VZCZCXRO6062
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #4661/01 3410854
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 070854Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1397
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0101
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1427
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004661 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EUN PINS CD CT FR
SUBJECT: CHAD/C.A.R. PKO:  "20 HELICOPTERS ARE HOLDING UP 
THE WORKS" 
 
REF: A. PARIS 4534 
     ¶B. N'DJAMENA 933 
 
PARIS 00004661  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  AF Presidential Advisor Romain Serman told 
U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro on December 6 that the 
issue of financing 20 helicopters was holding up the 
establishment and deployment of EUFOR to Chad and the Central 
African Republic.  Serman said that France would continue to 
lobby EU partners, especially the UK, to obtain a commitment 
to fund the helicopters.  Serman was optimistic that the 
mission would eventually be deployed but he could not predict 
when the commitment to fund the helicopters would be secured. 
 He indicated that France was no longer expecting EUFOR to 
operate at the 4,000 troop level and would accept a force 
level of 3,000.  So far, EU members had committed to about 
2,500, with France supplying 1,400-1,500 forces.  The French 
would welcome any help the USG could provide in encouraging 
EU members to help finance EUFOR.  He said that renewed 
fighting in Chad represented an effort by Chadian rebels, 
backed by Sudan and Libya, to impede deployment of EUFOR. 
Serman expressed concern about radical Islamic groups and 
criminal trafficking elements building continent-wide ties 
across the Sahel. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  AF Presidential Advisor Romain Serman met with U.S. 
Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro on December 6, focusing on 
EUFOR and the problems France has had in securing commitments 
from EU partners.  Serman said that the crucial impediment 
was the failure of EU partners to fund approximately 20 
helicopters (which would include gunships, transportation, 
and surveillance aircraft) deemed necessary to support EUFOR. 
 Serman expressed personal frustration and disappointment 
that, after having voted to engage in a peacekeeping mission 
in Chad and C.A.R., EU members were shying away from funding 
necessary components of the mission. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Serman said that France would continue lobbying EU 
members for financial support for the helicopters.  He 
identified the UK in particular, although France well 
recognized the constraints placed on the UK by its 
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq.  France hoped not to 
turn this into a debate about ESDP and EU pol/mil theology 
but rather appeal to EU partners' need to respond to the 
crises in the region and not merely make statements about the 
urgency to do something about such crises.  The French, he 
said, would emphasize that UNAMID and efforts in Darfur would 
be seriously compromised if EUFOR and MINURCAT were not 
deployed in parallel in Chad and C.A.R.  Serman was 
optimistic that the necessary commitments would be made to 
allow EUFOR to deploy but he could not predict when that 
might be. 
 
¶4.  (C)  When asked directly, Serman said that France was no 
longer thinking that reaching the former target of deploying 
EUFOR at the 4,000-4,300 level was feasible, and was now 
looking at a force of about 3,000 (ref A).  He said that 
about 2,500 troop commitments had been made, including 
1,400-1,500 French forces.  Three deployable battalions, one 
French, were now available.  Serman said that the issue of a 
military medical facility had been resolved, leaving only the 
helicopters as the key missing ingredient.  Serman said that 
France would welcome efforts by the USG to encourage 
potential contributors to EUFOR to step forward and make 
commitments. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Serman said that recent renewed fighting in Chad, 
which he said was quite heavy (ref B), represented an effort 
by Chadian rebel groups -- and their Libyan and Sudanese 
backers -- to scare off potential EUFOR contributors and to 
impeded its formation and deployment.  Serman noted President 
Deby's personal engagement in the combat, directing Chadian 
forces at the front, remarking on his "true warrior spirit." 
The recent fighting, Serman said, had resulted in casualties 
to Deby's own family.  Serman said that the rebels were 
exploiting the nature of the Zaghawa-against-Zaghawa 
fighting, imploring Zaghawa members on the government side to 
"stop killing your brothers and to turn against our real 
enemy, Deby."  Serman said that this seemed to be having some 
effect, with the fighting against Erdimi's Zaghawa rebel 
forces less intense than the combat against rebel elements 
led by Mahamat Nouri composed of members of the Daza/Goran 
ethnic group.  Serman said that a relatively large number of 
Goran had been "massacred" in the heavy fighting.  Serman 
 
PARIS 00004661  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
reported, consistent with ref B, that Mahamat Nour had taken 
refuge in the Libyan Embassy, leading Serman to comment on 
Qadhafi's continuing interest in dominating Chad. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ambassador Nigro said that his priorities would be 
humanitarian support for refugees and IDPs in Chad, 
democratization, anti-terrorism, and economic development, 
particularly concerning wise management of Chad's petroleum 
resources, which would eventually disappear.  Serman agreed 
with these goals and encouraged close cooperation with 
France's Embassy and its Ambassador, Bruno Foucher, whom 
Serman praised highly.  Serman said that Chad was important 
because it represented a target for radical Islam, which was 
operating to expand its influence westward across the Sahel. 
"If Chad falls, then the next target could be northern 
Nigeria," Serman said, noting that that would be disastrous. 
Serman and Ambassador Nigro agreed that another concern was 
the increased illicit trafficking of all kinds across the 
Sahel, and how trafficking groups were beginning to build 
ties among themselves and with Islamic groups.  This was a 
dangerous development, they agreed, one that such things as 
the TSCTP was designed to address, Ambassador Nigro noted. 
 
¶7.  (U)  Ambassador Nigro did not have an opportunity to 
clear this message before departing on December 6 for 
consultations in Germany.  He returns to Paris for meetings 
at the MOD and MFA on Monday, December 10, after which he 
travels to N'Djamena. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON