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DE RUCNDT #1217/01 3602030
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INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1535
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 1453
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0153
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RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0127
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 2774
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3000

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001217 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA AA AM BK BU CY EN GG GR HR
IC, LG, LH, MD, MK, MW, RO, RS, SI, TU, UP 
SUBJECT: EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE 62ND UNGA 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B&D) 
 
Summary and Introduction 
 
¶1. (U) This cable was prepared by Ambassador James Gadsden, 
who served as Senior Area Adviser for Eastern European 
Affairs to the 62nd United Nations General Assembly. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: Most Eastern European states generally 
supported US  priority objectives for the Fall session of the 
62nd UNGA:  adoption of the resolution condemning rape as an 
instrument to achieve military and political objectives; 
adoption of resolutions on the human rights situation in 
Iran, Burma, Belarus and the DPRK; resisting Palestinian 
resolutions widely supported by UN member governments; the 
appointment of US candidate David Walker to the Independent 
Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC), and focusing UN member 
states attention on excessive increases in the 2008/2009 
proposed UN budget. This message assesses the impact of 1) 
the tendancy of Eastern European states to align with EU 
member states on UN positions, 2) the interplay of regional 
sensitivities on UNGA voting decisions, and 3) the limits of 
Eastern European alignment with EU member states on UNGA 
issues on support for US positions.  To maximize Eastern 
European support for US positions, we should 1) intensify 
efforts to find common ground with the EU, with which Eastern 
European states tend to align; 2) cultivate relationships 
with Eastern European officials throughout the year in New 
York, Washington, and capitals, thereby demonstrating US 
interest in their assessment of their strategic environment, 
and 3) explore, long before the next UNGA, ways in which 
Eastern European states could support our positions without 
jeopardizing their strategic interests.  End Summary. 
 
The Tendency to Align with EU Member States 
 
¶3. (SBU) Three inter-related dynamics drive Eastern European 
states' UNGA voting. The dominant dynamic is the tendency to 
align with EU member states, except where their national 
interests lead them to choose another course. Perm Reps of 
new EU Eastern European states, such as Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania, together with aspirant 
Croatia, often state boldly that their top foreign policy 
priorities are NATO membership, EU membership, and 
participation in global affairs through the UN. For them, 
being a good new EU member means working to achieve consensus 
among EU member states on UN issues.  These countries treat 
the EU and the UN as vehicles through which they can leverage 
influence in global affairs with leadership positions in 
either organization.  The Croatian Perm Rep lobbied hard for 
Croatia's 2009 Security Council seat and was confident 
Croatia would win on the first round.  Slovenia's Perm Rep, 
poised confidently to coordinate in New York EU member state 
positions on UN issues when Slovenia becomes EU Council 
President on January 1, 2008, is already laying the 
groundwork for Slovenia's bid for a Security Council seat in 
2012 and a UNICEF Executive Board seat in 2008. Bulgaria soon 
will campaign to succeed Slovenia with a Security Council 
seat in 2010-2011. Substantive UNGA priorities for these 
states will remain human security, human rights, human social 
development, women's rights, HIV-AIDS, Millennium Development 
Goals, and climate change. Croatia is eager to contribute to 
UN reconciliation, peacekeeping, peace building, and police 
training efforts, areas in which it believes it can offer 
others the benefits of its experience. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
wants to emphasize humanitarian assistance in natural and 
man-made disasters. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  The tendancy to align with EU member state 
positions is clear in the voting patterns of Iceland, which 
is not an EU aspirant, and states to the East that wish to 
join the EU. The Icelandic Perm Rep indicated privately that 
unlike in the past, Iceland no longer will follow the US 
consistently on foreign policy issues.  It will instead align 
more closely with the EU. Eastern European countries such as 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Turkey, Albania, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Georgia also cite EU membership as 
their long term foreign policy high priority and the UN as 
their vehicle for engaging in global affairs. On most issues, 
they too tend to align with EU member states on UN voting. 
The most helpful and approachable non-EU Eastern European 
states were Ukraine, Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, and Montenegro. They 
were least comfortable when the US and the EU could not find 
common ground, for example on the Palestinian resolutions. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Central European states, the Baltic States, 
Ukraine, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova, 
especially grateful for the US role in their transition to 
democracy and market economy, are most comfortable when the 
US and the EU positions on UN issues mesh.   Except for 
Turkey and Iceland, both of whom committed to other 
candidates before the US candidate was announced, most 
Eastern European states voted for David Walker for the 
Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC). Once US 
negotiators developed a consensus rape resolution text, which 
EU states joined, most non-EU Eastern European states quickly 
did so as well. Most Eastern European states joined EU member 
states in voting for the DPRK and Burma human rights 
resolutions. Differences between EU and some Eastern European 
states over the Belarus and Iran human rights resolution 
complicated those states aligning with the EU. 
 
Regional Sensitivities 
 
¶6. (SBU) Regional Sensitivities form the second dynamic 
driving Eastern European states' UNGA voting. First among 
those are security and commercial relations. Armenia, for 
example, is a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, together with Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  In addition, Armenia enjoys 
beneficial trade relations with Belarus.  For these reasons, 
Armenia voted "no" in committee and plenary on the Belarus 
Human Rights Resolution, while EU states and Turkey voted 
"yes."  During the Belarus no-action vote, Armenia's Perm Rep 
went for coffee. Armenia objected strongly to current "GUAM" 
coordinator Azerbaijan's recent tabling of a draft resolution 
on protracted conflicts. The Azeri Perm Rep hinted that if 
the GUAM pushes this resolution forward, Armenia may 
re-examine its participation in the OSCE-sponsored talks on 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the Azeris tabled the draft this 
year, they expect it will be discussed in 2008. Ukraine is 
considering tabling during the 63rd UNGA a draft resolution 
on the 1932 famine, and the Perm Rep has requested the 
assistance of State Department legal advisors on language to 
avoid reference, even by implication, to "genocide." For 
completely different reasons, the Armenians and the Russians 
are both very sensitive about Ukraine's famine initiative. 
While Russia joined the consensus on the rape resolution and 
was an early supporter of the Walker nomination, Russia was 
not helpful on the country specific human rights resolutions. 
The Russians will pay close attention to UNGA reform 
discussions to ensure that UNGA reforms do not change what 
they see as the iron-clad, charter-based balanced 
relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA. 
 
¶7. (SBU) A second regional sensitivity is relations with the 
Moslem world.  For East European countries with Moslem 
domestic communities, such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Albania, 
Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the concern is the 
prospect of negative domestic repercussions of positions 
their governments might take on the Palestinian resolutions 
or on Iran. While EU member states tend to vote "yes" on some 
Palestinian resolutions and abstain on most, Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, also concerned about their image in the OIC, tend 
more consistently to vote "yes." Turkey chose not to 
participate in any voting on Iran. A third key sensitivity, 
especially for Armenia, is the diaspora throughout the Moslem 
world, but especially in Iran. Yerevan worries about the 
welfare of ethnic Armenians who for centuries enjoyed 
relatively privileged lives in Iran and elsewhere in the 
Middle East, including freedom to practice their religion. A 
fourth consideration is dependence, especially for energy 
supplies and investment resources. Iran supplies natural gas 
to Armenia, a concern as winter approaches, and is building 
an oil refinery in Armenia which could generate considerable 
employment.  Given these factors Armenia, in plenary, voted 
"no" on the Iran Resolution and "yes" on the no-action 
motion.  Armenia abstained or was absent for the vote on the 
amendment proposed in plenary. Regional sensitivities such as 
these do challenge the EU's push for Europe to speak with one 
voice on global affairs. 
 
The Limits on Aligning EU and Eastern European States 
Positions on UNGA Issues 
 
¶8. (SBU) In an ideal world, the EU Council President would 
relish more opportunities to declare on most issues the 
preamble to his December 18, 2007 plenary statement opposing 
no-action motions on the Iran, Burma, and Belarus human 
rights resolutions: " I have the honor to speak on behalf of 
the European Union. The candidate countries Croatia and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the 
Stabilization and Association Process, the potential 
candidates Albania and Montenegro, the EFTA countries Iceland 
and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as 
Moldova align themselves with this statement("  In New York, 
the EU presidency coordinates positions among EU member 
states through weekly meetings of the EU Perm Reps, the head 
of the New York Council Secretariat Office, and the head of 
the European Commission's New York office.  These meetings 
are supplemented by daily meetings of experts from member 
states missions and often from capitals as well. EU mission 
officials complain that they spend far more time in EU 
coordination meetings than they do at the UN. 
 
¶9. (SBU) A Troika of the presidency, the council secretariat, 
and the Commission meets twice yearly with EFTA members 
states and less frequently with candidate states, states in 
association arrangements, and other non-EU European states. 
More frequently, common EU positions and draft statements are 
simultaneously communicated electronically to EU and non-EU 
European Perm Reps together with an invitation to align with 
the EU.  Informal channels, such as readouts from Nordic EU 
member states to the Icelandic and Norwegian Perm Reps 
augment the periodic Troika meetings and electronic 
communications with non-EU European states.   The current 
head of the EU Council Secretariat's New York Office 
indicated that with the number and pace of EU coordination 
meetings and UN meetings, Council Secretariat officials in 
New York are simply not able to conduct extensive outreach to 
non-EU European missions. Now planning the future EU External 
Action Agency's New York office, he is already incorporating 
into those plans additional staff members dedicated 
specifically to outreach and improved coordination with 
non-EU European missions as well as with other UN regional 
groupings. 
 
Recommendations 
 
10.(C)  The most helpful and approachable non-EU Eastern 
European states were Ukraine, Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, and 
Montenegro. They tended to co-sponsor the rape resolution, 
support Walker's election, and vote with us on the four 
country specific human rights resolutions. Cultivating 
relationships with them throughout the year in New York, in 
Washington, and in capitals and demonstrating US interest in 
their assessment of their strategic environment would enhance 
the likelihood of their support for our positions during the 
next UNGA. With Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, we should 
explore ways in which those states could support our 
positions without jeopardizing their strategic interests in 
energy supplies, investments, trade, image in the OIC, 
repercussions in domestic Moslem communities, and the welfare 
of the diaspora in the Moslem world. In this context, urging 
"going for coffee" during important committee or plenary 
voting on Iran or on Palestinian issues, on which regional 
sensitivities are in play, might be a more effective initial 
US approach than pressing for a "yes" or a "no" vote or even 
for an abstention, which these countries have demonstrated 
they are politically not prepared to deliver. 
 
Khalilzad