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DE RUEHFR #4682/01 3451023
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O 111023Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1424
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0103
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1430

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004682 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EUN PINS CD CT FR
SUBJECT: CHAD:  AMBASSADOR NIGRO'S DECEMBER 10 MEETINGS 
WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS 
 
REF: A. PARIS 4661 
     ¶B. N'DJAMENA 944 
 
PARIS 00004682  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  French MOD and MFA officials expressed 
both concern and optimism over force generation issues 
related to the EU's planned mission for Chad and the Central 
African Republic (C.A.R.) during December 10 meetings with 
U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro.  The lack of helicopters 
remains the key missing ingredient.  The French acknowledged 
the difficulty in determing the reason for the recent renewed 
fighting in eastern Chad, but agreed that it was not helping 
convince potential EU participants to contribute to the EU 
mission.  MFA DAS-equivalent Christine Fages predicted that 
Chad President Deby would eventually reconcile with Zaghawa 
rebel elements and that he could come to support elections as 
the best way to remain in power.  Ambassador Nigro expressed 
USG support for French efforts in Chad and pledged to work 
closely with French elements in Chad.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro on December 10 
held separate meetings at the French Defense and Foreign 
Ministries (at the MOD:  Colonel Emmanuel Maurin and Elodie 
Riche of the Strategic Affairs Delegation; at the MFA: 
DAS-equivalent for West Africa Christine Fages, her deputy 
Benoit Decamps, and Chad desk officer Loic Mizon).  The main 
topic at both meetings was the problems France and the EU 
have had in obtaining commitments from EU members that would 
allow formation and deployment of the EU force in Chad and 
the CAR. 
 
¶3.  (C)  At the MOD, Riche expressed concern about obtaining 
the most important missing element, the 20 helicopters deemed 
vital to the mission.  She said that "this will be a big 
week," noting the December 10-11 GAERC meeting and, 
especially the December 14 European Council meeting (heads of 
state/government), where this matter, if not resolved by 
then, could be taken up at the highest level. 
 
¶4.  (C)  MFA DAS-equivalent Fages, in contrast, acknowledged 
difficulties in the force generation process but expressed 
optimism that a solution would be forthcoming.  The MOD and 
MFA officials agreed that it would be a grave error for the 
Chad operation to be cancelled for want of 20 helicopters. 
The EU would suffer serious credibility problems if it failed 
to carry out a mission that it had voted to undertake and 
which was essential for the UN's companion mission, MINURCAT. 
 This fact alone encouraged Ambassador Nigro's interlocutors 
to believe that a solution would be found.  The French 
reminded that the issue was not finding 20 helicopters but 
determining who would pay for them.  (NOTE:  The French gave 
no indication that France would finance the helicopters if no 
other EU partner offered to do so.  END NOTE.)  Repeating 
what the French Presidency told Ambassador Nigro last week 
(ref A), the French indicated that they would focus their 
lobbying efforts on the UK and Germany.  Maurin and Riche at 
the MOD said that they understood that President Sarkozy had 
set a limit on French participation in the mission -- no more 
than 2,000 French troops or, alternatively, no more than 50 
percent of the mission.  Maurin said that he did not think 
that Sarkozy would change these figures. 
 
¶5.  (C)  On the renewed fighting in eastern Chad, the French 
acknowledged that it was hard to determine the reasons for 
the rebels' choosing to fight now.  There were several 
potential reasons, including an assessment by the rebels that 
it was best to strike now before EUFOR and UNAMID deploy, 
which would hamper their ability to fight.  The fighting 
might also represent Sudan's decision to mark the end of its 
support for the rebels, encouraging them to make one last 
attempt.  The French said that the recent battles had been 
quite fierce, and costly for rebel forces, especially among 
the non-Zaghawa forces; it appeared that opposing Zaghawa 
forces were not fighting each other as much as other ethnic 
groups were doing. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The French said that it appeared that Deby's forces 
had prevailed in this latest round of fighting, to the point 
where Deby could leave Chad and attend the EU-Africa Summit 
in Lisbon this past weekend.  On December 12, in fact, Deby 
was in Paris, transitting between Lisbon and N'Djamena. 
(NOTE:  The French officials did not elaborate on what he 
might do in Paris.  END NOTE.)  His willingness to leave Chad 
 
PARIS 00004682  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
during a crisis, especially given his penchant for leading 
his men into battle, demonstrated confidence that this latest 
rebel offensive had been contained. 
 
¶7.  (C)  In any case, the fighting was doing much to build 
skepticism in Europe about participating in the Chad/C.A.R. 
mission, and this was no doubt one of its purposes, the 
French stated.  They regretted also that the "Arche de Zoe" 
child smuggling case had occurred at the worst possible time 
and that it and the renewed fighting had drawn attention to 
Chad in the most negative way, which must have affected the 
thinking of potential EU contributors to the operation. 
Fages said, however, that it was fortunate that the fighting 
was taking place now, before EUFOR and MINURCAT were on the 
ground.  If elements of the missions had been in place when 
the fighting began, EU and UN partners might be calling for 
an evactuation or a complete end to the missions.  She hoped 
that this offensive was a last gasp one and that the rebels 
would be exhausted by the time EUFOR and MINURCAT were ready 
to deploy. 
 
¶8.  (C)  On Chad politics more generally, Fages expressed the 
belief that Deby would reconcile with elements of the Zaghawa 
clan that were on the rebel side.  She predicted as well that 
Deby would eventually agree to accept a democratic process 
based on free and fair elections as the best means for 
remaining in power.  She said that as he aged and as going 
into battle pesonally became more difficult, Deby would 
understand that perpetual warfare was not in his interest and 
that an electoral process was his best recourse. 
 
¶9.  (C)  At both the MOD and MFA (and at the Presidency 
during his ref A meeting), Ambassador Nigro expressed 
appreciation for French leadership concerning Chad.  He noted 
the importance the U.S. placed on Chad and its key role in 
the larger set of regional problems, including Darfur.  He 
said that the USG specifically supported France's efforts to 
mount a peacekeeping operation in Chad and the C.A.R. and 
that the U.S. was exploring ways it could support EUFOR and 
MINURCAT, either politically, in the case of EUFOR, or 
through other possible forms of contribution, in the case of 
MINURCAT.  Ambassador Nigro expressed his keen interest in 
working with French elements in Chad, which his French 
interlocutors welcomed. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Ambassador Nigro did not have a chance to clear 
this message before leaving Paris on December 10. 
 
¶11.  (U)  Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON