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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0288/01 0311142
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311142Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5507
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR PROV
SUBJECT: IRAQI PARLIAMENT SPEAKER MASHADANI ON PROVINCIAL 
POWERS, BUDGET, OTHER ISSUES 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  COR Speaker Mashadani told us on January 30 
that he expects the Provincial Powers law to pass the CoR on 
February 4.  He does not agree with those arguing that a date 
for elections should be in the law but does believe that 
elections should be held as soon as possible, hopefully 
within this year.  The debate on 17 percent versus 13 percent 
for the KRG is a serious obstacle to budget passage. 
Mashadani liberally criticized the Kurds for acting only in 
the interests of their region.  The Speaker said that the 
Iraqi negotiators on a bilateral strategic framework 
agreement should be from the GOI, with the MFA in the lead. 
He disagreed with those who want to put political party 
representatives (i.e. CoR bloc leaders) in the mix, saying 
that they would go in with their own agendas.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) Political Counselor met with Council of 
Representatives (CoR) Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani on January 30 
at his Baghdad residence.  Mashadani aide Alex Terchanian 
along with Poloff and Political Specialist also participated. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Mashadani said he is giving the Provincial Powers law 
priority over the budget.  He is confident that it will pass 
on Monday (February 4).  All of the debate comes down to the 
fact that ISCI wants more authority for the provinces while 
Dawa wants a stronger federal government.  Fadhila, short 
sightedly,  only cares about the role of the current Basra 
governor.  IIP's position on the debate over decentralization 
has been weak, and Mashadani claimed he had to exert his own 
authority to give the Sunni Arab view.  He declared that he 
has given enough time to the members to sort out their 
differences and so now he wants a final reading with 
amendments getting an up or down vote from the CoR. 
 
¶4.  (C) Mashadani said that some want to set a date for 
elections in the Provincial Powers law.  He does not agree 
but does think that elections should be held this year.  He 
spoke at some length about his efforts to get the Elections 
Commission moving and ready for elections.  PolCouns urged 
him to press the IHEC to move forward on preparations for 
elections, but Mashadani said the commission had to act on 
its own initiative, otherwise it would appear as though it 
was being influenced.  Large numbers of Iraqis did not 
participate in 2005 provincial elections and it's time they 
had the chance to do so.  Many political groups won't get the 
people's support because of their leaders' behavior, 
Mashadani predicted, and elections would produce new 
leadership.  He declared that a "closed list" electoral 
system would not be acceptable to Iraqis.  Tawafuq, for 
instance, is not trusted by the public because the people did 
not know for whom they were voting.  Mashadani went on to 
criticize efforts by PM Maliki's office and others to 
influence the IHEC and vowed to stand in the way of such 
interference.  He singled out the PM's chief of staff as 
behind efforts to interfere with the electoral commission, 
stating that he acts "as if he were working for Saddam 
Hussein". 
 
¶5.  (C) On the budget, Mashadani said key leaders have not 
resolved their differences.  KRG President Massoud Barzani is 
insisting on 17 percent for the Kurdish region, but PM 
Al-Maliki only wants to give 13 percent, undercutting the 
budget his government was asking the CoR to approve. 
According to Mashadani, the PM wants the COR to take on 
Barzani's demand by reducing the percentage.  The Kurds have 
threatened to have President Talabani veto the budget if the 
amount is reduced.  Warming to the theme of blaming the 
Kurds, Mashadani advocated passing the budget over the 
objections of the Kurdish bloc, forcing Talabani to use a 
veto.  Then it will be obvious to all who is responsible for 
holding up the work of government.  He charged that the Kurds 
in the COR are completely under the thumb of Talabani and 
Barzani, so even if they think differently they are too 
scared to stand up for what they believe.  He hinted darkly 
at continued oppressive means used by the KRG to keep people 
in line.  They are not acting like Iraqis, Mashadani stated. 
Second Deputy Speaker Tayfour and the Kurdish delegates just 
want to get what they can for Kurdistan and go home.  The 
Peshmerga debate illustrates this attitude.  It is 
unacceptable that they want the federal government to pay for 
forces entirely under KRG control. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Regarding the January 26 PCNS meeting at which 
Maliki briefed CoR leaders on the framework for GOI LTSR 
talks with the U.S., Mashadani said VP Hashimi and PM Maliki 
favored including political party representatives in the 
negotations.  Mahsadani thought this a bad idea, since they 
would pull the Iraqi side in various directions.  By his 
account, others at the discussion agreed with him.  The talks 
should be in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
 
BAGHDAD 00000288  002 OF 002 
 
 
supported by the Ministries of Planning and Defense, 
Mashadani said.  The PM is ultimately responsible for coming 
up with a draft agreement, passing it to the PCNS, and then 
sending it to the CoR.  Mashadani was interested in what 
would happen to such an agreement in the U.S., given the 
election year and frequent statements from candidates calling 
for troop withdrawal from Iraq.  He said Iraqis would want to 
see that the U.S. Congress, and in particular Democratic 
party leaders, approved the terms of a bilateral agreement 
with Iraq.  PolCouns told him it was normal in such 
negotiations for the administration to brief appropriate 
Congressional committees on a regular basis, but bilateral 
agreements such as that currently envisioned with Iraq did 
not trigger U.S. constitutional requirements for 
Congressional ratification. 
BUTENIS