VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0021/01 0051258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD473669 MSI3766-695)
O 051258Z JAN 08  ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0978
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1130
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0344

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR
SUBJECT: PM KARAMANLIS TOUGH ON MACEDONIA NAME, PRAGMATIC 
ON TURKEY, RUSSIAN ENERGY 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DANIEL SPECKHARD.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In his first meeting with the Ambassador, 
Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis took a hard line on te 
Macedonia name issue, saying he had "done hs part," while 
Skopje had become increasingly intransigent.  A mutually 
acceptable solution -- which could include a composite name 
of "New, Upper, North, whatever Macedonia" for use in 
international fora and another name (i.e., the constitutional 
name) for internal use -- had to be found now before the NATO 
Bucharest summit or Greece would not approve FYROM's entry 
into Euro-Atlantic institutions.  On Kosovo, Karamanlis was 
less categorical, noting that Greece could understand U.S. 
concerns about delayed independence leading to instability. 
Nevertheless, Karamanlis said that the period after the 
Serbian elections could offer one more hance for 
negotiations to lead to a mutually cceptable solution.  On 
energy, Karamanlis arued that the Russians were going to 
build the South Stream gas pipeline, if not through Greece 
then somewhere else, so it was in Greece's interest that it 
go through Greece.  On Turkey, he said relations were better 
now than in the past and that he had a good relationship with 
PM Erdogan.  Karamanlis confirmed his visit to Turkey in 
January, and while he was "not optimistic" about a 
breakthrough, such a visit could have a long-term positive 
impact on bilateral relations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PRIORITIES 
---------- 
 
¶2. (C) The cordial January 4 meeting began with the 
Ambassador and Karamanlis providing overviews of their 
respective priorities.  The Ambassador said he was focusing 
his attention on four areas: 1) working with Greece to 
increase stability in the Balkans (including supporting 
efforts to find a solution to the Macedonia name issue and 
address the situation in Kosovo); 2) promoting regional 
stability in the Eastern Mediterranean (including supporting 
improvements in relations between Greece and Turkey and 
working toward a solution of the Cyprus problem); 3) working 
with Greece to combat domestic and international terrorist 
threats; and 4) promoting economic development (including 
promoting Greek and European energy security, bilateral trade 
and investment, and economic development in the wider Balkan 
region).  Karamanlis agreed this was a good set of priorities 
and spoke of the very close relations and similarity of 
outlook between the U.S. and Greece.  Greece's policy in the 
region had three basic goals: 1) promotion of the EU as the 
primary stabilizing factor in Europe; 2) changing the Balkan 
tradition of conflict to one of cooperation; and 3) seeking 
good relations with Turkey.  Karamanlis admitted Greece was 
not yet ready to be a leader in the EU -- its economy needed 
greater vitality -- but Greece was now at the top of the 
middle of the EU countries, as opposed to being at the bottom 
in the 1980s.  In terms of domestic priorities for 2008, 
Karamanlis said he would focus on reforms of the pension 
system (this was "our historical duty and had to be 
accomplished regardless of the political costs"), 
privatization, including leasing of major ports at Piraeus 
and Patras and the selling of Olympic airways, and education 
reform, including creating a legal framework for private 
universities in Greece. 
 
MACEDONIA NAME ISSUE 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Karamanlis took a hard line on the Macedonia name 
issue.  He said Greece wanted the entire Balkan region to be 
incorporated into Euro-Atlantic institutions and to 
assimilate Western values, which would improve stability and 
further economic development.  But, Karamanlis said, "let me 
be very frank, I think I have done my part."  According to 
the PM, Greek public opinion earlier had been very opposed to 
any use of the name "Macedonia," but following UN negotiator 
Nimetz's forward-leaning proposal two years ago, Greece under 
Karamanlis's leadership took the "bold step" of accepting 
Nimetz's proposal as a basis of negotiation, which came at 
tremendous political cost to Karamanlis and the New Democracy 
party (support in Karamanlis's home region of Greek Macedonia 
slipped from more than 50 percent to 40 percent).  Greece was 
open to a composite name -- "New, North, Upper, whatever 
Macedonia."  But a compromise was essential, Karamanlis 
argued, and so far FYROM remained intransigent, which 
Karamanlis attributed, in part, to the U.S. decision to 
recognize Macedonia by its constitutional name. 
 
¶4. (C) Karamanlis said he had told FYROM leaders that any 
Greek government going further would be thrown out of office. 
Thus, it was essential to find a mutually acceptable 
solution now.  In response to the Ambassador's query as to 
whether it would be possible to work to show real progress 
and commitment in the negotiations before the NATO Summit, 
while leaving the ratification period for finalizing an 
agreement, Karamanlis insisted that this would not be 
acceptable and an agreement needed to be reached before the 
Summit.  Without a solution, he said, "we cannot approve 
FYROM's entry into Euro-Atlantic institutions."  As for 
Nimetz's proposal for a two-name solution (Republic of 
Macedonia for internal use and a composite name for the UN, 
NATO, and other international usage), Karamanlis said Greece 
could live with that, but the composite name had to be used 
in all international fora, and Greece expected the U.S. to 
use the composite name as well. 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶5. (C) Karamanlis was less categorical on Kosovo.  He said 
Greece understood U.S. arguments about a delay in 
independence for Kosovo would foster further instability, but 
Greece wanted to find a solution that would avoid extremes 
and be more "swallowable."  Greece understood there would be 
no UDI before Serbian elections, and after the elections, 
negotiations should be given another try.  In his meetings 
with his Serbian counterpart last year, he felt that there 
was an understanding of the inevitability of independence but 
also heard a plea for "autonomy" as a step on the road to 
making independence politically palatable.  "Autonomy can 
always evolve into independence," the Serbian PM told him. 
The Ambassador highlighted the U.S. position of support for 
the Ahtisaari plan and urged the PM to use his and Greece's 
influence to encourage Serbia to recognize that Kosovo was 
lost and to act now in their own self interest in pursuing 
European integration for Serbia and Kosovo as the best way to 
protect Serbian interests in the region.  The PM said Greece 
would work within the EU to find a consensus, which was 
essential in promoting stability during this tense period. 
 
¶6. (C) On Russia's position on Kosovo, Karamanlis noted that 
Putin during Karamanlis's December visit to Moscow was 
surprisingly less "aggressive" on the issue than previously. 
Three years ago, Putin had done an hour-long monologue on 
Ukraine, and Karamanlis expected something similar on Kosovo 
in December.  While Putin's arguments on Kosovo remained the 
same, it was clear this time that Kosovo was "not his highest 
priority." 
 
RUSSIA AND ENERGY 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Speaking in broader terms about Russia, Karamanlis 
opined it was a nation with a great, if tragic, history and 
had felt "humiliated" in the 1990s.  Now Russia was getting 
richer and wanted to be part of the "leading team."  Putin 
obviously was "no teacher of democracy," but on basic issues, 
such as global stability and battling terrorism, Russia could 
be counted as a partner.  There was "no doubt" that Greece's 
values would not change, but Russia was an important country 
and Greece needed good relations with it.  For one, many more 
Russian tourists were now coming to Greece.  Then, of course, 
there was the energy question. 
 
¶8. (C) Karamanlis said he Burgas-Alexandoupolis oil pipeline 
had been in the works for 20 years, so that was nothing new. 
As for the Russian South Stream gas pipeline, Karamanlis said 
the Russians were going to build it, if not through Greece, 
then somewhere else.  Thus, "it's better for us if it's 
through Greece."  On the Ambassador's concern that South 
Stream could overshadow the Turkey-Greece-Italy gas 
interconnector (TGI) and confuse potential investors, 
Karamanlis tried to downplay progress on South Stream.  He 
and the Bulgarian and Italian presidents had only said they 
were "interested" in South Stream, but it would be "hard and 
time-consuming" to get the project off the ground.  As for 
TGI, he told a Moscow story:  Putin asked him what kind of 
gas Greece thought it could get through TGI.  Karamanlis 
replied "Azeri," to which Putin retorted "they don't have 
any."  The PM, however, was pleased with the cooperation with 
Azerbaijan and confident the project would proceed. 
 
TURKEY 
------ 
 
¶9. (C) Relations with Turkey were better than previously, 
according to Karamanlis, particularly in terms of his 
personal relationship with Turkish PM Erdogan.  But he could 
not say there had been any progress on substantive issues. 
Karamanlis's January trip to Turkey, which the PM confirmed, 
was a "very sensitive exercise," but one that might possibly 
lead to a "breakthrough."  Karamanlis was "not optimistic," 
but the visit could open a door.  Elements in the Turkish 
military appeared opposed, as was some of the Greek press. 
There might not be any immediate progress on substantive 
issues, but the visit could help strengthen relations in the 
longer term. 
 
¶10. (C)  This was also why Greece supported Turkey's EU 
accession.  Greek public opinion rose and fell on the issue 
depending on events in the Aegean, but from Karamanlis's 
point of view the rational for EU membership was very simple: 
a European Turkey would make a much better neighbor.  The 
Cyprus issue was not a Greece-Turkey bilateral issue, but it 
did overshadow and complicate the EU question.  Karamanlis 
said that perhaps after the Cypriot presidential elections in 
February there would be a window of opportunity to move 
forward on the Cyprus issue.  Whatever happened, Greece would 
be "helpful." 
 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
---------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the importance of 
cooperating on counterterrorism, particularly given Greece's 
geo-strategic location near the Middle East.  He also 
underscored his determination to bring to justice the 
perpetrators of the January 2007 RPG attack against the 
Embassy.  The PM assured the Ambassador of continued 
cooperation on counterterrorism. 
 
ADVICE FOR AMERICAN AMBASSADORS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Karamanlis concluded the meeting with some friendly 
pointers on negotiating the Athens diplomatic scene.  It was 
very important for the U.S. Ambassador to be discrete. 
Meddling with politicians or the press was unhelpful.  Too 
close relations with Greek politicos, journalists, and 
prominent businessmen were also dangerous.  Such contacts 
could lead to one being dragged down into "Balkans gossip." 
 
 
BIO NOTE 
-------- 
 
¶13. (C) The meeting took place in Karamanlis's office at the 
Maximou Palace.  Journalists with cameras were at the gate 
but had no opportunity to approach the Ambassador.  During 
the meeting, Karamanlis was very comfortable and gregarious, 
often expressing his respect and affection for the United 
States.  There were virtually no pauses in the conversation, 
and Karamanlis at times became animated, particularly when 
discussing the Macedonia name issue and Kosovo.  He sat on 
the edge of his seat and took out his Greek worry beads.  He 
spent over an hour with the Ambassador, more than double the 
allotted time. 
SPECKHARD