VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0742/01 3411356
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071356Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7259
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0543
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0489
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0450
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0464
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1025

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 
TAGS: IAEA AORC PARM KNPP IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: LIKE-MINDED AMBASSADORS REGROUP POST-NIE 
 
REF: A) STATE 162558 B) UNVIE 734 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 
1.4 b, d and h 
 
 Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) In the aftermath of the Iran NIE our priority in 
Vienna has been to maintain IAEA and Board member government 
pressure for full disclosure of Iran's past activities and 
compliance with UNSC requirements.  Like-minded Ambassadors 
shared concerns about the NIE and next steps on Iran in a 
December 6 strategy session.  Ambassador Schulte underlined 
that the NIE findings reinforce the lack of confidence in 
Iran's nuclear program.  The UK and France downplayed the 
significance of the NIE but Japan expressed concern that we 
not underestimate its impact on the Secretariat, the NAM and 
Iran.  Like-minded Ambassadors shared concerns about the 
Secretariat's methodology on the work plan, the lack of 
 
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transparency, adherence to deadlines and possible 
equivocation in reporting to the Board in January.  At the 
same time, they agreed that the work plan should not be given 
overarching importance as it is only a small part of the 
larger issue of confidence; that a "confession" about the 
past is insufficient and that Iran needs to make a strategic 
decision to abandon any nuclear weapons option.  As to next 
steps in the UNSC, the French favored quick adoption of a new 
UNSCR, and Japan reported the DG's opposition to a Security 
Council resolution.  Like-minded Ambassadors were uneasy 
about the prospect of the DG's trip to Tehran and complained 
about his public statements that they felt could undermine 
the safeguards system.  End summary 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶2. (S) While the NIE has taken some wind out of our sails in 
Vienna, we plan to refocus the Vienna diplomatic community 
and the IAEA on the finding of "high confidence" that there 
was a nuclear weapon program in Iran up until 2003.  This 
coincides with the inspectors' upcoming (week of December 10) 
trip to Tehran to hopefully receive Iran's answers to 
questions regarding "contamination," the Gachin mine, 
polonium 210, and, most importantly, the alleged studies. 
While we have little expectation that Iran will admit the 
military dimension of all those items, we need to ensure that 
the DG does not close these issues or even declare that 
Iran's information is "not inconsistent with" the Agency's 
findings as he has with the plutonium and centrifuge issues. 
Then we would be at odds not only with Iran, but with the DG 
and his many supporters. 
 
¶3. (S) We and our close allies in Vienna will continue to 
insist that the IAEA's credibility is at stake, even more so 
now that the findings of the NIE have been made public.  Iran 
still has no credibility regarding the history and original 
purposes of its nuclear program.  Until those are fully 
disclosed there can be no confidence in its current program 
-- Iran will remain in non-compliance with its safeguards 
obligations and the confidence building measure of suspension 
of proliferation sensitive activities will still be required 
to overcome the "confidence deficit."  Only with full 
disclosure and adherence to the Additional Protocol will the 
Secretariat be able to conclude, to the satisfaction of the 
 
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Board, that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for 
peaceful purposes.  Until then, the questions about Iran's 
program which arose and caused the Board to report Iran's 
file to the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, remain unresolved. 
 
Recommendation 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Mission recommends a demarche to Board members 
focusing them on the NIE finding of the original military 
purposes of Iran's program, and calling on members to insist 
on full disclosure from Iran as the only way to begin to 
resolve the impasse.  We will continue reminding the IAEA 
leadership of the DG's announced intention to have the work 
plan largely resolved by year end, and the risk to the IAEA's 
credibility if it allows Iran now to waffle on its work plan 
obligations. 
 
Impact of the NIE 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Schulte hosted a meeting of like-minded 
counterparts, EU-3 plus Australia, Canada and Japan December 
6 to discuss the implications of the NIE and next steps on 
Iran.  Ambassador Schulte dispelled rumors that the timing of 
the release had been politically motivated, and clarified 
that the process was driven by intelligence and a 
Congressional mandate.  Mission highlighted certain 
judgments: less confidence since mid-2007 that Iran had not 
restarted its nuclear weapons program, which also coincided 
with the Agency's diminishing knowledge of Iran's current 
activities; Iran's continued development of dual-use 
technologies while keeping open the option of a nuclear 
weapons program; the timeline for Iran to produce sufficient 
fissile material for a weapon had not changed since the 2005 
NIE; and the fact that the 2003 halt as well as suspension of 
enrichment and implementation of the AP at that juncture were 
the result of concerted international pressure. 
 
¶6. (C) UK and French Ambassadors downplayed the significance 
of the NIE, but Japan was more circumspect.  UK Ambassador 
Smith observed that the NIE changed nothing on fundamental 
questions, such as the lack of confidence and any economic 
rationale for Iran's enrichment program.  Ambassador Schulte 
agreed that the NIE's findings reinforce this fundamental 
lack of confidence.  In France's view, the NIE's focus on 
Iran's intentions as opposed to facts is misplaced.  French 
Ambassador Deniau underlined the fact that Iran had a covert 
program; that enrichment had no economic rationale and that 
Iran had consistently developed dual-use aspects of the fuel 
cycle.  He highlighted the first key judgment in the NIE 
confirming that Iran had a military program as an important 
new element.  Deniau disagreed with the Estimate's definition 
of a nuclear weapons program limited to covert activities 
since dual-use technology could be so applied.  German 
Ambassador Gottwald also noted the NIE's assessment of Iran's 
continuing to develop dual-use technology. 
 
¶7. (C) Japanese Ambassador Amano cautioned that the NIE's 
negative impact and willful misinterpretation by the 
Secretariat and the NAM should not be underestimated.  There 
 
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is a tendency to see the U.S. administration as divided and 
to focus on the assessment that Iran does not now have a 
nuclear weapons program.  DCM reported that the Secretariat 
is also concerned the NIE accentuated the sense of 
triumphalism in Iran and called in the Iranian Ambassador to 
reiterate the end 2007 deadline for the work plan. 
 
Secretariat Not Playing Ball 
 
SIPDIS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The IAEA's November correspondence with Iran on P1/2 
issues and the U-metal document, the former of which the IAEA 
"removed from the list of outstanding issues," caused 
consternation among like-minded Ambassadors.  Nuclear 
Counselor noted that while the IAEA cast the letters as a 
bureaucratic step necessitated by the sequential nature of 
the work plan, Iran had used them to declare the issues 
"closed."  Smith was "singularly unimpressed" by the 
Secretariat's handling of the letters, and took issue with 
 
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the use of language that differed from that used by the DG in 
reporting to the Board.  He understood that the letters were 
not intended to be categorical and DDG Heinonen had told him 
that he could revert to P1/P2 issues in dealing with the 
uranium contamination issue.  Deniau observed that the 
Secretariat's behavior demonstrated a lack of transparency 
 
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and institutional difficulty; when asked for the letters, the 
Secretariat had claimed they were confidential and no 
 
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different from the DG's report, only to have Jalili spring 
them on Solana in their November 30 meeting. (Note:  The EU-3 
will demarche the DG separately regarding the incident with 
Solana, and Ambassador Schulte has already raised the issue 
(ref b).  End note). 
 
¶9. (C) For the French, P1/P2 remained an outstanding issue. 
French DCM Gross questioned the Secretariat's methodology, 
and its apparent lowering of standards in the context of the 
work plan.  He noted that Iran had not answered all the 
questions and had not provided access to a single individual 
outside AEOI, nor to archives or facilities despite the 
numerous references to military and other agency involvement 
in nuclear activities.  Gross worried that once it confronted 
Iran with intelligence regarding the alleged studies, the 
Secretariat would accept Iran's responses without requiring 
 
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follow-up.  He underlined that the Board must give an 
independent judgment of the work plan.  Nuclear Counselor 
also expressed concern that the Secretariat could deal with 
the remaining outstanding issues in the same way as it had 
plutonium and P1/P2 issues, and simply declare Iran's 
non-answers to be "consistent." 
 
¶10. (C) UK Msnoff noted that it was unclear whether or not 
the Secretariat would report to the Board in January. 
Heinonen had said that he expected Iran to address 
contamination issues, alleged studies and the AP before 
Christmas.  If not, the DG would report in January.  If the 
Secretariat was satisfied, however, there might not be a 
 
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report.  The UK understood that the Secretariat was using the 
prospect of a report as leverage on Iran, but was still 
uneasy about this equivocating and leaving the decision to 
the Secretariat.  Japanese Ambassador Amano observed that 
Heinonen's technical briefing prior to the November Board had 
been extremely frank and useful on points such as the fact 
that items related to the 1993 offer had originally been 
ordered by Libya and were diverted to Iran instead. He 
suggested that the Secretariat distribute Heinonen's power 
point presentation and follow up with another briefing. 
(Note: The Secretariat refused Msnoff's request for a copy of 
this presentation, which we have reported in detail via 
email.  End note.) 
 
Confession is Not Enough 
------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Ambassador Schulte recounted that when he informed 
the DG about the NIE, he had emphasized the importance of the 
work plan and pushing Iran for a "confession."  Gottwald 
observed that we cannot leave any impression that the NIE 
lessened the relevance of the work plan and must continue to 
demand clear answers.  At the same time, confidence cannot be 
rebuilt absent the AP and the re-establishment of a robust 
verification regime.  He underlined the need to remain united 
and not give Iran any absolution. 
 
¶12. (C) Ambassador Smith was lukewarm about a "confession" 
from Iran.  A confession would only address the past, not the 
future and would also require some "penance" from Iran to 
redress fundamental concerns about its nuclear program, he 
argued.  Amano noted that we should not be satisfied with a 
"confession" about the past when what was needed was a 
strategic decision from Iran.  Smith observed that we must 
strike a fine balance between adherence to the deadline for 
completion of the work plan, and giving the impression that 
the work plan is all important.  The work plan is only a 
small, necessary but insufficient part of building 
confidence, he noted.   Ambassador Schulte agreed that even 
as we press the Secretariat to maintain deadlines and 
standards, the work plan is still only one element; current 
programs must be addressed through implementation of the AP 
and Code 3.1.  Australian Ambassador Shannon was likewise 
concerned that the work plan had come to dominate the 
international debate, and that we must move beyond the 
history, which created the lack of trust and confidence, and 
focus on the present.  He underlined that Iran's violation of 
its Chapter VII obligations jeopardized the UN Charter. 
 
Next Steps in the UNSC 
---------------------- 
 
¶13. (S) Deniau relayed Solana's oral report to P5 1 PolDirs 
that the Jalili meeting produced "even less" progress "if 
that is possible," than his October meeting with Iranian 
negotiators.  In Paris December 1 PolDirs discussed new 
resolution elements and the French are poised to move quickly 
on a UNSCR, based on agreed (if weaker) elements, to reassert 
Security Council requirements.  The Security Council could 
also require a report from DG ElBaradei on completion of the 
work plan. 
 
¶14. (S) Amano reported that the DG opposed a new UNSCR.  In a 
November 19 discussion, ElBaradei had told Amano that the 
Secretariat was convinced Iran would discontinue any 
 
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cooperation on the work plan, if the Security Council adopted 
a new resolution.  Rather than moving forward in the Security 
Council, Amano expected the Secretariat to plead for more 
time on the work plan.  The DG had said it would take four to 
five weeks but there is no firm deadline and this is, as 
ever, a moving target. 
Reining in the DG 
------------------ 
 
¶15. (S) Ambassador Schulte reported that the DG is planning 
on going to Tehran in the new year.  Like-minded Ambassadors 
agreed with Amano's assessment that such a visit is 
inherently "very risky."  Australian Ambassador Shannon noted 
the DG's tendency to speak "loosely" even if the PR is 
carefully crafted.  Shannon and Canadian Ambassador 
Gervais-Vidricaire also took issue with the triumphalist tone 
of the DG's  press statements on the NIE, particularly the 
use of the term "vindication" in his December 5 press 
conference.  Such rhetoric created unrealistic expectations 
about the capacity of the safeguards system, and Shannon 
believed we need to "come down hard" on the DG. 
SCHULTE