VZCZCXRO6991
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #0148/01 0311420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311420Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1129
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVSUPPACT SOUDA BAY GR PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY: ADDED SIPDIS CAPTION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KIRF PHUM SOCI TU GR
SUBJECT: GREECE/TURKEY: MFA TERMS KARAMANLIS VISIT 
"POSITIVE" BUT "NOT CONCRETE" --CORRECTED COPY:-- 
 
REF: ANKARA 173 
 
ATHENS 00000148  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: A/Political Counselor Jeff Hovenier for 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) MFA officials termed PM Karamanlis' January 23 - 25 
trip to Turkey "positive but not concrete."  They were 
pleased by statements by PM Erdogan that "could be seen as 
positive openings" on the status of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate in Istanbul, on the Aegean "casus belli," and on 
broader Aegean issues.  Furthermore, the two sides had "frank 
and positive" exchanges on Turkey's EU prospects (and Greek 
support for it); illegal migration; freedom of religion 
issues -- emphasizing the issues of the Patriarchate's status 
and Halki Seminary; Aegean issues -- with an agreement to 
give new impetus to the bilateral "exploratory talks; and 
Cyprus.  From the Greek MFA perspective, the major 
deliverable was the visit itself -- with no major hiccups or 
crises.  As the MFA Deputy Director for Turkey put it, "Now 
we can have more normal high-level exchanges."  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
A Further Step Towards Normalcy 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) A/Political Counselor met January 30 with MFA Turkey 
Desk officials, led by A-4 Directorate for Turkey Deputy 
Director Katerina Natsika.  Natsika said the MFA saw the 
Karamanlis visit as "positive but not concrete."  The key 
point was that the meeting took place, that there had been no 
crises during the visit, and it was now much easier for 
senior Greek and Turkish officials to have "dialogue" without 
a prior requirement for deliverables. 
 
---------------- 
Three "Openings" 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Natsika said the GoG saw three "positive signals" on 
key issues from PM Erdogan during the trip.  The Greeks see 
all three signals as an "opening" for further discussions: 
 
-- Ecumenical Patriarchate:  PM Erdogan said publicly that 
the question of the ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate was 
"something that affects the Orthodox community" and not 
something that concerns the Turkish state itself.  The Greeks 
will be pursuing with the Turks what this means in practice. 
 
-- Casus Belli:  Although PM Erdogan did not refer to 
Greece's long-standing request that the Turkish National 
Assembly rescind its 1996 resolution that any Greek decision 
to extend maritime territorial waters from 6 to 12 nautical 
miles would be a "casus belli," he did make a "vague" and 
"positive" reference to this issue by stating both publicly 
and privately that "resorting to the threat of the use of 
force should not be the rule for international relations." 
Natsika said Athens will "try to stretch this statement to 
the extreme" in engaging with Turkey on its long-standing 
request to withdraw the "casus belli." 
 
-- Aegean Issues:  PM Erdogan openly referred to the issue of 
the delineation of the continental shelf, without referring 
to the broader range of Aegean issues that Turkey usually 
raises in that context.  He also said that the question of 
the continental shelf could be resolved by "resorting to 
law."  The Greeks have long held that the various disputed 
issues in the Aegean are primarily based on questions related 
to exploitation of resources, and that these disputes could 
best be solved through an agreed delineation of the 
continental shelf.  The Greeks have also maintained that if 
the question of the continental shelf cannot be solved 
bilaterally, then the two sides should resort to 
international law through requesting a ruling by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.  Until 
now, Turkey has sought a political approach to these issues 
by insisting that the agenda include a wider range of issues 
than just the continental shelf and demurring on the question 
of resorting to the ICJ.  Natsika said senior Greek officials 
saw PM Erdogan's comments as leaning slightly closer to 
Greece's position, and said that this would be discussed 
further in upcoming bilateral talks (more below). 
 
----------------------------------------- 
The Agenda - No Surprises or Breakthroughs 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The MFA Turkey team identified the following items 
has having been on the agenda: 
 
-- Turkey's EU Prospects:  PM Karamanlis reiterated Greek 
support for Turkey's "full" accession to the EU.  PM Erdogan 
asked for this position to "continue and be more forceful." 
Karamanlis underscored the need for a clear political 
commitment on freedom of religion, minority rights, and good 
neighborly relations.  He also said that the additional 
protocol must be fully implemented. 
 
-- Illegal Migration:  PM Karamanlis highlighted the 
importance Greece attaches to this problem, and asked for 
better implementation of the bilateral protocol on 
readmission.  He also asked that Turkey be "more forthcoming" 
in its negotiations with the EU on a readmission agreement, 
noting that Greece receives the bulk of illegal migrants 
coming to the EU from/through Turkey.  The two PMs agreed 
that Greek and Turkish "experts" would meet in Athens in 
mid-February to identify areaQ the 
issue of the status of the Patriarchate in Istanbul.  MFA 
sources reiterated that Greece does not ask that Turkey 
recognize the Patriarchate as ecumenical, but that it not 
prohibit the Patriarchate from using this title and not 
interfere in "what are solely religious matters."  Karamanlis 
also reiterated Greece's request that the Halki Seminary be 
reopened.  On Halki, the Greeks said that "no progress" was 
achieved.  Erdogan repeated previous assurances that Turkey 
was carefully reviewing this issue and would come back to 
Athens with "concrete proposals" at a later date.  A Turkish 
Embassy representative in Athens told us that the Turkish 
proposal is and will continue to be to affiliate Halki with a 
Turkish university, something the Greeks and the Patriarchate 
have Ecumenical ostensibly ruled out. 
 
-- Aegean Issues:  Karamanlis made the point that he had not 
visited the National Assembly because of the "casus belli" 
decision.  Karamanlis also requested that Turkey "end the 
publication of erroneous and misleading information" on the 
Turkish Ministry of Defense website about Aegean violations. 
Erdogan did not respond on this point.  However, the two PMs 
did agree that the bilateral "exploratory talks" should be 
assessed.  There have been 37 rounds of the "exploratory 
talks" with little concrete outcome.  The two PMs agreed that 
the negotiators should develop a joint assessment for the two 
PMs of what the talks have achieved and how they can be given 
further impetus. 
 
-- Cyprus:  Both sides repeated "known positions."  The 
Greeks felt no progress was made. 
 
--  Economic Ties:  The Turkish side raised interest in 
greater use of air transport lanes (Athens - Istanbul/Ankara 
and Thessaloniki - Istanbul/Ankara) and sea transport lanes 
(Kavala to Izmir and Thessaloniki to Izmir).  These issues 
have been remanded to a bilateral "Steering Committee" that 
meets every four months at the level of MFA Political 
Directors.  The Greeks also termed PM Karamanlis' Istanbul 
event with Greek and Turkish businessmen a "great success." 
 
-- Expo 2015:  Apparently overruling advice from his own 
Government, Karamanlis told Erdogan that Greece would support 
Izmir's bid to host Expo 2015 (Note:  MFA officials said the 
GoG recommendation to Karamanlis had been to support Milan's 
bid.  End Note). 
SPECKHARD