VZCZCXYZ0029
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #4693/01 3461649
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121649Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1447
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 2154
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3823
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1436
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 004693 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017 
TAGS: PREL PINR EUN SU IV CD CT SG FR
SUBJECT: AF A/S FRAZER'S NOVEMBER 27 MEETINGS IN PARIS 
 
REF: A. BEIJING 7270 
     ¶B. KHARTOUM 1866 
     ¶C. STATE 161267 
     ¶D. PARIS 4603 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met with Darfur 
rebel leader Abdul Wahid al Nur and, separately, with 
Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert and MFA 
AF A/S Jean de Gliniasty on November 27.  Abdul Wahid 
requested a range of U.S. assistance, professed his support 
for the U.S., and stressed the need to impose an end to 
fighting in Darfur, which would then allow for broader 
political reconciliation.  A/S Frazer said that the 
international community was addressing Darfur's issues but 
that progress would take time.  She agreed on the need to end 
the fighting but said that there must be movement on the 
political front at the same time, encouraging Abdul Wahid to 
become more engaged politically.  The French officials shared 
many of A/S Frazer's views of Darfur and related issues, 
although they seemed more willing to pursue UNSC sanctions 
against Abdul Wahid, about which A/S Frazer was skeptical. 
She also cautioned against a premature decision by the French 
not to extend his French visa (which expires December 28) in 
view of his possibly creating greater problems elsewhere. 
While meeting with A/S Frazer, and consistent with a message 
she had conveyed to Abdul Wahid, the French received 
instructions from President Sarkozy in China to contact Abdul 
Wahid and to ask him, on behalf of the PRC, to ensure that 
Darfur rebels desist in attacking PRC units operating in 
conjunction with UNAMID; the French succeeded in contacting 
him and he said that he would so instruct his forces, having 
earlier made the same promise to A/S Frazer upon learning 
that the U.S. requested China to deploy engineers.  The 
French shared A/S Frazer's concern about Eritrea's harmful 
regional influence, the future of Senegal post-Wade, and the 
possibility that President Gbagbo would only allow elections 
to go forward in Cote d'Ivoire if he was certain he would win 
them.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Abdul Wahid 
----------- 
¶2.  (C)  AF A/S Frazer, AF Special Assistant Fatuma Sanneh, 
and acting Embassy AF-watcher met with Darfur rebel leader 
Abdul Wahid al Nur and his associate Ahmed M. Abdalla on 
November 27 in Paris.  A/S Frazer and Abdul Wahid expressed 
similar concerns about recent developments in Sudan/Darfur, 
including very worrisome renewed North-South tensions, the 
consequent threat to CPA implementation, First Vice President 
Salva Kiir's decision to withdraw his ministers from the 
government, and Abyei.  A/S Frazer outlined the USG's 
commitment to bringing peace and stability to Sudan, noting 
that the effort involved a "brick-by-brick" approach on 
several fronts  -- security, political, humanitarian 
assistance, and economic development.  The process was 
complex and would require time.  With concerted effort on the 
part of all concerned, favorable results were possible, and 
she noted the DRC as an example of a country where progress 
was made and elections held despite broad skepticism that 
that could be accomplished. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Abdul Wahid encouraged U.S. engagement and mentioned 
repeatedly his support for U.S. efforts.  When he asked about 
new U.S. proposals, A/S Frazer noted that the U.S. wanted to 
know what he wanted or was willing to do, and not to hear 
further rejections of international proposals, which he had 
voiced often in the past.  Abdul Wahid, as he stated several 
times, stressed the priority he placed on peace and security 
and his desire to end the killing of his people.  They would 
need help achieving security, however, and he placed no trust 
in the Khartoum government, which could not keep its promises 
and blamed the rebels for everything.  He stressed that 
simply signing an agreement and going to Khartoum would not 
stop the killing, pointing to Minni Minawi as proof.  He laid 
out a three stage process to peace:  "conflict suspension" 
(ending the killing of Darfuris), mediation towards a peace 
agreement, and then a Darfur-Darfur reconciliation process. 
He predicted if the south "goes" (i.e., ceases to be a part 
of a greater Sudan), then so would eastern Sudan and Darfur, 
followed by endless killing. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Abdul Wahid firmly stated that he was the Darfur 
leader with the most followers and most influence.  He 
expressed no confidence in Libya and said he could not 
negotiate with the Libyan dictatorship.  He supported AU 
efforts generally but not Salim Salim personally.  Abdul 
Wahid reiterated that an end to the fighting must come first, 
"and then we will be ready to negotiate."  He said that the 
newer factions and splinter groups should ally with his 
movement.  Asked gain for specifics, Abdul Wahid said that he 
would like U.S. financial support to allow purchases of fuel, 
food, and shelter, and then U.S. political support so that he 
could more easily rally other Darfur elements to his 
movement.  "Try us; if we fail, you can blame us," he said. 
 
¶5.  (C)  A/S Frazer said that his approach was generally 
reasonable, but the timetable was too long.  He would need to 
engage in political negotiations as UNAMID deployed, but 
before completion of the deployment of 26-27,000 forces on 
the ground.  She said the U.S. would consider possible 
non-lethal forms of assistance, noting the legal prohibition 
against supporting armed groups.  She emphasized the 
international community's efforts to bring security to the 
region, in the form of UNAMID, but that deployment would take 
time.  However, she stressed that while forces on the ground 
would increase security, similar progress should take place 
in parallel on the political side to guarantee long-term 
peace.  Abdul Wahid approved but noted that earlier 
agreements (e.g., Abuja) had not ended the fighting. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Abdul Wahid's associate, Ahmed M. Abdalla (who is 
apparently a doctor based in Canada and who had met with 
AF/SPG Lauren Landis, among other U.S. officials during a 
recent visit to the U.S.), reiterated that members of Abdul 
Wahid's movement were first and foremost struggling to stop 
the killing of their people and to ensure a positive future. 
He described the members of the movement as "100 percent 
pro-U.S." and in favor of democratic government.  He 
requested U.S. support and stressed his lack of trust in the 
Khartoum government, with an end to the killing his top 
priority:  "Stop the killing, then we can talk." 
 
¶7.  (C)  A/S Frazer expressed understanding with what they 
had said, noting USG reservations about the Khartoum 
government but also the need to work with it.  She stressed 
that the rebels should not/not put peacekeepers at risk.  She 
noted the case of China and the need to respect the 
recently-arrived PRC engineer battalion, which would perform 
vital work needed to underpin UNAMID's eventual deployment 
(refs A and B).  Abdul Wahid noted China's "arrangement" with 
the Khartoum regime over oil, which A/S Frazer observed as 
well, commenting that this could be used as leverage by the 
Chinese if they so chose.  Nevertheless, Abdul Wahid promised 
A/S Frazer that he would instruct his people to accept the 
Chinese contingent.  A/S Frazer again encouraged him to work 
with other factions and to accelerate the political process, 
just as she hoped that DPKO would speed work on UNAMID's 
deployment.  Asked what he would do if he could no longer 
stay in France, Abdul Wahid said that he would go 
"elsewhere," but avoided specifics.  A/S Frazer said that, in 
her view, imposing sanctions against him was not the answer 
and the U.S. would sanction rebels like Khalil Ibrahim who 
were spoilers and who continued their attacks, especially 
against peacekeepers. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The meeting closed with A/S Frazer and Abdul Wahid 
promising to stay in touch, to keep each other informed, and 
to work together where possible. 
 
Meeting with French Officials 
----------------------------- 
¶9.  (C)  Directly after the meeting with Abdul Wahid, A/S 
Frazer, S/A Sanneh, and Embassy acting AF-watcher met with 
Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert and MFA 
AF A/S-equivalent Jean de Gliniasty.  Gliniasty, who had just 
returned from New York where he attended a meeting on Sudan, 
said that the situation remained fragile, with Abdul Wahid 
and Khalil Ibrahim remaining outside the political process, 
which remained quite bogged down.  The North/South problem 
was worsening.  A/S Frazer reviewed her meeting with Abdul 
Wahid, emphasizing her advice to him on the need to make 
progress on political issues in tandem with improving 
security, with which Joubert and Gliniasty expressed 
agreement.  Gliniasty noted that Abdul Wahid had sent a 
letter to UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson on November 19,  in 
which he set forth only one condition for greater engagement 
politically (as opposed to the number of conditions he had 
previously stated), which called for the deployment of 
UNAMID.  Gliniasty regretted that Abdul Wahid continued to 
posture grandiosely, occasionally referring to himself as 
Darfur's "de Gaulle." 
 
¶10.  (C) At this point in the meeting, Joubert received a 
call from the Presidency.  He said that President Sarkozy, 
then visiting China, was asked by the Chinese to use France's 
influence with Abdul Wahid and request that Abdul Wahid's 
forces in Darfur not attack the Chinese engineering battalion 
deploying as part of UNAMID.  The Presidency was asking 
Joubert to contact Abdul Wahid immediately to pass on this 
message.  Gliniasty did so and reported that Abdul Wahid said 
that he would do so, responding in a "sincere" manner, 
Gliniasty reported.  Frazer commented that it was Khalil 
Ibrahim who was reported to threaten the Chinese to leave 
Darfur. 
 
¶11.  (C)  A/S Frazer said that the UNSC should consider 
sanctioning Sudan President Bashir for his failure to honor 
commitments he had made with respect to UNAMID.  It was not 
acceptable that he not cooperate fully, or believe he had a 
say in the countries that could participate in UNAMID, which 
only discouraged potential troop-contributing countries and 
caused DPKO to proceed more cautiously.  Joubert noted that 
China was becoming more and more of an option in terms of 
applying pressure on Bashir.  A/S Frazer said that China was 
showing more flexibility on a number of fronts because of PRC 
concerns that the 2008 Olympics go smoothly, with an effort 
to minimize PRC political vulnerabilities. 
 
¶12.  (C)  A/S Frazer and Joubert regretted that Egypt had 
been discouraged from playing a role in UNAMID, with 
Gliniasty saying he had advised Egypt to offer helicopters if 
troops were out of the question but that the Egyptians had 
said they had none to provide.  Joubert said that DPKO could 
have done better by accepting troops from Arab countries but 
stationing them only in parts of Darfur with Arab 
populations.  Joubert continued that Bashir had refused 
offers from Thailand and Nepal.  A/S Frazer commented that 
when Bashir thought he could pick and choose, so too did the 
rebels.  She noted that DPKO's search for the optimal was 
often counterproductive, refusing, for example Jordanian 
helicopter that could not fly at night, even though they were 
suitable for day use. 
 
¶13.  (C)  The Abyei problem was a difficult issue as well. 
A/S Frazer said a possible solution would be to ensure 
certain access to oil by the North should the South secede -- 
"we can perhaps separate the oil from the land."  Oil was one 
of the key issues, even though the reserves might go dry by 
¶2019.  Some form of guaranteed access could ease the problem. 
 Gliniasty said that the Khartoum regime was becoming more 
inflexible with the worsening of the CPA crisis.  A/S Frazer 
observed that Bashir had never really accepted an 
international peacekeeping operation and was trying to buy 
time.  Joubert agreed and noted how the situation had changed 
since the signing of the CPA, with the U.S. taking a 
different approach now that the realities and impact of the 
Iraq War and 9/11 had settled into place.  A/S Frazer said it 
was then clear that all options were on the table and that 
U.S. actions in Afghanistan convinced the NCP to negotiate 
genuinely the end of the North-South war. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Turning to the Horn of Africa, both sides were 
critical of Eritrea's role.  A/S Frazer described Eritrea as 
the region's "spoilers," seeking to provoke instability 
region-wide and refusing cooperation in a number of areas. 
She noted Eritrea's unhelpful stance and its move to a war 
footing, and that Eritrea was not simply trying to cause 
problems with respect to Ethiopia but to oppose practically 
everyone, seeking to be a dominant regional player.  She 
thought that Eritreans had been inspired by Qadhafi and 
wanted to emulate him.  She noted that the threat from 
Eritrea to Ethiopia seemed greater than the threat from 
Ethiopia to Eritrea since Eritrea was arming and supporting 
insurgency groups in Ethiopia.  Eritrea, moreover, was 
supporting and helping arm rebel groups across the region. 
One reason peace in the region was difficult was the 
dependence rebel groups had on funding from countries like 
Libya and Eritrea.  If the funding ended, peace would be more 
within reach. 
 
¶15.  (C)  On the need to finalize Eritrea-Ethiopia border 
issues, Gliniasty said the French had floated an idea of a 
possible successor mechanism to the EEBC (refs C and D), 
should it cease to function, but had gained no traction. 
Joubert thought that Ethiopia might be open to accepting the 
EEBC's demarcation if it received something in return, such 
as meaningful and global dialogue on the port of Assab.  A/S 
Frazer said that dialogue was necessary and Lynn Pascoe was 
pursuing an initiative to facilitate dialogue -- Ethiopia 
agreed but Eritrea had said no for now.  If Ethiopia said no, 
Eritrea would agree.  The issue was not ripe for resolution. 
 
¶16.  (C)  Joubert noted the renewal of fighting in Chad.  He 
wondered about the timing and the extent to which Chadian 
rebels had been pushed out of Sudan, perhaps as a ploy by 
Libya and Sudan to forestall deployment of the EU operation 
intended for Chad and the C.A.R.  In any case, the latest 
round of fighting was apparently a defeat for the rebels. 
Joubert noted, with some admiration, the way President Deby 
had apparently appeared at the front and personally directed 
operations.  Joubert saw this as a larger effort by Sudan to 
destabilize the region to its advantage, and another 
indication that it did not want to implement commitments it 
had already made.  A/S Frazer said that this was consistent 
with a point Abdul Wahid had earlier made. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Returning to Abdul Wahid, A/S Frazer noted that in 
some respect he was shown to be correct.  She cautioned the 
French against canceling his visa, commenting that he could 
play a more negative role elsewhere.  The French mentioned 
Senegal as a possible new destination, observing that 
President Wade wanted Abdul Wahid to go to Senegal. 
Discussion turned briefly to Senegal, with Gliniasty saying 
that Wade's son was a person to be avoided.  Wade seemed to 
be grooming his son, but the son lacked Wade's charisma and, 
especially, his ability to speak eloquently in Wolof -- an 
important skill in Senegal for a politician, which the son 
did not possess.  Gliniasty said that France unfortunately 
did not have concrete evidence of any wrongdoing or 
transgressions on the son's part.  Of course Wade's 
"political son" was Idrissa Seck, even despite the troubles 
the two have had, including the latter's jailing. 
 
¶18.  (C)  The French expressed concern about Senegal and 
Wade's increasingly wayward leadership.  Joubert recounted a 
story of how the Senegalese had completely misinterpreted the 
financial aspects of the voluntary tax on international air 
travel.  Wade somehow believed that Senegal (or he himself) 
could profit from this if Senegal played an active role or 
landed the headquarters administering the program, and had to 
be convinced that the contemplated system did not include 
cash but rather a system of credits, whereupon the Senegalese 
lost interest.  Joubert believed that this showed the bad 
advice Wade was receiving. 
 
¶19.  (C)  On Cote d'Ivoire, Joubert noted the meeting then 
taking place in Ouagadougou intended to resolve voter 
registration issues.  So far, there were few reasons for 
optimism.  The French expressed the view that Gbagbo would 
continue to stall the elections process until the point that 
he believed he had comfortable control over them and was 
confident that he would win an election.  However, Joubert 
said that Cote d'Ivoire could not lose another year, noting 
that the elections had been postponed regularly for the last 
couple of years.  Concerning Operation Licorne, Joubert said 
that France would continue to reduce its contingent but 
would, despite these drawdowns, maintain the ability to 
perform its support mission for UNOCI.  A/S Frazer noted 
DepSec Negroponte's visit to Cote d'Ivoire (in which she 
participated) and the clear message the U.S. had sent 
regarding the importance of elections and implementing the 
Ouagadougou Accords, to which the Ivoirians had responded in 
the positive manner one would expect on such an occasion, 
although that did not guarantee there would be no backsliding. 
 
¶20.  (C) COMMENT:  The meeting was a useful one for both 
sides, and the French clearly profited from the opportunity 
to consult broadly with A/S Frazer, Gliniasty saying that he 
had cut short his visit to New York to be available during 
her transit through Paris.  The French indicated that they 
would welcome further close and regular consultations of this 
kind.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶21.  (U)  A/S Frazer has cleared this message. 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON