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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD FOR SECSTATE RICE, APNSA HADLEY, 
SECDEF GATES, AND VPOTUS CHENEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017 
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC JA BR IN GE
SUBJECT: USUN VIEWS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 
 
REF: A. STATE 169809 
     ¶B. USUN 1183 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment.  With inter-governmental 
negotiations on Security Council reform set to begin in 2008, 
a serious debate has begun on Council expansion.  We are 
closer than we have been in several decades to the prospect 
that a formal proposal for expansion could be put to a vote. 
We do not know yet if any proposal could secure the needed 
two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, although this is 
possible.  In any scenario, the position of the African bloc 
will be critical.  Therefore, we believe it is time to 
seriously consider our response.  We have four options: (1) 
avoid engagement and rely on our veto in the ratification 
phase to preserve our interests; (2) delay engagement until 
African states begin to declare support for realistic 
proposals; (3) start to engage the key players with a view to 
shaping where they throw their votes; and (4) proactively 
articulate an American position and mobilize a coalition to 
support it.  We recommend that we begin to engage now to 
understand better the political terrain; to test reactions to 
certain principles, possible redlines, and other structural 
reforms we would seek as part of a comprehensive reform of 
the UN; and then to determine which option to pursue.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
The Political Landscape on UNSC Reform 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Changes in the global distribution of power since 
1965, when the membership of the Council was last adjusted, 
underlie the political impetus for Security Council 
expansion.  Some states are perennial critics of the Council, 
although this is typically ideological in nature.  The real 
danger is that, as the membership of the Council has not been 
updated to reflect geopolitical realities, new rising powers 
as well as their friends and allies might come to view the 
Council,s role as illegitimate.  This, in turn, could 
undermine the willingness of countries to abide by its 
resolutions. 
 
¶3. (C) The U.S. position is that we favor permanent 
membership for Japan, that other nations should be considered 
as well, and that changes in the Council should be part of a 
comprehensive package of structural reforms.  All significant 
proposals for Council reform, however, go beyond the position 
of favoring Japan alone for permanent membership.  Based on 
the President's speech to the UNGA and bilateral engagement 
with G-4 members, we are already viewed within the P-5 as 
more forward-leaning than Russia and China.  The British and 
French are publicly wedded to the G-4 approach, partly to 
deflect attention from questions about over-representation of 
Europe among the permanent members. 
 
¶4. (C) According to the UNGA resolution adopted in September 
2007, member states are set to begin inter-governmental 
negotiations on Council reform before September 2008.  These 
negotiations could provide a vehicle for the G-4 model 
(permanent seats for Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, and two 
African countries, as well as four additional non-permanent 
seats) to be brought to a vote.  Because the G-4 proposal was 
not put to a vote in 2005 when it was first tabled, it is 
difficult to know exactly how much support it would have 
commanded.  We do not, however, believe that it enjoyed the 
support of the required two-thirds majority (128 countries) 
of member states.  But in the coming months, the G-4 will 
revise their proposal and could force many previously 
undecided countries as well as African Union members to show 
their cards and reveal how close to 128 votes Council 
expansion has now come. 
 
¶5. (C) We believe expansion of the Council, along the lines 
of the models currently discussed, will dilute U.S. influence 
in the body.  USUN currently starts most discussions about 
important Council statements or resolutions with at least six 
votes (U.S., UK, France, and the three European delegations) 
and must secure three more to reach the required nine votes 
-- barring a P-5 veto -- for adoption.  To take just the G-4 
countries plus the yet-unidentified African state(s) that 
would join them in permanent membership, we are confident we 
 
could reliably count on Japan's support, and to a lesser 
degree, on Germany's.  However, on the most important issues 
of the day -- sanctions, human rights, the Middle East, etc. 
-- Brazil, India, and most African states are currently far 
less sympathetic to our views than our European allies. 
 
¶6. (C) Due to the arithmetic of the UNGA, the African states 
will be critical in determining whether any Charter amendment 
reaches the two-thirds majority.  Based on public speeches 
and our own estimates, we assess that the G-4 model or some 
variant thereof currently enjoys the support of roughly 70-95 
member states.  The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) proposal (no 
additional permanent seats, but 10 additional non-permanent 
seats) enjoys support of no more than roughly 20-25 member 
states.  The African Union (AU) model (largely the same as 
the G-4 model but with veto rights for all new permanent 
members) counts about 40-50 adherents.  Out of a total of 192 
member states, these figures leave about 40 states without a 
clear position on UNSC reform.  Assuming these 40 states 
either split their support between the rival camps or abstain 
from voting, it is clear that the G-4 proposal or its 
successor will need the support of a sizable number of 
African states to reach the 128-vote threshold. 
 
Principles for Acceptable Council Expansion 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Regardless of how we play the situation tactically, 
our position should be based on a set of principles that 
define the parameters for acceptable Council expansion, 
including a group of structural UN reforms that would be 
acceptable trade-offs for our support for Council expansion: 
 
-- TAILORING COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP TO ADDRESS CRITICAL STRATEGIC 
CHALLENGES:  We should not think about Council expansion just 
in the abstract, but also as a way to fashion the Council to 
address the contemporary era's fundamental challenges, 
including instability and threats arising from the Middle 
East, the management of the rise of China, and proliferation. 
 This would imply that countries to be added should align 
with our interests and views of these problems. 
 
-- PRESERVING U.S. INFLUENCE:  We should base our approach to 
Council expansion along the following lines in order to 
prevent significant erosion of our current level of 
influence: 
 
¶1.  SMALLEST POSSIBLE EXPANSION: A dilemma of Council reform 
is that it is inevitably "additive" in nature because 
declining powers and regional blocs can prevent any 
diminution of their representation on the Council.  A modest 
expansion of two or three permanent members would best suit 
our interests, but the dynamics of securing the two-thirds 
majority for a particular proposal would create pressure to 
move to a significant expansion of five to seven new members. 
 As it is, negotiating documents that require unanimity among 
fifteen members is already a long and difficult enough 
process.  We are also cognizant that this may not be the last 
call to expand the Council over the life of the United 
Nations. 
 
¶2.  NO EXTENSION OF VETO:  Addition of new permanent members 
with veto rights would increase the risk to U.S. interests 
from Council expansion exponentially.  We should quietly 
allow discontent with P-5 veto prerogatives to ensure the 
veto is not extended to new members while joining Russia and 
China in stoutly defending existing P-5 vetoes.  Although G-4 
countries privately concede the veto, most AU states remain 
united behind the demand in the AU "Ezulwini Consensus" for 
two permanent seats for Africa with veto rights.  Cracks 
began to appear in the AU position, however, when ten African 
states joined India in September 2007 in tabling resolution 
L69 -- which did not make any stipulations regarding the 
right of veto.  USUN understands that an AU summit is planned 
for late January 2008, at which African supporters of L69 
(South Africa and Nigeria most prominently) will seek greater 
flexibility in the AU position. 
 
¶3.  MAINTAINING OUR ARITHMETIC ADVANTAGE IN UNSC VOTING: 
According to the UN Charter, in order for the Council to 
adopt a resolution, nine of its fifteen members must vote in 
favor without any P-5 vetoes.  As described earlier, USUN 
 
currently starts most important debates with six typically 
sympathetic countries (P-3 plus European delegations) and 
must secure three more to reach the nine-vote threshold.  If 
the Council were expanded to 20 members but the minimum votes 
for adoption of UNSC resolutions were set at 11, USUN would 
start most debates with eight votes -- assuming Japan and 
Germany were among the new permanent members -- and still 
only have to seek three more for adoption.  Adjusting voting 
thresholds in an expanded Council could be an important 
vehicle to preserve our current arithmetic advantage in the 
UNSC. 
 
¶4.  ENSURING PREDICTABILITY IN THE SELECTION OF NEW MEMBERS: 
While an amendment to the UN Charter to expand the Security 
Council would have to specify the names of the new permanent 
members, most UNSC proposals envision as a first step a 
framework resolution to set forth a mechanism to elect the 
new permanent members.  To maximize predictability, we should 
structure the framework agreement to require that candidate 
members receive broad support from the UNGA membership as a 
whole, not within regional blocs, and to limit the rounds of 
balloting on each seat. 
 
-- LINKAGE TO CRITICAL STRUCTURAL REFORMS:  Any change in the 
Council should only be made in exchange for significant 
structural reforms to revitalize the institution as a whole. 
The list below is illustrative of the trade-offs we should 
pursue.  It should be noted that all of these would be highly 
controversial at the UN and that many would threaten the 
current base of support for the G-4 or other UNSC expansion 
proposals.  Many of these reforms might also dissuade African 
states from supporting a "package" of UNSC expansion tied to 
structural UN reform. 
 
¶1.  SHIFT TO VOLUNTARY FUNDING:  This reform would have the 
most dramatic impact on General Assembly decision-making, the 
U.S. financial contribution to the UN, and support for 
greater transparency and accountability within the UN system. 
 Its viability as a reform tied to UNSC expansion depends on 
the willingness of aspirants for permanent Council seats to 
increase their contributions and/or pledge to cover any 
shortfall from a decrease in contributions by other states. 
African states, whose support would be crucial to successful 
UNSC expansion, would be particularly concerned about a drop 
in UN funding for development projects. 
 
¶2.  WEIGHTED VOTING: Weighted voting could be based strictly 
on the assessment rate for contributions, a double majority 
voting system, or a bicameral UNGA in which representation in 
the second chamber is based on financial contributions and 
concurrence between the two chambers is necessary for all 
budgetary decisions.  Weighted voting is likely to be one of 
the most unpopular structural reforms for countries that do 
not attain permanent seats on the UNSC, including African 
states, because their influence in the UNGA and Fifth 
Committee would also be circumscribed. 
 
¶3.  REDUCTION IN U.S. CONTRIBUTION:  The U.S. financial 
contribution to the UN would decline with either a floor or a 
cap on UNSC permanent member contributions.  If the floor 
were set at 5 percent of contributions (China currently pays 
2.6 percent, Russia 1.2 percent, Brazil 0.87 percent, and 
India 0.45 percent), and the G-4 countries plus an African 
state were to become permanent members, the U.S. contribution 
for non-peacekeeping assessments would decline to roughly 18 
percent.  The same floor/cap could be used to lower U.S. 
assessments to finance peacekeeping operations.  Such 
proposals would probably be most palatable to African and 
other developing countries, but they would have to overcome 
Russian and probably Chinese opposition. 
 
¶4.  IMPROVING OVERSIGHT:  Some of the proposals to improve UN 
oversight include enshrining a "sunset clause" in the UN 
Charter, according to which all UNGA mandates would terminate 
after five years unless renewed by a two-thirds vote.  Other 
ways to ensure transparency and accountability include 
guaranteeing Office of Independent Oversight Services (OIOS) 
independence in the UN Charter and/or ensuring access to all 
internal UN audits by all member states. 
 
¶5.  POLITICAL REFORMS:  States under UNSC sanctions could be 
barred from running for seats on any UN body.  This reform 
 
was proposed unsuccessfully in the run-up to the creation of 
the new Human Rights Council, as a considerable number of 
states complained of UNSC encroachment on the rights and 
prerogatives of other UN bodies. 
 
U.S. Options 
------------ 
 
¶8. (C) With these principles in mind, we believe that the 
United States has four options to respond to the new round of 
activism on Council expansion: 
 
-- OPTION 1: Avoid engagement on Council expansion and rely 
on our veto in the ratification phase to preserve our 
interests.  Amendments to the UN Charter require the 
ratification of two-thirds of UNGA and must include the P-5. 
The United States could therefore remain disengaged from the 
process and determine its position in the ratification phase. 
 The risk is that an expansion that threatens our interests 
could pass in the UNGA, that we would be isolated in 
rejecting ratification, and that this, in turn, would 
undermine the legitimacy of future Council actions. 
 
-- OPTION 2: Delay engagement until African states begin to 
declare support for realistic proposals.  When we get 
strategic warning that parts of this bloc are beginning to 
declare their intentions, we would engage with key players to 
shape the outcome, including potentially organizing a 
coalition to block proposals contrary to our interests.  The 
risk is that by waiting we will allow momentum to develop 
behind unfavorable proposals and come to the game too late to 
intervene successfully. 
 
-- OPTION 3: Engage the key players and undecided countries 
with a view to shaping where they throw their votes.  By 
articulating to these states the kind of expansion we could 
support, the United States could try to moderate their 
demands and mobilize their support behind our views.  The 
risk is that such engagement could accelerate the momentum 
behind Council expansion in ways that we could not ultimately 
control. 
 
-- OPTION 4: Proactively articulate an American position on 
Council expansion and mobilize a coalition to support it. 
Because of our vital interest in the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the Council, the United States would engage 
the G-4 or some subset of the group to set forth its own 
proposal for Council expansion as part of a comprehensive 
package of structural reforms for the UN.  This would 
certainly accelerate the process of considering Council 
expansion, with the attendant risks, but we would be postured 
to shape a coalition in favor and against particular models. 
 
Recommendation 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (C) We recommend that we move forward in four steps. 
First, in order to collect sufficient information for a 
well-informed decision, USUN will in the next few months 
enter into discussions with other member states, with an eye 
to monitoring how close the G-4 or other models are to 
reaching the two-thirds majority, and carefully and 
selectively testing reactions to our principles in ways that 
do not accelerate movement toward Council expansion.  Second, 
we should assess and refine the principles described above 
for acceptable Council expansion.  Third, we should decide 
which specific structural reforms we should seek in exchange 
for our support to expand the Council, as any Security 
Council expansion has to be part of a comprehensive package 
of reform of the UN as a whole.  Fourth, we should decide 
which of the above-noted procedural options, or others that 
might later emerge, would best serve our interests. 
Khalilzad