VZCZCXRO3641
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0994/01 3511431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171431Z DEC 07 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8416
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1033

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000994 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTIES HEAD FOR DECEMBER SHOWDOWN 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 836 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 971 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1.4(b) and 1. 
4 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  An October agreement between the "governing" 
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the opposition to amend 
the "TRNC constitution" and consider early elections may 
derail before January 1 given the wildly differing goals of 
the participants.  CTP considers the ad hoc committee 
agreement useful in luring the opposition back to 
"parliament," creating the appearance of reconciliation with 
opposition parties, and democratizing an outdated 
"constitution."  The opposition National Unity Party (UBP) 
and the Democrat Party (DP), boycotting the "parliament8 
since October 2006, are not against amending the 
"constitution," but are demanding as quid pro quo early 
elections in 2008, a CTP non-starter.  CTP appears unlikely 
to back down, given its strong majority in "parliament," 
meaning UBP and DP--unless saved by a deus ex machina of 
Ankara-imposed early elections--seem headed for another 
political defeat. End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
----------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On October 9, the "governing" CTP and the two main 
opposition parties, the National Unity Party (UBP) and 
Democrat Party (DP), agreed to amend the "TRNC constitution" 
and a number of other "laws" (concerning political parties, 
elections and referendums, and "parliamentary" by-laws), as 
well as discuss transition to a &presidential8 system in 
the Turkish Cypriot-administered area.  CTP also accepted DP 
and UBP's demands to consider early "parliamentary" elections 
(the next vote is scheduled for 2010).  The parties agreed to 
work in ad hoc committees until December 20, then take stock 
and, if all concurred, set a date by January 1 for both early 
elections and a referendum on the changes (the "presidential" 
transition was outside of the equation, however).  The 
opposition's agreement to work in ad hoc committees was its 
first foot back in "parliamentary" waters after it stormed 
out in October 2006 (Note:  Both UBP and DP have accused CTP 
of violating political ethics when it dumped DP as its 
"junior partner" 15 months ago in favor of the 
newly-founded--some say with support from Ankara--"Freedom 
and Reform Party" (OP).  OP ranks include defectors from both 
DP and UBP. End Note) 
 
------------------ 
What they agree on 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) The parties concur that the "TRNC constitution," not 
amended since its adoption in 1985, is outdated and not in 
tune with twenty-first century demands.  Most of the ad hoc 
committee work to date, in fact, has focused on amending it. 
Ahmet Kasif, a UBP "MP" and member of the "constitutional" ad 
hoc committee (CAHC), told Poloff on November 14 that the 
"constitution" is twenty-two years old and not reflective of 
the "TRNC's" desire to "open up to the world."  CTP General 
Secretary Omer Kalyoncu, chair of the CAHC, joked with Poloff 
 
SIPDIS 
on November 22 that his party had even accepted UBP's 
proposal to amend "Article 12," which forbids changing "the 
rights and status of the 'TRNC'"  Kalyoncu was optimistic, 
however, that the parties would eventually agree on all the 
"articles" but "Temporary Article 10" (army/police control) 
and "Article 156" (Military Judicial Power). Others we spoke 
with share this view as well. 
 
------------------------ 
What they don,t agree on 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) As noted above, the parties appear less willing to 
compromise on two key "articles" dealing with 
civilian-military relations:  "Temporary Article 10," which 
gives Turkey control of the police and armed forces, and 
"Article 156," which, in certain circumstances, allows 
military courts to try civilians.  "Temporary Article 10" 
appears the most difficult to change.  CTP &Minister of the 
Interior8 Ozkan Murat told us December 5 that CTP favors 
putting the police under civilian control and leaving the 
armed forces, for the present, under Turkish command.  In 
contrast, UBP Party President Tahsin Ertugruloglu told us on 
November 27 that UBP "never" would agree to changing 
 
NICOSIA 00000994  002 OF 003 
 
 
"Temporary Article 10."  DP "MP" Ertugrul Hasipoglu, a CAHC 
member, took a more nuanced if equally obstructionist path, 
telling us November 14 that amending the article must be 
discussed with Turkey first.  CTP is unlikely to back down, 
however.  Kutlay Erk, a CTP insider and former mayor of 
Nicosia, asserted November 19 that "democratizing" the 
"constitution" is "as important to us as early elections are 
to UBP and DP." (Note: UBP and DP also fear that CTP would 
pack the police with party faithful, should command be 
transferred to the "TRNC.") 
 
----------------------------------- 
And what they really don,t agree on 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The real obstacle between the parties has nothing to 
do with the "constitution," and everything to do with their 
radically differing goals and expectations of the committee 
process.  For the opposition, the ad hoc committee work has 
one aim:  to force early elections in 2008.  UBP General 
Secretary Nazim Cavusoglu, another CAHC member, told the 
 
SIPDIS 
Embassy December 4 that the "constitutional" work of the 
committee was necessary, but the real goal was early 
elections. For CTP, just the opposite is the case.  Bayram 
Karaman, a CTP "MP" and also a committee member, told us on 
November 30 that CTP had "thrown the opposition a life 
preserver" by forming the ad hoc committees, and that there 
would be no early elections in 2008.  DP's Hasipoglu, 
however, told us that he &would take his hat and leave8 if 
the committee's work did not lead to early elections in 2008. 
 
----------------------------- 
Hard fall for the Opposition? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Kalyoncu of CTP told us the CAHC would not be able to 
finish its work by December 20 and would need to continue at 
least another three months.  If pressed by the opposition for 
early elections as a price for continuation, he continued, 
CTP would name some date in 2009, and "parliament" 
subsequently would pass an early-election resolution.  (Note: 
 The CTP/OP "government" enjoys a strong majority, with 29 of 
50 "seats.")  Kalyoncu strongly hinted that CTP would use 
ongoing 2008 "parliamentary" budget debates to delay the work 
of the CAHC.  Barely containing his anger, he added that the 
opposition "should have thought of this before starting its 
completely unfounded boycott." 
 
¶7. (C) DP leader Serdar Denktash told us that, absent early 
elections in 2008, he and his five "MPs" would resign from 
"parliament" in January, after the party receives the first 
tranche of its "state" budgetary support.  Kudret Akay, a 
former DP insider who recently broke from the party, said 
November 29 that he doubted all the DP deputies would resign, 
however.  UBP boss Ertugruloglu, who personally is against 
the boycott, nevertheless revealed that early elections in 
2008 are a must for the party.  In contrast to Denktash, 
Ertugruloglu saw no logic in resigning from "parliament" even 
if the opposition did not obtain early elections in 2008. 
UBP General Secretary Cavusoglu, however, told us that their 
situation "would turn into a comedy" if they did not resign 
in such a case. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) The true reason behind the ad hoc committee / 
"constitutional" debate has always been about holding--or not 
holding--early elections.  In that sense, CTP is holding all 
the cards.  It enjoys a strong majority in "parliament," and 
the UBP/DP boycott of that institution has not found support 
among the general populace.  Moreover, many in the opposition 
itself are unhappy with the boycott and think it is hurting 
them.  To illustrate, one boycotting UBP "MP" told us that 
politics was not just "shouting in villages," but getting 
down to the business of "legislating."  Thus, opposition 
threats to resign from "parliament" or continue to boycott it 
do not scare CTP.  That said, it is unclear how long CTP, 
and, more importantly Turkey, will tolerate the near total 
absence of an opposition from "parliamentary" life here.  In 
his September 19 speech before the "TRNC parliament," Turkish 
President Abdullah Gul pointedly noted that "political 
controversies" in northern Cyprus should not weaken the 
legitimacy of the "state."  Gul's comments lend some credence 
to rumors we have heard recently (Ref B) that Turkey supports 
2008 elections here (other rumors claim it prefers a a 2009 
 
NICOSIA 00000994  003 OF 003 
 
 
date, however, in order to favor newcomer and alleged AKP 
favorite OP.)  We expect some type of behind-the-scenes 
intervention from Ankara to end the present political crisis, 
either by triggering early elections in 2008 or by 
strong-arming the opposition--or at least UBP--back into 
&parliament."  Barring that, UBP and DP will continue their 
self-inflicted downward spiral.  As we continue to monitor 
events, we need to make sure that T/C nationalists and Turkey 
do not use the issue of early elections as a means of 
delaying engagement in a renewed UN negotiating track in 
¶2008. 
SCHLICHER