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Viewing cable 07TOKYO5491, ACTING U/S ROOD'S NONPROLIFERATION MEETINGS WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO5491 2007-12-07 07:02 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO5931
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKO #5491/01 3410702
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 070702Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0107
INFO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0499
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1991
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8416
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4809
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7208
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8475
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5467
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7306
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0463
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 005491 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN THY NGYUEN 
DEPT FOR EAP/J JESSICA WEBSTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017 
TAGS: KNEP MNUC PARM PINS PREL PTER IAEA JA
SUBJECT: ACTING U/S ROOD'S NONPROLIFERATION MEETINGS WITH 
GOJ OFFICIALS ON NOVEMBER 9, 2007 
 
TOKYO 00005491  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b,d 
 
 1. (C) Summary: Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, John C. Rood, conducted a 
series of successful and substantive nonproliferation 
meetings with senior GOJ officials November 9 on the margins 
of the U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, 
Non-Proliferation and Verification.  Japan continues to be a 
strong partner in important nonproliferation areas of 
concern.  On North Korea, Japan shares the U.S. view on the 
importance of a complete and correct declaration of North 
Korea's nuclear programs.  Regarding the removal of the DPRK 
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, at least one 
GOJ official noted that de-listing North Korea without 
progress on resolving the abductions issue could undermine 
U.S.-Japan relations.  With respect to China,s expanding 
military modernization efforts and the lack of transparency 
provided by Beijing, GOJ officials agreed that China 
increasingly poses a security challenge.  On Iran, Japan is 
in favor of a third UNSC sanctions resolution.  Discussions 
on ballistic missile defense (BMD) revealed that Japan 
believes the program is critical to deterring potential 
actions by rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. 
However, one GOJ official commented that Japan would like to 
deepen cooperation so that in the future Japan will have 
&real8 joint BMD development with the U.S.  The importance 
of Information Security and nuclear energy/security 
cooperation, including DOE/NNSA's Radiation Emergency 
Response Workshop, was also discussed.  End Summary. 
 
MOD Vice Minister Masuda: China Concerns and BMD Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
2.  (S) Acting U/S Rood,s discussion with Ministry of 
Defense Administrative Vice Minister Kohei Masuda focused on 
issues related to regional security.  Stressing that China is 
Japan,s &main concern,8 Masuda said he felt it was 
important to understand the reasons behind China,s current 
military expansionism.  Contrasting the current view of China 
with the Cold War perception of the Soviet Union, Masuda 
noted it was hard to think of China as an enemy given Japan's 
economic ties with the country.  He added he believes China 
may be heading down a &path of (military) development that 
it can,t slow down,8 and that China may not yet have fully 
considered the rationale for growing its military might. 
 
3.  (S) Noting that the United States also views China as a 
significant security challenge, Acting U/S Rood agreed that 
relations with China are complex.  Acting U/S Rood 
highlighted the multi-dimensional U.S.-China relationship and 
said the United States, economic relationship with China 
helped mitigate conflict.  Emphasizing that the United States 
is particularly concerned with the growth in China,s armed 
forces industrial infrastructure, U/S Rood said it would be 
imperative to manage China,s rise in military power.  He 
added that the United States is experimenting on working with 
China on a number of strategic security issues, most notably 
Iran and North Korea, and said the recent progress in 
beginning disablement and Yongbyon would not have been 
possible without China.  Acting U/S Rood conceded results 
have been somewhat mixed on strategic engagement with China, 
but said the process has helped produce important bilateral 
ties with senior Chinese officials. 
 
4.  (S) Turning to BMD, Acting U/S Rood said he was pleased 
with Japanese cooperation, emphasizing that it was an 
important element to take away the coercive capability of 
potential enemies and protect critical assets during the 
early stages of a conflict.  Highlighting the December 2007 
planned missile test by Japan, Acting U/S Rood noted that BMD 
added a new dimension to the U.S-Japan relationship.  Masuda 
agreed on the importance of BMD, and stressed that he views 
the program as essential for deterring any potential actions 
by &rogues states such as North Korea or Iran.8  He 
 
TOKYO 00005491  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
stressed, though, that he also viewed BMD as an important 
part of countering the growing military power of China. 
Masuda said he felt that the current BMD relationship was not 
truly joint development, noting that he saw the United States 
as having a deeper relationship with other countries on 
similar programs.  He hoped that in the future Japan would be 
able to have &real8 joint BMD development with the United 
States.  Masuda said, however, that this might require a 
public-private partnership in order to overcome the 
&hurdle8 of Japanese arms export laws. 
 
5.  (S)  In closing, Acting U/S Rood stressed the U.S. 
concern over the Aegis information leak and said that the 
United States and Japan needed to work together to improve 
information security.  Masuda said he was &very concerned8 
about the matter and noted that the Japanese government 
understood the critical importance of preventing leaks of 
confidential information.  He added that &improvement8 was 
 
SIPDIS 
needed on the Japanese side and said Japan would take the 
&advice8 of the United States from the bilateral 
information security task force (BISTF) process. 
 
 
MEXT Looking to Contribute to Radiation Emergency Response 
Workshop 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
6.  (C) Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Technology 
(MEXT), Director General Yasutaka Moriguchi opened the 
discussion by highlighting the Ministry,s two major safety 
missions: the prevention of radiation injury to local 
citizens and detection of radiation levels released into the 
environment.  Under this umbrella, MEXT regulates the usage 
of domestic radioactive isotopes and the safety of research 
reactors. 
 
7.  (C) After outlining MEXT's mission, Moriguchi segued to 
discussion of DOE,s Radiation Emergency Response Workshop. 
He pointed out that several agencies should be involved 
because Japanese law requires all relevant GOJ entities to 
work together and provide a coordinated response in the event 
of an actual radiation emergency.  Moriguchi explained the 
Cabinet Secretariat is responsible for leading the GOJ's 
interagency coordination on Emergency Response.  Moriguchi 
stated that MEXT is studying how to contribute to the 
workshop in the areas related to MEXT,s capabilities.  MEXT 
can share the burden by measuring and analyzing radiation 
levels, developing a plan to quarantine and transport injured 
persons, and dispatching appropriate experts.  MEXT works 
closely with a number of experts, namely the Japan Atomic 
Energy Agency, National Institute of Radiological Sciences 
and national universities.  Experts from those institutions 
along with MEXT officials will be sent to affected areas to 
provide technical and medical advice as needed.  Moriguchi 
ended the meeting by stating that a formal response on 
Japan,s participation will be sent through diplomatic 
channels. 
 
METI on Export Controls: Strict on Iran and Wary of India 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
8.  (C) In his meeting with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (METI) Director General Tsuneyoshi Tatsuoka, Acting 
U/S Rood began by saying the United States is increasingly 
using financial measures to target nations such as Iran and 
the DPRK because of their effectiveness in bringing about 
concrete results.  On October 25, the USG took financial 
actions against Iran,s Revolutionary Guard Corporation and 
other entities, including three of Iran's top four banks and 
certain corporations and individuals.  Given Iran,s 
deceptive business practices, these measures aim to restrict 
Iran's ability to finance proliferation activities as well as 
to put pressure on Tehran to comply with its IAEA and UN 
Security Council commitments.  Acting U/S Rood suggested the 
GOJ consider issuing an advisory on how Japanese industry can 
 
TOKYO 00005491  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
take precautions to ensure transactions do not support 
illicit activities.  Acting U/S Rood reiterated Secretary 
Rice's message that &Now is not the time for business as 
usual with Iran.". 
 
9.  (C) Tatsuoka stated METI takes a very strict approach on 
export controls with regard to Iran.  Japan imports 12 ) 13 
percent of its crude oil from Iran and disrupting that flow 
would have a large impact on the economy, Tatsuoka said.  The 
GOJ will watch closely any developments in the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the situation in Iran. 
 
10.  (C) The United States is also very concerned about 
nuclear security, particularly with regard to nuclear power 
plants and fuel storage sites, Acting U/S Rood continued. 
There will be a nuclear renaissance in the U.S. and around 
the world given rising oil prices and climate change 
concerns.  Given terrorists' desire and efforts to acquire 
nuclear materials that can be used in an attack, in 2001 the 
U.S. launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, which now has 62 participating countries.  Acting 
U/S Rood stated the U.S. would like to work with Japan to 
host a workshop on nuclear security capacity building, and to 
establish a legal framework under which the two nations can 
share classified information in support of this objective. 
 
11.  (C) Tatsuoka relayed that the GOJ is most concerned 
about China and India being able to keep nuclear and dual-use 
technology secure.  Tatsuoka said the Government of India has 
asked the GOJ to relax its export control regulations toward 
India so that India can import more sophisticated technology. 
 METI remains skeptical, however, about India's export 
control regime and has not as yet relaxed those regulations. 
Tatsuoka stated he would travel to Delhi in late November to 
discuss this issue further with the GOI.  Acting U/S Rood 
agreed while significant improvements have been made, more 
work needs to be done to bring India,s export control and 
proliferation trade regulations and ability to exercise 
effective controls up to international standards. 
 
ACCS Ando: Cautions on Delisting and Wary of Chinese Business 
With Iran 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
12.  (C) The Russian vice-foreign minister had expressed 
concerns to the Japanese about U.S.-Japan cooperation in BMD, 
according to Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyasu Ando. 
 U/S Rood noted the Russians had generally not complained 
about U.S. BMD initiatives with Japan in the past but had 
recently raised questions about possible placement of BMD 
facilities in the Czech Republic or Poland.  In particular, 
the Russians did not want BMD sites to be located in former 
Warsaw Pact states that had now joined NATO.  Ando said the 
Japanese response to Russian concerns had been to stress that 
U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation was not directed at Russia. 
 
13.  (C) Turning to the issue of North Korea, Ando stressed 
three points of concern which had also been relayed to A/S 
Hill during his visit to Japan the previous week.  First, 
North Korea needed to complete disablement of Yongbyon's core 
nuclear facilities and to disclose their remaining facilities 
by the end of the year.  Second, the United States should 
take into consideration reports of North Korean weapons 
transfers to Syria when reviewing the possibility of removing 
North Korea from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states. 
Third, the United States should understand that de-listing 
North Korea without progress on resolving the abductions 
issue would undermine U.S.-Japan relations. 
 
14.  (C) Acting U/S Rood indicated the United States believed 
disablement of the Yongbyon's core facilities would largely 
be completed by the end of the year, although in the interest 
of thoroughness, a few actions might require a bit more time. 
 Some quick, if less complete measures, had already been 
 
TOKYO 00005491  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
taken to disable the facility.  The USG has set aside about 
$20 million to cover the initial cost of the disablement 
process.  Acting U/S Rood added that the USG would likely ask 
Congress for additional funding and might also seek financial 
assistance from other countries as the disablement process 
moves forward.  Ando responded he was not in a position to 
make a commitment, but that funding for disablement could be 
discussed. 
 
15.  (C) A full declaration of North Korea's remaining 
nuclear facilities, however, could be more difficult, Acting 
U/S Rood noted.  The United States wanted to discuss a 
declaration with the North Koreans before December to clarify 
what the acceptable content of such a declaration should be. 
He acknowledged his own skepticism about North Korea's 
intentions to provide a complete and correct declaration, but 
added the only way to test those intentions is to move ahead 
with the disablement and declaration process and see what 
actions North Korea takes. 
 
16.  (C)  Acting U/S Rood emphasized A/S Hill understands 
Japan's concerns about moving too quickly on removing North 
Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and 
reviewed the procedures by which a country is removed from 
the list.  Acting U/S Rood explained that the President must 
notify Congress of his intent to remove a country from the 
state sponsor of terrorism list, and that upon receiving such 
notice, Congress has 45 days to undertake action preventing 
the removal.  If no such action is taken, the President then 
has the authority to de-list, though he is not obligated to 
do so.  Should the President wish to proceed with removing a 
country from the list, the Secretary of State executes that 
action on behalf of the President.  Ando pressed for 
clarification of whether the final decision on removing North 
Korea from the list would fall to the President or to the 
Secretary of State.  Acting U/S Rood replied that, while the 
 
SIPDIS 
Secretary of State formally takes the action to remove a 
 
SIPDIS 
country, in the case of North Korea this would be done with 
the approval of the President. 
 
17.  (C) Ando observed Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka 
Machimura had raised the abduction issue with Defense 
Secretary Gates the previous day (November 8) and added the 
 
SIPDIS 
issue remains of great importance to Machimura, Prime 
Minister Fukuda, and other members of the Cabinet. 
 
18.  (C) Acting U/S Rood highlighted U.S. concerns about the 
direction of events in Iran.  Although Iran had probably 
overstated their development of nuclear technology in an 
attempt to convince other countries that any efforts to block 
the program would be futile, progress nevertheless is 
continuing.  In particular, further progress in enrichment 
technology would put Iran on the "glide path" toward a 
nuclear weapon.  This was the reason behind the United 
States' diplomatic effort regarding the Iranian nuclear 
program, U/S Rood indicated. 
 
19.  (C) At present, however, Iran has not felt the need to 
come to the negotiating table, the Acting Under Secretary 
observed.  In fact, political factions in Iran had hardened 
their positions on the nuclear program.  This situation 
contributed to the U.S. decision to take financial measures 
against Iran as a way to increase pressure on Tehran to 
comply with its IAEA and UN Security Council commitments. 
Acting U/S Rood emphasized the United States. would have 
liked to deal with this question through the United Nations 
Security Council but Russian and Chinese opposition had 
bogged down that channel, with differences on the content of 
a possible Security Council resolution still under debate. 
 
20.  (C) The new U.S. financial sanctions on Iran, Acting U/S 
Rood stated, were the largest imposed by the United States 
since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.  Most notably, the 
sanctions endeavored to target institutions related to Iran's 
 
TOKYO 00005491  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
Revolutionary Guard, an element involved in weapons 
proliferation and support for terrorism.  Acting U/S Rood 
expressed hope that Japan would adopt similar financial 
measures against Iran and noted other major states such as 
France and the United Kingdom were considering sanctions of 
their own.  He stressed action by just those few countries 
that possess major financial centers could have a significant 
impact on the Iranian government. 
 
21.  (C) Ando responded Japan has fully implemented the 
relevant U.N. sanctions against Iran and will continue to do 
so despite the economic impact on Japan, which imports over 
ten percent of its oil from Iran.  Noting China appeared to 
have been taking advantage of the fuel situation, however, he 
asked whether the U.S. had engaged the Chinese on the 
problems with Iran.  Acting U/S Rood affirmed that the United 
States had discussed Iran with the Chinese, albeit with mixed 
results.  The U.S. efforts now centered on convincing the 
Chinese not to engage in "business as usual" with Iran. 
Treasury U/S Levey would be meeting with the Chinese in the 
near future to convey U.S. concerns, he added. 
 
22.  (C) Ando queried whether the United States had any 
information regarding possible nuclear cooperation between 
Iran and North Korea.  Acting U/S Rood indicated no evidence 
had been found of exchanges on nuclear or associated 
technology between the two countries despite longstanding and 
ongoing cooperation on missile development.  He also 
reaffirmed the President's statement last year that any 
transfer of nuclear technology by North Korea would be seen 
as a grave threat to the United States, and that North Korea 
would be held accountable for any such action taken. 
 
23.  (U) This cable was delayed in order to obtain Acting 
Under Secretary Rood's clearance. 
SCHIEFFER