VZCZCXRO8016
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #0092/01 0221624
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221624Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1055
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMNAVREG EUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000092 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS NATO MK KI SR GR
SUBJECT: MANAGING GREECE ON KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA 
 
REF: A. SKOPJE 0032 
 
     ¶B. SKOPJE 0017 
     ¶C. ATHENS 0021 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b, d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) Managing Greece over the next few months is likely to 
be difficult on the key Balkan issues of Macedonia and 
Kosovo.  To leverage Greek behavior we should: 
 
-- Engage the Greeks on Kosovo and Serbia, including through 
extending an invitation to them to participate in 
international structures for dealing with Kosovo and asking 
then to lead some efforts to support Serbia,s transition; 
 
-- Develop a coordinated message from partners -- ideally the 
Quint -- and from high-level U.S. officials that highlights 
the consequences of Greek behavior for regional stability; 
 
-- take steps with Skopje to encourage progress in the Nimetz 
process; and 
 
-- Avoid linkages between Greek behavior on Kosovo and 
Macedonia with unrelated Greek desiderata that could prove 
counterproductive.  End Summary 
 
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High Stakes 
----------- 
 
¶2.  (C) U.S./Greek relations are never frictionless or 
serene, but the coming months have the potential to be 
especially difficult.  Our paths on two critical related 
issues -- Macedonia and Kosovo -- diverge; we need to 
influence Greece to play a more constructive role on both 
issues.  This cable lays out Embassy Athens' thinking on how 
to do that, particularly during FM Bakoyannis, mid-February 
visit to Washington. 
 
¶3.  (C) Bringing economic and political stability to the 
Balkans is one of our highest policy priorities in Europe. 
Greece has been an uneven partner in this endeavor, 
responding positively in some areas -- such as providing 
troops for NATO's Kosovo Force and the EU Force in Bosnia, 
and in promoting trade and investment in the region -- but 
not on our terms in others.  On the two large Balkan issues 
pending this Spring, we diverge. 
 
-- Kosovo:  The Greeks are disquieted by the prospect of 
Kosovo's independence over Serbia's objections.  Greek 
antipathy largely stems from a knee-jerk affinity for the 
Serbian position (based, among other things, on Orthodox 
solidarity), but also from concerns of a possible negative 
precedent for Cyprus and a possible reactionary response in 
Serbia that could destabilize the region.  We lay out the 
counterarguments every chance we get, but have not been able 
to sway the opinions of the public or policy makers.  That 
said, the current Greek stance can probably best be described 
as a discomfited lack of resistance.  The Greeks are not 
taking steps to stymie EU decision making on a Rule of Law 
Mission, they have pledged substantial personnel to the EU 
Rule of Law Mission, they have pledged to maintain their 
force levels in KFOR, they have provided staff for the 
International Civilian Office (ICO), and they have also told 
us that they will not block decisions on Kosovo in any of the 
relevant international fora (OSCE, UN, EU).  They aren't 
enthusiastic, but they will not be spoilers.  However, a 
post-UDI Kosovo will require friends in the region who are 
committed to its success, political stability, and economic 
growth.  And Greece can play a helpful role in mitigating 
further self-inflicted wounds in Serbia and help them on the 
path to integration. 
 
-- Macedonia:  Even more troubling is Greece's expressed (and 
sincere) intent to block a NATO invitation to Macedonia, 
absent an agreed solution on the name.  Although this would 
be contrary to Greece's obligations under the 1995 
U.S.-brokered Interim Accord, the Greeks have made abundantly 
clear that this decision is firm.  We share Embassy Skpje's 
ref A assessment that a Greek veto woul be highly negative 
for Macedonia, for regional stability, and also for Greece,s 
hope of eventually reaching an agreement on the issue. 
 
---------------------- 
Influencing the Greeks 
---------------------- 
 
ATHENS 00000092  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) In the near term, we need to exercise our influence 
on the Greeks to get them in a better place on both issues. 
We recommend the following: 
 
-- Coordinated Messages from Partners:  Although the U.S. and 
UK have engaged with the Greeks on these issues, we do not 
see indications that our other partners have.  We believe it 
important that the Greeks hear from Allies beyond the U.S. 
and the UK of the consequences of Greece's policies for 
regional stability.  Such messages would have the most impact 
if delivered jointly -- a Quint approach to the Greeks on 
Kosovo and Macedonia would be optimal. 
 
Our messages should include the following points on Macedonia: 
 
o Support for the Interim Accord and expectation that Greece 
will comply with its obligations and evaluate Macedonia on 
NATO's performance based standards and not block an 
invitation as "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" 
should it meet those standards; 
 
o Statement that we are encouraging Skopje and Athens to 
engage seriously now in the Nimetz process; 
 
o Encouragement for Greece to carefully weigh the costs and 
benefits of blocking Macedonia's entry into NATO, including 
thinking through how a post-veto scenario would bring this 
long standing issue closer to resolution; and 
 
o Assurances that the Quint will not accept a "wear them 
down" strategy from Skopje, but will continue to press for a 
mutually acceptable resolution for as long as it takes. 
 
The last point is particularly important as senior Greek 
officials are convinced that GOM leaders are not interested 
in accepting a composite name for international organizations 
and would use an invitation to NATO membership without a 
final resolution as a way to further kick the ball down the 
road while they chip away at any remaining resistance to 
their constitutional name. 
 
-- Balkans and Regional Role:  The Greeks consider themselves 
a key player in the Balkans.  They want to be part of any/all 
multilateral structures working in the region.  We should 
consider inviting them to participate in the steering board 
for the International Civilian Office in Kosovo, even absent 
rapid recognition of an independent Kosovo.  We should also 
find other ways to involve the Greeks in broader 
considerations of stability in the Balkans and other regions. 
 
 
-- Serbia Handlers:  Although PM Karamanlis is not generally 
motivated by additional responsibilities, we believe he and 
FM Bakoyannis would be receptive to U.S. and European 
requests to engage with Belgrade on behalf of the 
international community, in the lead up to and the aftermath 
of Kosovo independence.  The Greeks are proud of their 
"special relationship" with Serbia.  Although the Greeks will 
likely not be objective in dealing with Serbia, we do believe 
they would faithfully convey concerns from the international 
community to Belgrade and vice versa and could play a 
important and useful role in leading a "friends of"-like 
effort in the aftermath of a UDI to emphasize the 
international community's interest in Serbia's future.  This 
would provide the PM and FM with some cover with the public 
in the face of the difficult and unpopular political 
decisions they will need to take with respect to Macedonia 
and Kosovo. 
 
-- High-Level Encounters:  We note Embassy Skopje's ref B 
recommendation for a White House meeting in March by 
Macedonian PM Gruevski.  In the zero-sum calculations of the 
region, we should consider a concomitant gesture to the 
Greeks.  We note that the President has traditionally 
received a senior Greek official in Washington for the March 
25 Greek Independence Day, and we should extend an invitation 
to PM Karamanlis to be that official this year.  Such a visit 
should not be limited to the Macedonian issue, but cover the 
range of "strategic partnership" issues the President and 
Prime Minister covered in their last meeting in March 2005. 
 
-- Nimetz Process: The continued public drumbeat vis-a-vis 
Macedonia's name/NATO prospects has led many Greeks to see 
much of their broader relationship with the West through this 
prism.  Therefore, any progress that could be achieved would 
not only pay large benefits related to Macedonia, but would 
also spill over into other areas.  We therefore support 
Embassy Skopje's (ref A) suggestion to press Skopje to 
propose a formula that goes beyond Skopje's current "dual 
 
ATHENS 00000092  003 OF 003 
 
¶5.  (C) We recommend we avoid establishing linkages between 
Greek behavior on Macedonia or Kosovo with Greek desiderata 
on unrelated issues on the grounds that it is likely to be 
counterproductive.  A U.S. effort to link Greece's desire to 
participate in the visa waiver program with Greek behavior on 
Macedonia (or Kosovo) is likely to reinforce Greek 
determination to veto Macedonian entry into NATO.  The Greek 
leadership would see this as an unacceptable threat from the 
West, and PM Karamanlis could only take the position of 
standing up against "unacceptable" U.S. pressure to maintain 
Greece's position of principle.  The Greeks may be able to be 
talked quietly down from their tree, but they won't be 
threatened or ordered down. 
¶6.  (C) Likewise we will need to reflect carefully on the 
consequences we establish for Greece should it fulfill its 
threats.  We will need to bear in mind that the manner in 
which we react can and will influence follow-on developments. 
 It is important our response not further complicate the 
continuing need for Greece,s cooperation in supporting 
stability in the Balkans and the possibility of the two sides 
eventually reaching a compromise on the name issue, no matter 
how remote that might seem at the time.  We still have many 
strategic interests in Greece that we need to keep in mind, 
including the use of the deep water port and air field at 
Souda Bay -- our key military logistics hub in the Eastern 
Mediterranean --  and the Port of Thessaloniki as a key route 
for transit of goods to Kosovo and the Balkans. 
SPECKHARD