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O 121437Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7224
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0179
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RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RIYADH 002474 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR DAS GGRAY 
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, A/S KHARBERT, AND 
MWILLIAMSON 
S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN AND BAVERILL 
DS/ATA FOR KMALOY 
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY 
DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT 
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 
TAGS: KCIP EPET ENERG PTER ASEC SA
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY VISIT TO LAUNCH DEEPER MOI COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. RIYADH 2117 
     ¶B. RIYADH 1954 
 
Classified By: DCM Michael Gfoeller for reasons 
1.4 (b) (c) and (d). 
 
¶1.  This cable has been cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Gray, Assistant Secretary Kolevar, and S/CT Deputy 
Coordinator Feierstein. 
 
-------- 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  An interagency team traveled to Riyadh on December 
3-5 to signal the USG's strong support for the Ministry of 
Interior's (MOI) proposal for deeper cooperation, including 
for its modernization drive.  The MOI is requesting USG 
assistance with the daunting task of modernizing across its 
spectrum of operations: law enforcement, special security 
operations, civil defense, and intelligence.  Our MOI 
interlocutors, including Assistant Minister of Interior for 
Security Affairs HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayif, warmly 
welcomed proposed USG inter-agency support (septel) in areas 
such as training, systems, and technology.  Major General Dr. 
Saad Al Jabri signaled that discussions on new mechanisms for 
inter-agency cooperation should continue in parallel to 
on-going cooperation under the Joint Working Group (JWG) for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and proposed 
amending an existing agreement to quickly facilitate new 
areas of cooperation.  Embassy Riyadh has proposed the 
1970s-1990s JECOR technical assistance program as a possible 
model for cooperation.  A JECOR-style program would enable 
cooperation with a variety of USG agencies with "one-stop 
shopping," for the MOI, a suggestion which keenly interested 
our interlocutors.  The MOI underscored its interest in a 
long-term partnership and flexible cooperation mechanism to 
meet a rapidly-evolving threat. 
 
------------------- 
Meeting Attendance 
------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The visiting delegation included: 
 
--Department of State NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) 
Gordon Gray, 
--Department of Energy Assistant Secretary Kevin Kolevar, 
--Department of Energy DAS William Bryan, 
--Department of State S/CT Deputy Coordinator Gerald 
Feierstein, 
--Department of State Political Military Bureau Deputy 
Director Brooke Milton-Kurtz 
--Department of Homeland Security Coast Guard Captain Don 
Grant, 
--Department of Defense Colonel Don Olds, 
--Department of Defense Commander Mark Panicek, and 
--Department of Defense Desk Officer Jared Thomas. 
 
Key participants from the MOI participating in the December 4 
and 5 meetings included: 
 
--Major General Dr. Saad Al-Jabri, Senior Security Advisor to 
the Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif, 
-- Dr. Saud al Semari, MOI, Director of Modernization and JWG 
Co-Chair, 
-- Dr. Kahlid Al -Ageel, MOI, Manager, High Commission on 
Industrial Security, and 
--Abdullah Al-Hammad, MOI, Budget Director. 
 
Mission participants included: 
 
RIYADH 00002474  002 OF 007 
 
 
 
--Charg D'Affaires Michael Gfoeller, 
--Acting Deputy Chief of Mission David Rundell, 
--Energy Attach Shannon Ross, 
--Naval Attach Rick Ryan, 
-- Economic Officer Vanessa Paulos, 
--Political Military Officer Joel Wiegert. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
"No Question about the Strength of Our Ties"; 
JWG Set the Stage for Future Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (C)  DAS Gray opened by discussing the USG's commitment 
to resolving issues in the Middle East, whether in Lebanon, 
Iraq, or Saudi Arabia.  He noted our leadership's commitment 
to working with the MOI was demonstrated by the size and 
diversity of the inter-agency team which had traveled from 
Washington.  Dr. Al-Jabri responded, "We have a very 
strategic relationship.  Since we signed the MOU (on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, in December of 2006), it is 
progressing very well.  There is no question about the 
strength of our ties.  In every house in Saudi Arabia, they 
appreciate the relationship.  9/11 was a big shock to our 
whole society; this kind of relationship was not available to 
us before.  Dr. Al-Jabri, emphasizing the demands now made by 
his senior leadership for even broader and deeper 
cooperation, continued, "The Joint Working Group (JWG) has 
done a good job.  It is highly appreciated; it is one of the 
best things we have done in the last two years."  Setting the 
stage for the rest of the day's discussions, he then noted, 
"However, now our leadership has become more demanding." 
 
------------------------------------ 
Update on the Joint Working Group 
and Contingency Planning Activities 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (S)  Dr. Hadleg, Director of the MOI's Radical Ideology 
Department, opened the activities with a briefing on the 
MOI's de-radicalization initiative (setpel).  To provide a 
common foundation of understanding for all present, 
Dr.Al-Semari then provided a briefing on JWG activities since 
the group's establishment in December 2006.  He highlighted 
JWG rapid security assessments at Abqaiq Oil Facilities, Ras 
Tanura and Ras al Ju,aymah Terminals, Qateef Junction, 
Eastern Province Coast Guard Facilities and Operations, and 
Yanbu Industrial City.  He noted Sandia National Laboratories 
had conducted a two-week workshop to train MOI officials and 
industry security personnel from key energy, power, water, 
and petrochemical facilities.  The training had focused on 
the design-basis threat model (DBT) used to protect critical 
U.S. facilities, such as nuclear installations.  Looking 
forward to future JWG activities, Assistant Secretary Kolevar 
stated that within 6-8 weeks, the JWG would put another 
subject matter expert team on the ground to assess training 
needs for the Facilities Security Force Training Academy. 
Additionally, the JWG had planned a Vulnerability Assessment 
for Abqaiq Plant, the world's largest oil processing 
facility, for the January-February timeframe. 
 
¶6.  (S)  A/S Kolevar then provided an update on the 
contingency planning project underway with the MOI.  He noted 
the JWG had received a batch of contingency planning 
documents from the MOI, and a U.S. team was moving forward 
with machine and human translations in parallel.  The U.S. 
had established a group of technical experts to review the 
documents.  Should the group come to the KSA in January, they 
would be prepared to provide the MOI with general feedback on 
the contingency plans, and a sense of what gaps remain. 
Following that, the experts would deliver formal feedback on 
 
RIYADH 00002474  003 OF 007 
 
 
the contingency planning documents at the next JWG meeting in 
February 2008.  Highlighting the interest with which these 
issues are followed, Dr. Al-Jabri requested, "When you meet 
with the King, can you make sure that the Assistant Secretary 
can brief him on this?" 
 
------------------------------------------- 
MOI Highlights Sensitivity of Negotiations 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S)  Turning to the issue of broader interagency 
cooperation with the MOI, Dr. Al-Jabri indicated that 
although the MOI team represented was small, "the right 
people" with the right level of negotiating authority were 
present.  Dr. Al-Jabri stated the MOI did not want to risk 
information leaking out by bringing a large team to such 
sensitive discussions.  Dr. Al-Jabri noted, however, that the 
Ministry of Finance was aware of the negotiations, and the 
MOI was fully authorized to carry out the discussions from 
the financial perspective.  He remarked on the key attendance 
of the MOI's budgeting officer. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Positive Views of US Systems and Technology 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S)  Dr. Al-Jabri highlighted the MOI's positive views of 
U.S. technology and systems.  "The U.S. has the best people, 
the best technology, and we want a good result."  He noted 
just recently the MOI had concluded a commercial purchase of 
helicopters, and now the MOI wanted a "useful mechanism" to 
support further such sales.  To quickly facilitate new areas 
of cooperation and enable to the MOI to more easily obtain 
political buy-in for a new agreement (including from the 
Ministry of Finance) he proposed amending the December 2006 
MOU between the MOI and DOS. (Note: The existing MOU, "The 
Framework for Cooperation to Improve Security at Critical 
Energy Facilities in the KSA" was signed by Undersecretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security Joseph and 
HRH Mohammed bin Nayif.  End note.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
Saudi Needs for MOI Modernization: 
Training, Systems, and Technology 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S)  Dr. Saud Al-Semari then presented an overview of the 
MOI's operations, which include law enforcement, security 
operations, civil defense, and intelligence components.  He 
emphasized that Special Security Operations in particular 
needed accelerated and well-organized cooperation with the 
U.S., to include training, systems, and technology.  He added 
that the MOI also needed extensive assistance to build its 
human resources, on which all else depends. 
 
---------------------------- 
USG Can Meet Your Needs, but 
Need to Specify the Tool 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S)  DAS Gray responded, "The USG can meet these needs. 
We have an extensive ability to train, including in law 
enforcement, the State Department, including Diplomatic 
Security, S/CT, and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs. 
 We have the best technology, and a good relationship of 
selling our systems to Saudi Arabia.  It would be helpful if 
you could identify as specifically as possible the right tool 
for your needs.  The willingness is there, we just need to 
specify the need."   Deputy Coordinator Feierstein 
re-iterated that the DOS's ATA program has been involved in 
JWG assessments and technical assistance from the start.  He 
 
RIYADH 00002474  004 OF 007 
 
 
indicated ATA could also assist the MOI with law enforcement 
training.   He noted, "As far as overall commitment and 
capacity, we're there, and we'll continue to be players." 
 
------------------------------------ 
MOI White Paper To Clarify USG Role 
Vis a Vis Modernization Effort 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (S)  Deputy Coordinator Feierstein continued by asking 
our MOI counterparts to clarify how they saw the USG 
contributing to the MOI's overall modernization effort.  He 
queried, "One thing we need to know to recommend specific 
ideas: is the role of the USG limited to critical 
infrastructure protection, or do you see USG participation 
beyond that?  It would be helpful for us to understand the 
decisions which have already been made.  We recognize that 
this train has already begun to move from your perspective." 
Dr. Al-Semari responded by asking for the USG's specific 
questions in writing.  He indicated the MOI would then 
prepare a white paper to respond to the questions, "for 
mutual understanding."  (Note: The delegation prepared a list 
of questions and passed these to the MOI on 5 December.  End 
note.)  Dr. Al-Jabri concurred this would help to better 
identify the MOI's needs and requirements. 
 
------------------------------------- 
MOI Interested in Flexible Mechanism 
to Meet Evolving Threat 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S)  Dr. Al-Jabri then addressed Deputy Coordinator 
Feierstein's remarks, emphasizing the MOI sees a need for a 
flexible long-term partnership which can evolve over time. 
He stated, "the threat is not fixed, so our needs may be 
different tomorrow.  We are interested in setting up a 
mechanism for cooperation, we're interested in a long-term 
partnership, and not just our current needs." 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
How does an Interagency Agreement Mesh with 
MOI's Relationship with Bearing Point? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S)  Deputy Coordinator Feierstein queried how the 
proposed cooperation with the USG might fit in with the MOI's 
on-going contractual arrangements with consulting firm 
Bearing Point.  (Note: Bearing Point has a three-year 
contract with the MOI to assist with its modernization 
effort.  End note.)  Dr. Al-Jabri responded that when the MOI 
contracted with Bearing Point, it did not have these 
mechanisms (e.,g. the JWG or proposed inter-agency 
mechanism), and it faced substantial time pressure.  He 
stated, "We approached everyone, including the private 
sector, because we had to launch a huge modernization 
program.  We used the tools available to us at the time, 
which were commercial mechanisms."  Dr. Al-Semari clarified, 
"The role of the consultant is limited, it is not a 
decision-making role, it is doing the homework and the heavy 
lifting."  Comment: The implication appears to be that the 
MOI will maintain the advisory services of Bearing Point to 
do the "heavy lifting," but the MOI leadership would prefer 
to have a strategic partner such as the USG as well.  In this 
meeting as in the past, the MOI leadership has made clear 
they are inherently more trusting of a 
government-to-government relationship than of their "hired 
guns."  End comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
US Assistance Welcome in MOI Strategic Planning: 
Challenge of Modernizing All Faces of the MOI 
 
RIYADH 00002474  005 OF 007 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶14.  (S)  Dr. Al-Semari turned to the challenge of 
modernizing the MOI across its several directorates, with 
more than a quarter million forces in its employ.  He stated, 
"Energy infrastructure is one area, but there is not one 
single stakeholder.  We have to modernize them all.  The MOI 
has many different faces, military, intelligence, civil 
defense.  We can't only modernize one side, we have to 
modernize all sides." 
 
¶15.  (S)  Outlining the work Bearing Point has carried out to 
date, Dr. Al-Semari explained, "We have now done an 
across-the-board needs assessment.  We now have a good level 
of detail, and are making a strategic plan.  Integration is a 
key word.  The consultants (Bearing Point) help with 
integrating the systems and companies (e.g. contractors)"  He 
indicated that USG assistance with the strategic planning 
process would be welcome once a cooperation mechanism is in 
place.  He related, "We can work on strategic planning once 
we have a mechanism.  We have a current state we are in, we 
want a future state, and we need a partner to help us reach 
that point." 
 
-------------------------------- 
JECOR: "One Stop Shopping" for 
Interagency Assistance to the MOI 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Rundell then gave 
a presentation on the U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Cooperation 
Commission, known as JECOR, a program started in the 1970's 
to provide a wide range of technical expertise to the Saudi 
Government.  ADCM Rundell noted that over more than a quarter 
century, JECOR provided the Saudi state with the expertise to 
build civilian government infrastructure, from building a 
national treasury, to national parks, to ambulance services. 
Under this program, the Saudi Ministry of Finance (MOF) paid 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide a wide range 
of training, advisory, and procurement services, to the 
then-fledgling Saudi government.  Many USG departments and 
agencies provided advisors to Saudi Arabia.  At one point, 
JECOR had over 300 advisors in-country.  ADCM Rundell 
explained that we were looking to the JECOR as one possible 
mode of successful interagency cooperation.  JECOR provided a 
"one-stop shop" for the SAG, which did not have to make 
separate contacts and agreements with each USG agency. 
Instead, Treasury made contact with all of the other USG 
agencies on behalf of the SAG. 
 
¶17.  (S)  ADCM Rundell cautioned the proposed MOI-interagency 
cooperation program has a few significant differences from 
the JECOR program.  Unlike JECOR, this program will include 
civilian and military components.  Nonetheless, the MOI may 
wish to retain the some organizational features of JECOR - 
funding flowed from one Saudi agency to one Washington 
agency, with a primary point of contact on each side.  Charg 
D'Affaire's Gfoeller noted the "one-stop shopping" model had 
proved successful in the past, through various Democratic and 
Republican administrations.  ADCM Rundell emphasized we are 
not seeking slavish imitation of the JECOR model, but looking 
for a starting point for a work-able and flexible model to 
meet current needs.  We are actively seeking input on 
improvements to the model, and are open to suggestions from 
the MOI.  Additionally, there are likely to be modifications 
necessitated by changes in how the USG operates since the 
1970s, such as a greater reliance by the USG on contract 
staff. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Interagency Cooperation: Broad and Flexible, 
 
RIYADH 00002474  006 OF 007 
 
 
Parallel to but Separate from JWG 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (S)  When asked to clarify the relationship between the 
Joint Working Group (JWG) for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection and the proposed mechanism for inter-agency 
cooperation, Dr. Al-Jabri responded that he believed the JWG 
was working very well.  He also saw no harm if we had an 
independent mechanism for inter-agency cooperation.  Dr. 
Al-Semari added, "Let's start now as parallel efforts, then 
judge how we're going."  Dr. Al-Jabri then requested a 
follow-up "brainstorming session" to provide recommendations 
to Washington for the inter-agency cooperation mechanism. 
 
¶19.  (S)  The interlocutors agreed the focus should be on a 
broad and flexible agreement, which did not specify a minute 
level of detail.  Noting that the original JECOR agreement 
had encompassed military cooperation, although this aspect of 
the agreement was never utilized, CDA Gfoeller remarked, "We 
don't know what sort of cooperation we will need in thirty 
years, and we don't want to limit ourselves." 
 
------------------------------------- 
Explaining FMS Processes to the MOI 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (S)  Deputy Director Milton-Kurtz then initiated a 
discussion of Foreign Military Sales issues by emphasizing 
our willingness to engage with the MOI on counterterrorism 
and border security issues.  She provided an overview for the 
MOI on the U.S. system of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and 
legal requirements for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), 
including explaining the need for early Congressional 
notification of possible sales.  If the MOI determines that 
it would like to participate in FMS sales, Deputy Director 
Milton-Kurtz requested the MOI supply her office with 
additional information on specific MOI units and their 
mission, as well as the types of equipment purchases which 
would be considered.  She noted U.S. law provided scope to 
authorize FMS sales to MOI units with a counterterrorism 
mission, but the State Department would have to "make the 
case" to allow FMS sales to the MOI to move forward. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶21.  (S)  The MOI is facing a profound sense of urgency 
regarding their modernization project, in conjunction with 
meeting the challenge that Iran and the internal terrorism 
threat pose to their energy infrastructure and internal 
stability.  Their senior leadership believes its past 
partnership with the French government has failed them.  MOI 
interlocutors also repeatedly express their sense that a 
series of contractors and consultants have also let them 
down.  They are turning to the USG for an unprecedented level 
of assistance and strategic cooperation.  If we succeed, this 
program could become the equal of our cooperation programs 
with US Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia (USMTM) and 
the Office of the Program Manager for the Modernization of 
the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG), programs we have 
run with Saudi counterparts for 60 and 25 years respectively. 
 
 
¶22.  (S)  However, the USG will have to demonstrate an adept 
and rapid inter-agency response to meet these  requests, as 
the MOI believes its window of opportunity to gear up to meet 
these threats is very limited.  This inter-agency visit was 
extremely positive, and has moved the ball forward 
significantly.  The MOI would clearly prefer to deal with the 
U.S. to protect the country's economic "crown jewels," its 
 
RIYADH 00002474  007 OF 007 
 
 
oil facilities in the Eastern Province.  However, if we are 
perceived as slow to organize ourselves, the MOI could turn 
its attention elsewhere. 
 
¶23.  (C)  JECOR, one possible model for interagency 
cooperation, made a positive impression on the MOI.  Dr. 
Al-Jabri and his team were comfortable discussing a program 
of JECOR's scope.  They concurred with us that resident and 
embedded advisors would be needed to achieve the MOI's goals. 
 From the MOI's perspective, the JECOR model has several 
advantages:  it has a strong track record of success across 
many Saudi ministries.  The MOF, JECOR's Saudi home, has a 
positive view of the program's track record, which will ease 
the MOI's task of obtaining the MOF's buy-in and allow MOI to 
more easily mobilize financial resources for the project. 
Finally, the SAG retains in its employ several officials, 
both Saudi and American, who worked on JECOR, and whose 
expertise the MOI could tap to help design the new project. 
FRAKER