least not 
before 2010 or 2011 after the term of IPAP-2 ended.  NATO 
Special Representative to the South Caucasus Robert Simons 
said that Azimov had told him that Azerbaijan was not even 
ready to seriously consider an intensified dialogue.  If 
there is such an internal debate about NATO membership, it 
has yet to produce any tangible public steps in the direction 
of reversing the policy of moving slowly and guardedly toward 
a greater role in NATO. 
 
¶15.  (C) DAO Comment:  The Defense Attache agrees that the 
GOAJ's policy toward NATO can generally be characterized as 
"intentional ambiguity," although this ambiguity parallels 
many other former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet countries' 
early relations with NATO.  The GOAJ's ambiguity also stems 
from the perception that the West has not yet decided to 
stand with Azerbaijan.  While the GOAJ often has unrealistic 
expectations of what the West should do to demonstrate its 
support for Azerbaijan, the GOAJ's sense of unmet 
expectations exists.  Senior GOAJ officials have also 
privately suggested that Azerbaijan has a long-term intention 
to join NATO, but the GOAJ is not yet ready and it is worried 
about Russia and Iran's responses.  While the MOD is not 
capable of planning genuine, far-reaching defense reforms, 
Azerbaijan's interactions with NATO -- including providing 
troops for coalition efforts in Afghanistan -- have at a 
minimum pushed the MOD to understand that its military future 
lies in adopting NATO standards. 
LU