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FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
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INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 7964
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3979
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3242
RUEHNY/ODC OSLO NO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 001161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017 
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP PREL PINR PINS PGOV NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY'S DEFENSE POLICY AT A CROSSROADS: CLARITY 
FROM USG IS KEY 
 
REF: A. OSLO 1093 
     ¶B. OSLO 988 
     ¶C. OSLO 382 
     ¶D. OSLO 184 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson 
for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (SBU) Norway is undergoing a philosophical, bureaucratic 
and public debate on what its defense policy, obligations and 
needs will be for the next five to ten years.  The outcome 
will have significant implications for Norway,s ability to 
fulfill NATO obligations as well as its ability to cope with 
the potential of increased military threats in the Arctic. 
An additional factor in the debate is increased official 
interest in Nordic defense cooperation, with a particular 
focus on Sweden.  The planned purchase of 48 new fighter 
aircraft (relevant to the Joint Strike Fighter program), and 
a decision on a costly fast patrol boat program top 
procurement concerns.  As the debate intensifies, 2008 will 
be a decisive year for Norway,s defense capabilities and 
strategy. It is vital that the USG speak and act clearly and 
at senior levels when Norway is an outlier on key issues. 
Norway is changing and USG engagement is key to avoid further 
drift.  End Summary 
 
What?  Soldiers Actually Shoot? 
-------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Background to this debate includes a government 
which rhetorically affirms NATO as Norway,s primary security 
provider but which is at heart skeptical of the use of 
military power in all but the most benign ways, tempted by 
the idea of closer Nordic defense cooperation and includes an 
anti-NATO party, the Socialist Left (SV) as a member of the 
governing coalition.  The vigorous internal governmental 
debate over Norway,s contributions to ISAF, as well as 
repeated public negative comments concerning NATO and U.S. 
missile defense plans are illustrative of the general impulse 
of this government (see reftels for details). 
 
¶3. (SBU) The deaths of two Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan 
over the past year have forced the government to finally 
publicly explain why Norway is in Afghanistan.  Public 
support for Norwegian deployment to Afghanistan is roughly 
50% but in large segments of society, and certainly in SV, 
there is a strong belief that military force creates rather 
than solves problems and that the military should be used 
only for UN mandated peacekeeping missions.  This view is 
particularly prevalent among younger Norwegians who have no 
direct memories of U.S. assistance during the Cold War or 
WWII.  This has led the GON to keep silent about Afghanistan 
or to stress the development side only, implying that 
&others8 do force, and Norway does reconstruction. 
 
Flat Budgets 
---------- 
¶4. (C) Governmental skepticism of defense has been reflected 
in flat budgets for the last five years, meaning in real 
terms, decreases in funding.  This at a time when Norway 
accumulated a vast 380 billion dollar surplus in its &oil 
fund8.  An additional factor is that the Minister of 
Defense, Anne-Grete Strom Erichsen, is one of the weakest 
cabinet members.  She is a former Mayor of Bergen with no 
previous defense experience and is completely overshadowed in 
intergovernmental debates by the strong personalities of the 
Foreign Minister (Jonas Gahr Stoere), the Finance Minister 
(Kristin Halvorsen, head of SV) and the Development and 
Environmental Minister (Erik Solheim also SV). 
 
Norway,s Future Defense Capabilities Limited 
-------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) In contrast to the Minister, the Norwegian CHOD, 
General Sverre Diesen is very capable and well respected and 
has been fighting hard to protect Norwegian defense 
capabilities, to restructure the military away from a static 
territorial defense to a more expeditionary force and to make 
the political case for the need for the military and for 
increased resources for the MOD.   He headed the MOD Defense 
Study (released recently along with a concurrent study 
conducted by largely civilian defense experts).  The studies 
 
largely concurred with his assessments and judged future 
security threats against Norway to be not invasion but an 
isolated and limited use of force against Norwegian 
interests, likely to be in the Arctic.  In a speech on 
November 26, Diesen specified further, saying that increased 
Russian military activity in the Arctic could lead to such a 
conflict or to the use of military power to force the 
Norwegian government to change its policy on a controversial 
issue. Diesen stated further that in such a situation Norway 
would need to have the capability to cope without NATO 
support.  The Studies also called for increased cooperation 
with Sweden and other countries to save money on equipment 
purchases, training and exercises.  (Note: MOD claims that 
the fighter purchase is explicitly excluded from equipment 
coordination with Sweden).  Newspaper editorials called the 
Studies brutally honest and compared the current funding 
levels (in terms of GDP) to defense spending in the 1930s, 
which was historically low and left Norway ill prepared to 
deal with the German invasion in April 1940. 
 
¶6. (C) The Studies reached the same conclusions on the impact 
of current funding, namely that a continued flat defense 
budget will require cuts in some equipment purchases, require 
international cooperation to save money, the closure of many 
bases and the consolidation of Norway,s joint headquarters, 
and create limitations on the effectiveness of the military 
both in international operations and in Norway.  The civilian 
defense study stated that without increases in the budget 
Norway will be hard pressed to defend its interest in the 
Arctic region, will be unable to respond to crises in Norway 
if parts of the military are engaged in international 
operations and will find it difficult to justify the 
purchases of frigates, fast patrol boats or fighter aircraft 
that currently are planned or under consideration.  The 
studies called for the purchase of new fighter aircraft and 
frigates but recommended canceling the fast patrol boat 
program.  In recent years only the Coast Guard has seen 
increases in budget and staffing.  This trend would continue 
with the exception of an increase in professional soldiers in 
the army (a decrease in overall number would continue). 
However, the funding increases for the Coast Guard have 
largely been to increase capabilities for policing fisheries 
and have very limited military application. 
Impacting NATO's Joint Warfare Center 
--------------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) The Studies recommended relocating the current 
Norwegian joint headquarters in Jatta near Stavanger 
(co-located with NATO,s Joint Warfare Center) to Bodo, 
possibly leaving the Joint Warfare Center without sufficient 
support, the closure of all but two naval bases and five air 
bases and the reduction of the Home Guard. (Comment: 
Relocation of the Norwegian HQ in Jatta could have a 
significant impact on the Joint Warfare Center as the 
Norwegians currently provide much of the logistical support. 
The Norwegian MOD has promised to maintain the current level 
of support). 
 
Tough Choices and Russian Behaviour 
----------------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) By presenting such a stark picture, Diesen appears to 
be calling the GON,s bluff, saying in effect, if you 
continue to give us insufficient support, this is what you 
will get, a military without capabilities either to defend 
Norway or to participate in international operations.  It 
remains to be seen how the GON will react to the Studies or 
what revisions the Minister of Defense and Parliament will 
make during their review and the subsequent debate on this 
issue.  The multimillion dollar purchase of six fast patrol 
boats seems likely to be a hot political topic as the boats 
are made in Norway and large amounts of money have already 
been spent on this project.  Recently, media reports 
indicated that the head of the Navy reversed his earlier 
agreement with the Defense Study and is now saying that 
Norway needs to keep its MTB fleet.  Recent Russian aircraft 
carrier activity off Norway,s coast caused FM Stoere to joke 
at a meeting attended by the Ambassador that &Russia is 
helping us refute those who question our need for fighter 
aircraft.8  We are watching how increased Russian activity 
affects defense policy and budget debates. 
 
Nordic Defense: Supplement or Substitute for NATO? 
------------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) Unlike the debate over budgets and capabilities, 
 
interest in increased defense cooperation with Sweden and 
Finland commands broad agreement between the GON and MOD. 
Along with the favorable mention of this concept in the 
Defense Studies, Diesen and the Swedish CHOD, Hakan Syren, 
meet regularly and have called for closer cooperation in 
speeches in the fall of 2006.  Late this summer they wrote 
joint editorials in leading Norwegian and Swedish papers 
calling for increased formal cooperation in defense issues. 
This cooperation would entail joint procurement, training, 
exercises and deployments on international operations.  A 
recent proposal by an influential advisory body for a change 
in Swedish defense policy, in which Sweden stated that it 
would not be passive in the case of a catastrophe or attack 
on EU or Nordic members, caused jubilant headlines in Norway 
which stated that Sweden will defend Norway.  Norway,s 
Deputy Defense Minister welcomed the statement and said that 
Norway would reciprocate.  The enthusiastic welcome of the 
announcement demonstrates the significant public and official 
appetite for cooperation with Sweden. 
 
¶10. (C) On the MFA side, the Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish 
Foreign Ministers have begun regular meetings, the most 
recent held in Bodo (the location of Norway,s Northern 
command center) on October 10.  (Note: The GON briefed that 
Russian bombers flying just outside Norwegian air space 
simulated what appeared to be a cruise missile attack on Bodo 
the day of the Nordic Minister,s meeting.)  Increased 
defense cooperation with Sweden is welcome by the GON as it 
sees Sweden and Finland as countries with experience in the 
North (read with Russia) who share the same rough political 
ideology.  In particular SV strongly supports closer defense 
ties to Sweden, which in their view could weaken NATO ties. 
On the opposite side of the political spectrum the 
conservative Progress Party also welcomes increased ties with 
Sweden based on the belief that security cooperation would 
strengthen Norway's territorial defense.  It is clear that 
relations with Russia form a substantial rationale for 
increased Nordic cooperation along with the publicly stated 
goal of increased savings on military purchases.   MFA 
Political Director Kai Eide tells us increased Nordic 
cooperation is easier now because Sweden and Finland are 
close partners with NATO, arguing that this initiative brings 
others closer to NATO rather than drawing Norway away. 
 
¶11. (C) Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere has made repeated 
speeches welcoming increased Nordic cooperation and has 
entertained several high- level Swedish industry delegations. 
 In past public comments Stoere took pains to state that NATO 
remains the anchor of Norway,s security.  More recently he 
has spoken of the unique potential for Nordic defense 
cooperation, calling great power objections relics of 
history.  In a recent December conference Stoere stated that 
the GON sees NATO as a strategic &hedge8.  According to 
Stoere,s and Diesen,s public comments, Norway would like to 
develop, in cooperation with Sweden and Finland, joint 
participation in international operations, joint procurement 
of increasingly expensive military equipment, and joint work 
to increase the focus on northern issues in NATO, the UN and 
the EU.  There has been less mention of cooperation with 
fellow NATO allies Denmark and Iceland, who would be perhaps 
more natural partners in the Arctic, but lack Sweden and 
Finland's expertise and long experience with Russia. 
 
¶12. (C) In private conversations with the embassy, MFA 
Political Director Kai Eide stated that Norway,s interest in 
Nordic Defense Cooperation is to encourage others to 
participate in joint operations in Afghanistan.  Eide also 
stated that Finland is more interested in broad defense 
cooperation than in joint operations.  He mentioned that 
Russian embassies in the region have expressed concern that 
the Nordic initiative is aimed at them.  Other Embassy 
contacts have reported that they heard Eide mention privately 
that the GON,s interest in increasing contacts with Sweden 
and Finland is to somehow take advantage of those countries, 
knowledge of Russia and access to the Russian economy. 
 
Return to the Sagas: Norwegian Defense of Iceland? 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶13. (U) After the U.S. withdrew its presence at the Keflavik 
airbase, the Icelanders asked Norway and other NATO allies 
for help in providing air surveillance.  Norway was willing 
to cooperate and signed a security agreement with Iceland 
committing them to hold joint exercises on Iceland annually 
 
and to help monitor the busy sea-lanes off Iceland,s coast. 
The first joint exercise under this new agreement, named 
Northern Viking, was held this year and included U.S., 
Norwegian, and Danish forces.  Despite some Icelandic claims 
that Norway has now taken over responsibility for the defense 
of Iceland, the Norwegian agreement was very clear in 
restricting its role with Iceland to peacetime operations, 
including joint exercises and training and periodic visits by 
Norwegian forces to Iceland.  It specifically does not 
include security guarantees or basing arrangements. 
 
Implications for the Joint Strike Fighter 
---------------------------------- 
¶14. (C) Any discussion of closer Norwegian-Swedish defense 
industry cooperation inevitably brings up the ongoing Swedish 
campaign to sell the Gripen fighter to Norway.  Norway is 
considering the purchase of Gripen, Eurofighter or the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF).  Sweden has conducted an aggressive 
marketing campaign, promising a wide range of industrial 
cooperation and dominating the media coverage of the fighter 
competition.  The Embassy has been concerned that the Swedish 
effort is intended to change the rules of the competition 
away from a discussion of the needs of the Norwegian Air 
Force to one over the desirability of closer defense and 
industrial cooperation with Sweden.  The MOD assures us that 
their recommendation on which fighter to purchase will be 
based on a competition among all three competitors in which 
the planes, abilities, the industrial compensation package 
and the needs of the Air Force are the primary factors. 
Diesen has publicly stated (and others have privately 
claimed) that the fighter competition is separate from his 
proposals to increase cooperation on defense procurement with 
Sweden. Despite these statements many in Parliament and the 
government will be eager to push the debate towards a 
discussion of a closer relationship with Sweden vs. a closer 
relationship with the United States. This debate has already 
begun in the media with political cartoonists and editorial 
writers enjoying the chance to cast a technical debate over 
fighter planes into a debate over strategic orientation. 
 
Conclusion: Looking for Security and Ideological Comfort 
--------------------------------------- 
¶15. (C) Comment: FM Stoere realizes the need for continued 
close security ties to NATO and the U.S. but at the same time 
is uncomfortable with the direction of U.S. and NATO security 
policy.  His evolving public comments indicate the GON is not 
looking to replace NATO but seeks additional partners in 
security which are a better ideological match with the GON 
and can balance the U.S. heavy NATO alliance.  One example is 
Norway's increased defense ties with the EU and its 
participation in the EU Nordic Battle Group, despite being a 
non-EU member.  Cooperation with Sweden and Finland offers 
both the possibility of savings on equipment purchases and 
the chance to work with likeminded nations who prioritize UN 
involvement, favor peacekeeping over peacemaking and who are 
concerned about Russia.  Stoere's coalition partners from SV, 
of course, are unabashedly anti-NATO and anti-defense. 
 
Implications for U.S. Policy 
------------------------ 
¶16. (C) The decisions made by the GON on the Defense 
Studies, recommendations on funding, the purchase of new 
aircraft and on its relations to its neighbors will have a 
significant impact on Norway,s ability and desire to meet 
NATO commitments and spark a reassessment of Norway's defense 
policies.  We expect Norway's move toward Nordic cooperation 
and preference for UN mandated peacekeeping missions to 
remain, even if the current government does not win the 2009 
election.  This tend combined with a general antipathy to 
missile defense, efforts to ban cluster munitions, focus on 
disarmament instead of non-proliferation and reluctance to 
use its vast energy wealth to fund defense spending open 
questions regarding Norway's commitment to be a serious and 
dependable ally.  Thus, despite continued close and 
productive military to military relations, the GON,s actions 
and long-term trends bear watching in NATO and bilaterally. 
In this atmosphere it is more vital than ever that we speak 
and act clearly and at senior levels when Norway is an 
outlier on key issues.  Eager to act more independently but 
loathe to be seen as weakening trans-Atlantic ties, the GON 
will listen and respond when confronted.  Assuming generally 
common interests and policies, however, would be a mistake. 
This is not the Norway many remember, and failing to make 
 
clear our objections will encourage more drift.  End Comment 
WHITNEY