VZCZCXRO6988
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #1193/01 3541802
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201802Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3380
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1214
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1103
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2980
XMT AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2022 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR PINS ECON XW XY ZF ZU
SUBJECT: UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 62ND GA 
 
REF: 06 USUN 2260 
 
Classified By: Min.- Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis for reasons 1.4 (B&D 
) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Gerald Scott is again serving as Senior Area Advisor 
for Africa at USUN during the regular session of the General 
Assembly. These are his personal reflections on African 
participation as the regular session of the 62nd GA draws to 
a close.  (Note that while in the UN context the African 
Group includes the states of the North African littoral, 
usage of the term in this cable reflects Ambassador Scott's 
portfolio which deals only with the delegations of the 
African governments falling within the purview of State's 
Bureau of African Affairs.) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU) The record of the African delegations at this GA 
does not vary much from that of last year. There was some 
criticism of the USG in the General Debate, especially on our 
Cuban embargo.  A protracted negotiation of our resolution 
condemning rape "in conflict and related situations" resulted 
in a much modified text which was finally adopted by 
consensus.  Four country-specific human rights resolutions 
(Iran, Burma, Belarus and DPRK) were approved in Third 
Committee (and have been referred to Plenary), but it was a 
near-run thing since no-action motions receiving substantial 
African support were proposed on three of them in Committee. 
The anti-Israeli texts passed by massive margins, African 
performance mitigated by a handful of abstentions.  The 
annual resolution condemning our Cuban embargo, which also 
passed with almost universal approbation, was the occasion 
for six African delegations to attack us from the floor.  Our 
efforts at budget discipline received no real African 
support.  But in elections of individuals to UN bodies, our 
candidates have prevailed with large numbers of African 
votes.  I recommend further dialogue to emphasize the 
importance we attach to the UN and our desire to see it 
function more effectively. End Summary 
 
THE GENERAL DEBATE 
 
¶3. (SBU) The seven days of the General Debate, which begins 
the General Assembly, provide the annual opportunity for each 
member to express its views on the state of the world.  Most 
of this is diplomatic boiler-plate, but occasionally 
something breaks the monotony.  Since any direct criticism of 
another government is, in this context, an unfriendly act, I 
always listen for mention of the US.  Angola, the Gambia, 
Namibia, and Sao Tome all objected to our Cuban embargo. 
Namibia which has criticized us on this in four of the last 
five General Debates, inaccurately called it a "blockade," as 
do the Cubans.  Eritrea charged that we sided with Ethiopia 
in the boundary dispute.  But President Mugabe of Zimbabwe 
gave one of the most vituperative speeches heard in such 
debates, partly directed at the British but mostly at the USG 
and President Bush.  (Except for a junior note-taker, we 
withdrew all our delgation during his performance.) 
 
¶4. (U) On the other hand, several delgations praised us. 
Liberia, Malawi (for help with Malaria), Mauritius (for our 
sanctions against Burma), Togo.  Niger's printed text had 
praise for our Middle East initiative, but this was dropped 
from the spoken text.  Botswana favorably cited President 
Truman.  For some reason, Djibouti and Mali did not speak 
this year. 
 
THE U.S.ANTI-RAPE RESOLUTION 
 
¶5. (C) After weeks of negotiation, the Third Committee 
adopted the U.S.-sponsored resolution "Eliminating rape and 
other forms of sexual violence in all their manifestations, 
including in conflict and related situations" by consensus. 
Our original title was "Condemning the Use of Rape as an 
Instrument of State Policy," and the text was more pointed 
towards deliberate suppression of a population (or segment 
thereof) by violence including rape.  Our draft text, which 
we had hoped would garner widespread support, was instead 
opposed by a small group of African missions who insisted 
that it was in fact aimed at Sudan - and possibly other 
African states.  While we believe that most African 
delegations would have accepted our draft, or something close 
to it, the dynamic of African group politics meant that 
almost all were silent in the caucus while Egypt, Sudan and 
Uganda held forth on the necessity of resisting the US text. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001193  002 OF 004 
 
 
We were in negotiation with the Africa group headed first by 
Benin and then by Angola. Both gave the impression of trying 
to be helpful, but the constant referral of every 
modification to the Africa Group allowed Sudan, Egypt, Uganda 
and South Africa to set the tone. The DRC was an original 
co-sponsor, but reportedly spoke little.  Tanzania reportedly 
made helpful arguments.  The final consensus preserved the 
essence of our argument, but the lengthy process consumed an 
extraordinary amount of time and energy. 
 
 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS 
 
¶6. (SBU) Every year we, Canada and the Europeans sponsor 
country-specific human rights resolutions in Third Committee. 
 This year the process was complicated by the existence of 
the Human Rights Council, the Geneva-based body replacing the 
Human Rights Commission.  The Council, of which we are not a 
member, has so far compiled a very weak record, finding only 
Israel worthy of serious criticism.  We and others have 
therefore argued that the General Assembly and its Third 
Committee should continue to be the fora for consideration of 
egregious violators.  This year we sponsored a text on 
Belarus, the EU sponsored texts on the DPRK and Burma, and 
Canada sponsored a text on Iran.  In the Third Committee (see 
USUN 1082) the DPRK draft passed 97 (US) - 23 - 60.  (The 
Africans were 10 - 5 - 26 - and 7 not participating.)  The 
North Koreans did not present a no-action motion to block 
consideration of the draft. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Burma, Iran and Belarus drafts were all 
confronted by no-action motions in Third Committee, all of 
which were defeated, but in the case of Iran by one vote. 
Africa no-action votes were as follows: on Burma, 17 - 6 - 17 
- 8; on Iran, 28 - 4 (Burundi, Liberia, Madagascar and 
Rwanda) - 10 - 6; on Belarus, 17 - 6 - 15 - 10.  These are 
the key votes, because, if successful, they block 
consideration of the texts which pass by comfortable margins 
- though only after a major lobbying effort. A number of 
African delegations were consistent supporters of no-action 
motions: Angola, Botswana, Congo, DRC, Gambia, Guinea, 
Namibia, S.Africa, Swaziland and Zambia.  To these Sudan, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe added consistently negative votes on the 
texts of the drafts as well.  But an interesting point; in 
spite of the rhetoric about group unity, most of the 48 AF 
delegations did not adhere to this pattern.  Some were 
consistently absent: CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome, 
Seychelles.  Some consistently abstained (or mixed 
abstentions with absences): Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone. And the other 26 were more varied 
in their voting. So it is clear that there is no African 
consensus on the question of country-specific human rights 
texts.  So long as no African country is the object of the 
exercise, most delegations demonstrate a considerable freedom 
from the restraints of what is often put forward as the 
Non-Aligned Movement position of opposition. 
 
8.(SBU) On the texts, Burundi and Liberia were constantly 
with the US.  Tanzania and Ghana were with us on Burma and 
the DPRK.  Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe were consistently 
opposed; Somalia opposed the texts three times, the Gambia 
and Guinea twice.  A more detailed analysis was supplied by 
email on Nov. 26th.  What will really count, of course, are 
the votes in Plenary which will take place after I leave the 
Mission. 
 
ANTI-ISRAELI RESOLUTIONS 
 
¶9. (C) Every year the GA votes a number of 
pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli texts. These are sticks to beat 
the Israelis (and ourselves) and every year we suffer massive 
defeat. We are required by PL 106-13 to actively seek the 
abolition of entities that contribute neither to peace nor to 
the goal of UN reform. With that in view, we concentrate on 
attempting to reduce the support for three resolutions that 
mandate three unhelpful UN bodies: The Special Committee to 
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied 
Territories, The Division for Palestinian Rights of the 
Secretariat, and The Committee on the Exercise of the 
 
SIPDIS 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. 
 
¶10. (U) The Plenary votes on the Division of Palestinian 
Rights and on the Committee on the Exercise of the 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People have taken 
place.  The Division  was reconfirmed by 110 - 8(US) - 54. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001193  003 OF 004 
 
 
The Committee was reconfirmed by 109 - 8(US) - 55. (Note that 
this Committee is chaired by Senegal, and Guinea, Madagascar, 
Mali, Namibia, Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Africa are 
members.) In both votes, the Africans voted 37 - 0 - 2 
(Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire) and 9 marked absent (Burundi, 
Chad, Eq. Guinea, the Gambia, B. Bissau, Madagascar, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome and Seychelles). 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
Practices was reconfirmed in Fourth Committee by a narrower 
margin (85 - 8(US) - 70). (This is a three-member committee 
of which Senegal is the only African.) The Africans voted 25 
- 0 - 8 (Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, E.Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Malawi, and Swaziland) and 15 not participating (B. 
Faso, CAR, Chad, DRC, the Gambia, G.Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, and Somalia).  Since the total of negative votes and 
abstentions on this resolution almost equal the positive 
votes, we are pushing to reduce the support for this text in 
the Plenary vote which at this writing has not taken place. 
(In the 4th Committee vote, compared with last year, Eq. 
Guinea went from "yes" to "abstain."  Cape Verde and Uganda, 
the reverse.) 
 
THE CUBA EMBARGO RESOLUTION 
 
¶12. (SBU) Another event in which we suffer an annual loss is 
the resolution calling for an end to the U.S. embargo of 
Cuba.  This year the vote was 184 - 4(US) - 1.  Every member 
of the African Group voted in favor of the resolution; no 
surprise there.  But in addition, six addressed the Assembly 
to underscore their opposition to our policy.  They were 
South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Sudan. 
(Uganda was new to this list.  On the other hand, Lesotho and 
Namibia spoke last year, but not this year.)  The standard 
language is more in sorrow than in anger, but Sudan called 
the embargo a "blockade" and said it was "a crime against 
humanity." 
 
INDIVIDUAL ELECTIONS 
 
¶13. (SBU) Another major aspect of our effort in the General 
Assembly is the election of U.S. candidates to various UN 
bodies.  Here we are almost always successful, and generally 
have very good support from African delegations.  This year 
we saw Ms Felice Gaer, one of twelve candidates, elected to 
one of five open seats on the UN Committee Against Torture. 
David Walker, the Comptroller General of the U.S., was 
elected to the UN Independent Audit Advisory Committee 
(thirty African delegations pledged their support).  We 
expect that Pierre-Richard Prosper will be elected to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 
January. 
 
THE BUDGET AND UN REFORM 
 
¶14. (C) Part of the dialogue in New York is our effort to 
restrain the UN budget and promote more efficient use of 
resources.  We battle strong headwinds on this, since the 
Africans contribute almost nothing and receive a great deal. 
If we and a few others pay more, it is no loss to them.  Most 
of the negotiations on these matters take place among experts 
in the Fifth Committee, but I try to sensitize Permanent 
Representatives to the reality that our concerns are not only 
driven by (legitimate) Congressional interest, but also by 
our desire to see the UN made more effective. Unfortunately, 
when most delegations hear "reform," it translates into more 
African seats on the Security Council -- and not much else. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶15. (C) The African Group has the reputation of being the 
most unified of the regional groups.  This is a reflection of 
the reality that the weak hang together for fear of being 
hanged separately.  And they are swayed on some issues 
important to us by the remnant of the anti-colonial dynamic 
and the knowledge (as one Ambassador put it to me) that they 
are (some of them, at least) one coup d'etat away from 
finding themselves on, e.g., a human rights black list.  But 
it does not take much contact to realize that African 
governments, like most others, send very impressive people to 
New York.  Unfortunately, unless they are on the Security 
Council, or are before the Council because of crises, or are 
automatically very major players (e.g., Nigeria), they 
necessarily get little attention from us until we staff up 
for the GA -- at which point one does one's best. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001193  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶16. (C) Cooperation with individual missions is often 
striking -- even if it frequently does not in public extend 
further than a principled abstention on a dicey vote.  I 
should like to mention several missions particularly helpful 
this year (some more with advice and information than with 
votes): Botswana, Burundi, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania.  Others, 
particularly unhelpful, were Uganda (a real change), South 
Africa (thanks to their NAM leadership tradition), and of 
course Sudan and Zimbabwe (with neither of whom have I 
established real contact). 
 
¶17. (C) Most of the rest were personally congenial, but 
unable or unwilling to step very far away from the standard 
posture on controversial issues.  Many in the north are 
governed by Islamic/Arab considerations.  South Africa exerts 
too much of a pull on her neighbors.  But if engaged and 
cultivated individually, much useful work can be done. 
 
¶18. (C) I recommend that most Embassies seek out the 
appropriate level at the Foreign Ministry or the Presidency 
and discuss our common and divergent positions during the GA. 
 Our gratitude for support should be expressed as well as our 
disappointment, particularly on human rights issues, since 
these matters come up year after year. In the process, they 
should be reminded that there is no real African consensus on 
these matters. 
 
¶19. (C) Governments need to hear that we value the UN, take 
it seriously, and want it to be more effective in dealing 
with the crises and the issues of the international system. 
There is a perception that we see the UN, and especially the 
GA, as a negative element in our world.  This may 
occasionally be an accurate view, but it is a distinctly 
unhelpful one, especially in Africa where the UN is seen as 
the natural friend of the weak.  We need to position 
ourselves better in this regard, and in doing so will 
increase useful cooperation in matters of common concern in 
the years ahead. 
 
 
 
Khalilzad