VZCZCXRO1808
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #2060/01 3370850
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030850Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8849
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3493
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9706
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4109
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3972
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7219
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0199
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0401
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0010
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1666
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0860
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2154
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 002060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN 
UNOSCE FOR ELIZABETH KAUFMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV KDEM OSCE UZ
SUBJECT: ODIHR TEAM COMPLETES RUSHED NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
MISSION 
 
Classified By: Poloff Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Two officials from OSCE's Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) conducted a 
hastily organized needs assessment mission from November 28 - 
30 in Uzbekistan, immediately after MFA stopped dragging its 
feet on issuing visas.  The ODIHR team met with each of the 
registered political parties in Uzbekistan, who reported a 
uniformly positive picture of pre-election conditions.  Even 
parties which did not meet the high threshold of required 
signatures to place candidates on the ballot did not 
complain, instead criticizing themselves for "not functioning 
properly".  While MFA orchestrated the official agenda, local 
OSCE staff arranged private meetings for the ODIHR team with 
unregistered parties Birlik and Ezgulik, who "balanced the 
rosy official picture" with complaints of political 
oppression.  With just three weeks remaining until the 
election, the ODIHR team will immediately report results of 
the needs assessment mission to its Warsaw headquarters for a 
prompt decision on whether to send an observer mission.  In 
addition to OSCE, the GOU is inviting several other regional 
organizations, sympathetic countries, and hundreds of 
individuals to observe the elections, and Ezgulik is trying 
to register a domestic observation effort which will likely 
not be approved.  A small-scale observer mission is the only 
possibility given official constraints imposed by the GOU and 
the lack of time to adequately prepare, but even a small 
observer mission can benefit long-term USG and OSCE interests 
in Uzbekistan despite the inevitable outcome of the 
elections.  End summary. 
 
Hastily Arranged Visit 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Two ODIHR officials visited Uzbekistan from November 
28 - 30 to conduct a needs assessment mission, which is a 
standard procedure before deciding on the nature and scope of 
election observer missions.  They briefed OSCE member state 
representatives and others at COB on November 30 and also 
privately briefed Charge d'Affaires earlier that day.  The 
trip was hastily organized after the GOU dragged its feet on 
issuing visas, and ODIHR's Konrad Olszewski noted that 
Uzbekistan "has been mirroring Russia almost exactly, even 
with the same conditions specified."  Given the short 
timeframe until elections, the ODIHR team traveled 
immediately to Tashkent and "improvised" the needs assessment 
mission. (Note: It's good that they traveled quickly, as MFA 
provided only a four-day window of eligibility on their 
visas.  End note.) 
 
Not a Single Area for Improvement 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Upon arrival in Tashkent, the team received a warm 
welcome and "good signals," and MFA even opened its VIP 
lounge for meetings.  The ODIHR team met with representatives 
from each of the three registered political parties who 
managed to successfully register candidates in 
highly-orchestrated events set up by MFA.  The parties 
presented a "united and positive picture of pre-election 
conditions" and did not offer a single concern or area for 
suggested improvement in the election process.  Even the two 
parties whose candidates were excluded from the ballot after 
failing to meet a dauntingly high threshold of required voter 
signatures within a short timeframe did not complain about 
this burdensome requirement; they instead criticized 
themselves for "not functioning properly."  The ODIHR team 
expressed suspicion during a private meeting with Charge at 
how some parties actually did manage to gather more than 
900,000 signatures in a short timeframe for their candidates 
to qualify for the ballot. 
 
Conditions Look Good on the Surface 
 
TASHKENT 00002060  002 OF 003 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The ODIHR team noted that the election process looks 
good on the surface, as there is a plurality of choice with 
three candidates from different political parties and an 
"initiative group."  Of these, one candidate is a woman and 
one is non-partisan (the ODIHR team did not meet with 
representatives of Mr. Saidov, the candidate affiliated with 
the GOU's NCHR rather than a political party).  The Central 
Election Commission is providing television access to all 
candidates, and is airing a series of carefully staged 
question and answer sessions with candidates -- including 
President Karimov -- which are being held throughout the 
country.  Olszewski noted that since the process of 
registering candidates and placing them on the ballots has 
finished, any remaining election decisions during the 
campaign will not likely be contentious.  Olszewski 
hypothesized that the real contest will be which province can 
deliver the highest turnout with the most favorable results 
for President Karimov. 
 
Unregistered Parties Remain Shut Out 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) The ODIHR team officially requested meetings with 
officials of unregistered parties, to which MFA replied that 
it was "under consideration" and "they would let them know." 
With just three days in Uzbekistan and no response 
forthcoming, the OSCE Project Coordinator's Office in 
Tashkent quietly facilitated private meetings with Birlik and 
Ezgulik representatives.  In these unscripted meetings the 
ODIHR team told the Charge that they "got a chance to balance 
the very rosy picture" provided by the GOU.  These parties 
were "less happy" and "complained about political 
oppression."  Birlik noted that it remains unregistered 
despite meeting the qualifications and officially applying in 
2000, 2004, and 2005.  Olszewski also reported in a briefing 
to the diplomatic corps that they received complaints "that 
this is not a real contest because there is no plurality of 
choice." 
 
MFA Noncommittal on Observer Visas 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) A key issue in any observer mission, especially given 
the tight timeframe before elections, is ensuring that 
observers are promptly issued visas by the MFA.  As of the 
end of the needs assessment mission, MFA remained coy and did 
not provide any assurances that they would quickly 
accommodate visa requests for observers.  The ODIHR team 
noted that they will draft their report and travel on the 
weekend to facilitate a rapid decision in Warsaw, and said 
observers could be deployed as early as December 5.  ODIHR 
has already publicized position announcements for experts on 
its website and has received applications.  ODIHR team told 
the Charge if a decision is made to deploy an observation 
mission, ODIHR believed it could find up to 25-30 observers, 
the limit the GOU put on the size of the mission. 
 
Three Observer Mission Options Presented 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Olszewski informed the diplomatic corps that according 
to ODIHR methodology there are typically three different 
types of possible observer missions.  The first is a 
full-scale effort, with both long-term and short-term 
observers in place for many weeks, which he said was not 
possible in this context given the short timeframe and the 
GOU restriction of 25-30 short-term observers.  The second is 
a limited election observer mission, which focuses on 
analyzing the pre-election environment.  It includes no 
short-term observers and thus cannot include any systematic 
observation of election day procedures.  The third option 
 
TASHKENT 00002060  003 OF 003 
 
 
features groups of experts who follow specific elections 
processes, but this is typically only utilized in countries 
"with a long-established tradition of democratic elections." 
The British Ambassador noted that none of these options 
appears viable in this context, and Olszewski declined to 
speculate about ODIHR's decision.  However, he noted in a 
private courtesy call with Charge that the invitation is 
appreciated and there is still -- barely -- enough time to 
mount some sort of observer mission.  He added that ODIHR 
does not want to be haphazard and any observer mission must 
be able to carry out meaningful observation activities, and 
it is clear that any observer mission to Uzbekistan would be 
an unusual case. 
 
ODIHR Observers Would Have Plenty of Company 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In addition to a possible ODIHR mission, election 
observers will be present from the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), and a number of bi-lateral observers from other former 
Soviet states.  MFA also informed the ODIHR team that 
approximately 250 private individuals will also be invited to 
observe elections, including some from western nations.  The 
ODIHR team "did not want to waste any time" considering these 
observers since their credibility will be suspect and the 
GOU's motivation in interviewing them on mass media is clear. 
 Poloff spoke with a Korean diplomat at the ODIHR briefing to 
the diplomatic corps, who reported that the South Korean 
Embassy was approached by the GOU on November 30 and asked to 
arrange for ten private citizen observers to come to 
Uzbekistan, which the Koreans "are not at all interested in 
doing" but were curious if other missions were asked. 
 
¶9. (C) The ODIHR team reported that the Ezgulik organization 
submitted an application to the GOU on November 9 to conduct 
a domestic observer mission.  The team was impressed that 
Ezgulik plans to mobilize 1,000 people to participate, which 
Olszewski noted "would be a massive effort and significant 
even without an official registration."  Unsurprisingly, 
there has been no response thus far from the GOU. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) ODIHR is clearly trying to make up for lost time and 
could announce a decision on an observer mission as early as 
December 3, while there is still enough time to mount a 
small-scale observer mission.  While the GOU's visa games 
cloud the logistical picture of sending observers at this 
late stage, the outcome of the election is not in doubt and 
the GOU is already assured that ODIHR's mission will be at 
most a small, limited effort.  Ultimately, the GOU has little 
to lose in issuing the visas at this stage and can claim 
credibility for inviting and hosting an OSCE observer 
mission.  Post got the impression from our private meeting 
that the ODIHR advance team wants to accept the invitation 
and send some sort of observer mission, especially after its 
recent experience with Russia.  We believe that even a small 
ODIHR observer mission is in the long-term regional interests 
of the USG and the OSCE, providing that the GOU is not able 
to dictate the composition of the ODIHR team. 
HANSON