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P 311506Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TIRANA
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INFO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 3241
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1234
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0048
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RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 4458
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 3238
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3503
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2372
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 3722

S E C R E T TIRANA 001090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BELGRADE ALSO FOR PODGORICA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL AL
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF THE ALBANIAN INTELLIGENCE 
SERVICES 
 
REF: TIRANA 949 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES STEPHEN A. CRISTINA 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (C) AND (D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (S)  Albania's intelligence services, the 
Military Intelligence Service (SHIU) and the Albanian 
State Intelligence Service (SHISH), have improved 
their capabilities and are close partners with the 
USG.  During the visit of President Bush, in the 
support they provide for troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and in their close cooperation in the 
Global War on Terrorism, Albania's intelligence 
services have demonstrated their capabilities and 
willingness to assist the USG in any way requested. 
Despite progress, the intelligence services continue 
to be hampered by drastic budget shortfalls and some 
attempts at political manipulation.  The USG 
maintains a close and cooperative relationship with 
both services who are excellent partners in pursuing 
US intelligence objectives.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------ 
The Services 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (S)  SHIU: The SHIU is the military intelligence 
branch that is responsible for battlefield 
intelligence, analysis, and some basic foreign 
intelligence gathering.  SHIU uses military attaches 
assigned to Albanian diplomatic missions as its 
primary foreign intelligence gathering capability, 
which is therefore limited as the attaches are not 
trained in specific intelligence gathering functions. 
The SHIU is not discussed in detail in this cable 
because of its limited national-level intelligence 
role and function. 
 
¶3.  (S) SHISH: The SHISH is the descendant of the 
communist era intelligence service known as the 
"sigurimi" that was the enforcement tool of the 
communist regime.  The SHISH has adapted well to the 
post-communist world and has become a professional, 
largely apolitical intelligence service.  The SHISH 
conducts both domestic and foreign intelligence 
operations but is focused on the internal threat, 
primarily related to organized crime, corruption, and 
the like.  SHISH personnel are well trained and are 
assigned to five branches:  Technical Operations, 
Foreign Intelligence, Counter Espionage, Counter 
Organized Crime, and Counter Terrorism.  Although 
senior management of the SHISH is generally 
motivated, the institution as a whole is not highly 
motivated and has little altruistic or patriotic zeal 
for its work. 
 
------------------------ 
Key Performance Measures 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (S) Organized crime:  The SHISH has made 
excellent progress against organized crime (OC) 
targets but is hampered by legal constraints, chiefly 
Albania's broad legal immunity for government 
officials.  The SHISH is aggressive in targeting 
organized crime suspects, but many times mustt cease 
investigations that are tied to officials with 
immunity.  (NOTE:  All members of Parliament, 
 
Ministers, Judges (trial, appellate, Constitutional, 
and Supreme Courts), Central Election Commission 
members, the People's Advocate, and the Chairman of 
the High State Control (an independent body) enjoy 
Constitutional immunity from prosecution for all 
criminal offenses.  END NOTE.)  Because of this, 
there is great incentive for OC figures to obtain 
positions of power in government.  SHISH is limited 
to information gathering and has no arrest authority. 
SHISH gathers and passes information on OC and 
narcotics trafficking to the Albanian State Police 
for further investigation and arrest. 
 
¶5. (SBU) War Crimes:  Albania has no known war 
criminals, and has assisted in providing information 
on wanted persons in Serbia and Bosnia when 
information was available. 
 
¶6. (S) Politicization: The senior ranks of the SHISH 
understand the need to remain apolitical and in the 
last few years have fought to maintain professional 
independence. According to the Albanian Constitution, 
the Director of SHISH is appointed by the President 
of the Republic and is independent from the executive 
branch (the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers). 
Ensuring the independence of this position has, 
however, proven difficult.  After his election as 
Prime Minister in 2005, Sali Berisha tried to replace 
the current SHISH director with a political 
supporter, which resulted in a lengthy battle between 
the President, the PM, and the SHISH Director. 
Direct USG intervention eventually ensured that the 
Director (Bahri Shaqiri, a highly professional and 
valuable contact) was allowed to remain.  To this 
date, Berisha has refused to meet with Director 
Shaqiri, even in the context of official visits of 
SHISH counterpart personnel. 
 
¶7.  (S)  Known militants of the governing Democratic 
Party (DP) with direct ties to the Prime Minister 
were appointed as the current SHISH Chief of 
Personnel and in the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG).  The Personnel Chief has orchestrated certain 
appointments and hirings that do not meet SHISH's 
professional development goals, although Director 
Shaqiri theoretically has the final decision on all 
hiring.  On-going financial cuts, recently drastic in 
nature, have inhibited SHISH's ability to conduct its 
work and are perceived by some in the agency as an 
attempt to influence its behavior.  Despite these 
challenges, there is little evidence that the 
majority of SHISH personnel have succumbed to 
specific political influence.  The two overt 
political appointees in SHISH (OIG and Personnel 
Chief) do not have access to operational information. 
 
¶8. (C)  The Parliament has a limited role in 
oversight of the SHISH through the Parliamentary 
National Security Commission (NSC).  There is some 
public and private discourse in Parliament about 
increasing this oversight role and establishing some 
form of intelligence commission, but thus far it has 
not materialized into any concrete plan.  The 
relationship between SHISH and the current NSC 
appears to be cordial and cooperative across party 
lines.  Indeed, Albanian politicians outside the 
executive branch appear to recognize and value the 
agency's new apolitical and professional performance. 
 
¶9. (S) Penetration:  The SHISH and SHIU are not known 
to have any high level penetrations, despite wide 
public perception among Albanians that the SHISH is 
 
"full" of members of the former communist 
intelligence service (the "sigurimi") and OC figures. 
From a USG perspective, there are few individuals 
that have remained with the organization after the 
end of the communist period, and those that have are 
generally capable partners.  There are several 
incidents where investigations on OC have stalled due 
to unknown circumstances or have not turned up 
evidence that was suspected, suggesting that there 
may be some low-level penetration of the SHISH by OC 
elements, but we are unable to detect any suggestions 
of this above low levels. 
 
¶10. (S)  Cooperation with USG:  Both SHISH and SHIU 
are excellent partners with the USG.  There is close 
cooperation on all intelligence activities including 
OC, Kosovo and other issues of regional stability, 
and on counterterrorism.  As with the GOA across the 
board, Albanian intelligence services go beyond the 
normal call of duty to demonstrate loyalty and 
partnership to the U.S.  This was recently 
demonstrated by the unwavering, all-out cooperation 
in preparation for the June 10, 2007, visit by 
President Bush, the first of any sitting U.S. 
President and an event of a scale Albania had not 
previously witnessed. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶11. (S)  New President Bamir Topi appears to support 
the current SHISH director fully, which is 
encouraging. Berisha's recent success in removing the 
Prosecutor General (reftel) provokes the question 
whether the PM will renew efforts to remove the SHISH 
director.  Seeing the SHISH retain its apolitical 
stance is clearly a high priority and a key test of 
Berisha's intentions, in terms of USG interests. As 
long as SHISH's growing professionalism is not 
undermined, we can count on a cooperative partner in 
international intelligence operations for the 
foreseeable future. Reinforcement from Washington 
with high-level GOA contacts of the need for an 
independent, professional, and adequately funded 
intelligence service would assist us in maintaining 
the integrity of this important partner. 
 
CRISTINA