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INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1036
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 001002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/SCE, EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY RU SE
SUBJECT: FM LAVROV DELIVERS SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 3480 
 
NICOSIA 00001002  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Greek Cypriot opinion leaders characterized 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's December 9-10 visit to the 
island as "Russia Riding to the Rescue."  Lavrov's timing was 
impeccable, and seemingly too providential (for the G/C 
cause) to be coincidental.  He arrived shortly before two key 
debates:  the UN Security Council discussing renewal of the 
UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary General's 
locally-controversial December UNFICYP report, and EU 
ministers and heads of state/government tackling Kosovo final 
status.  Mainstream media and pro-government politicians 
subsequently would claim Lavrov helped deliver victory in 
both, with the administration milking the results for maximum 
electoral gain.  Russian interventions in New York had 
defeated the "Anglo-American attempt to interject unfair 
political criteria" into the UNFICYP debate and ensured 
passage of UNSCR favorable to Greek Cypriots, the newspapers 
trumpeted.  Along similar lines, Lavrov's widely-covered 
comments on the dangerous, precedent-setting nature of a 
Kosovo unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) had 
bolstered Nicosia's arguments in Brussels, and perhaps 
convinced member-state fence-sitters to oppose a UDI.  More 
thoughtful commentators and third-country diplomats 
questioned what "quo" Cyprus had offered for Russia's "quid," 
since Lavrov's message throughout had delighted even the 
hardest G/C hard-liners.  Similarly worried, UNFICYP contacts 
fretted that a developing Nicosia-Moscow "axis" boded poorly 
for Cyprus Problem negotiations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Long in the Works, but Timing TBD 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Scuttlebutt here regarding a pending Lavrov visit 
surfaced in the fall, growing in volume after GoR Special 
Cyprus Coordinator Leonid Abramov visited the island November 
17-18.  Russian Embassy DCM Alexander Shcherbakov informed us 
November 21 that Abramov had traveled to Cyprus "to prepare 
the ground" for the Minister's visit, tentatively scheduled 
for December 10-12.  Lavrov had no specific purpose in coming 
to Cyprus other than to reciprocate for then-Cypriot FM 
George Lillikas's February trip to Moscow, Shcherbakov 
asserted.  He expected "the usual:"  calls on President 
Tassos Papadopoulos, House President Dimitris Christofias, 
and FM Erato Marcoullis.  As Cyprus, not his embassy, was 
crafting the schedule, he expected Lavrov would remain south 
of the Green Line and see no Turkish Cypriots officially. 
Shcherbakov acknowledged the potential electoral 
repercussions of organizing a high-level visit while Cyprus's 
presidential campaign was hitting full stride.  "It's 
unavoidable, however," was his justification. 
 
------------------------ 
Mostly Music to G/C Ears 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Lavrov evidently shortened his visit to allow 
attendance at a Russia-EU Dialogue meeting in Brussels 
(Reftel).  Arriving December 9, he conducted the planned 
meetings and also took time to bestow the "Pushkin Medal" on 
the Russian-educated Christofias and a former Cypriot 
minister.  His press conferences following the Papadopoulos 
and Marcoullis meetings generated most of the press play, 
however.  Lavrov first took aim the December UNFICYP report, 
whose "pro-Turk" contents had spawned greater-than-normal 
angst amongst Greek Cypriots.  On Paragraph 45, which stated 
"...the upcoming year may prove to be crucial in the search 
for a comprehensive settlement," Lavrov blasted Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon for attempting to impose timetables on 
the negotiation.  No such timetables would grace the UNSCR 
that eventually endorsed the report, he promised.  Referring 
to Russia's stance on the Cyprus Problem, Lavrov parroted the 
oft-repeated Greek Cypriot maxim that any solution must be 
"viable, workable, and based on a body of prior UNSCRs." 
 
¶4.  (U) With Troika talks having concluded the same day and 
with Kosovo garnering great coverage here, media sought 
Lavrov's position on final status.  The Russian was careful 
not to proffer a direct Kosovo-Cyprus comparison (although 
the press took that liberty in interpreting his remarks 
later).  Asked to reveal Russia's likely reaction to a Kosovo 
UDI and other nations' responses to it, the Minister remarked 
that countries recognizing Kosovo would violate international 
law and set off a chain reaction in the Balkans and 
elsewhere.  "The West should think long and hard before 
taking this route," he concluded. 
 
NICOSIA 00001002  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Subsequent days' headlines screamed "A Setback for 
the Anglo-Americans" and "Russia to the Rescue;" reportedly 
the government was "completely satisfied" by Lavrov's visit. 
No longer would Britain and the United States exercise 
exclusive control over Cyprus Problem negotiations, now that 
Moscow, a permanent Security Council member, was exerting its 
influence.  Self-congratulatory back-patting increased with 
news of "victory" in New York; the latest UNSCR did not 
welcome the unpleasant UNFICYP report, but rather only 
sections of it.  Additional good news came from Brussels, 
with tougher-than-expected Council conclusions criticizing 
Turkey, and with no member-state consensus emerging over 
recognition of Kosovo's independence.  Such outcomes proved 
that President Papadopoulos's hard-line policies were 
delivering successes, the pro-government press reported, and 
disproved allegations of Cyprus's worsening reputation and 
growing isolation in international fora. 
 
------------------ 
But At What Price? 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Papadopoulos detractors, both media and political, 
soon began asking what Cyprus had offered to cement this 
asymmetric friendship between an island and a superstate. 
Most alleged a simplistic "Kosovo for Cyprus" arrangement, in 
which Nicosia committed to opposing recognition of a Kosovo 
UDI within EU fora -- much to Russia and Serbia's liking -- 
while Russia promised to protect Greek Cypriots' interests in 
the Security Council.  More serious critics questioned 
whether doing Russia's bidding in Brussels amounted to 
abandoning Cyprus's true allies and interests, which lay 
firmly in the West, not the East.  Cyprus risked becoming 
Moscow's "EU satellite," certain to bring a harsh reaction 
from fellow member-states. 
 
¶7.  (C) In a de-brief December 13, Shcherbakov dismissed talk 
of an axis or arrangement between the two nations.  Also 
false -- "pure conspiracy theory" -- were allegations that 
Lavrov had timed his visit specifically to offer Cyprus 
and/or Papadopoulos a lifeline   Shared interests explained 
the shared positions of Moscow and Nicosia on Kosovo and the 
Cyprus Problem, he insisted.  Both opposed separatism, 
whether in Kosovo or elsewhere.  Both favored political 
solutions enjoying blessing from all sides to the dispute. 
And both Russia and Cyprus opposed arbitration, "suffocating 
timetables," and internationally-imposed settlements.  Such 
commonality of interests ensured constructive discussion on 
other matters tackled during the visit, Shcherbakov added, 
from Russia-Cyprus law enforcement cooperation to visa policy. 
 
¶8.  (C) Foreign Ministry official Maria Michael confirmed 
December 12 that Cyprus and Russia had made progress on the 
bilateral agenda during FM Lavrov's visit.  In addition to 
legal and consular matters, the sides also reached agreement 
on unspecified technical and economic agreements.  The 
significance of Lavrov's visit lay in his comments regarding 
the Cyprus Problem, however.  His pro-Greek Cypriot stance in 
the MFA press conference had surprised even Cypriot 
counterpart Marcoullis.  "We couldn't have drafted better 
talking points," Michael chuckled.  Like Shcherbakov, she 
disparaged rumors of a mutual back-scratching arrangement 
between the nations.  "We see things the same way in Kosovo 
and on the island," she concluded. 
 
¶9.  (C) Ban Ki-Moon's Cyprus report could have damaged 
Cypriot interests gravely, asserted Greek Embassy DCM 
Nicholas Garilides December 13.  The UNFICYP document invited 
countries to upgrade relations with the Turkish Cypriot 
entity to a level just below official recognition -- "just 
like Taiwan."  It therefore was predictable the RoC would 
trot out its biggest guns in defense.  Whether or not the 
visit's original focus was bilateral issues, Papadopoulos and 
Marcoullis had had no choice but to lobby Lavrov hard 
regarding the Cyprus Problem and Kosovo.  It was not 
difficult for Moscow to say "yes" to the request, Garilides 
reasoned.  Russia already backed the G/C position, and by 
stating it so clearly, had won the RoC's gratitude.  "A small 
investment for a big payout -- Cyprus's help in Brussels, on 
Kosovo and other matters."  In playing the Russia card, 
however, Cyprus had taken a step bound to draw larger EU 
member-states' ire and leave it isolated.  "I would not want 
to be in their position," Garilides reflected. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
And to the Detriment of CyProb Negotiations? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
NICOSIA 00001002  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Lavrov's aggressive tone and solidly pro-G/C message 
had startled UNFICYP Senior Adviser Wlodek Cibor, especially 
considering that Russian Ambassador Andrei Nestrenko normally 
adopted reasonable, balanced positions in Nicosia P-5 
representatives' meetings.  Lavrov had opened their December 
10 call by brandishing a copy of Papadopoulos's latest 
proposal to jump-start the moribund July 8 Process 
negotiations, Cibor revealed on December 13, and questioning 
why Ban's report had not praised the G/C leader's efforts. 
Lobbing G/C buzzwords liberally -- "settlers," "pseudostate," 
and "so-called isolation" being three -- Lavrov laid blame 
squarely on Turkey for the stall in negotiations. "And why 
was it imperative to reach a solution in 2008?" the Russian 
demanded, alluding again to the Ban report.  "Why not 2009 or 
2010?" 
 
¶11.  (C) The meeting with Lavrov reminded Cibor of 
get-togethers with Papadopoulos and his fellow G/C 
hard-liners.  Had the Greek Cypriots succeeded in obtaining 
Russia's blind support on the Cyprus Problem, perhaps in 
exchange for backing in Brussels?  If so, chances for 
significant movement in settlement talks seemed scant, since 
the G/Cs would take extreme positions knowing that Moscow had 
their backs. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶12.  (C) It is immaterial whether Cyprus and Russia 
established a formal arrangement during the Lavrov visit to 
support each other's respective interests in European Union 
and United Nations fora; for the short-term, their positions 
on Kosovo and the Cyprus Problem are in synch, albeit for 
different reasons.  We would hope that Cyprus's sharpest 
strategic minds are weighing the long-term pros and cons of a 
virtual alliance guaranteed to raise EU member-state 
suspicions and complicate consensus-building in Brussels, 
however.  But for the time being, it's party hats and Dom 
Perignon at the Presidency and MFA, with officials 
celebrating a diplomatic victory over the vilified 
"Anglo-Americans."  Papadopoulos benefited greatly from 
Lavrov's visit, and it's no great leap to assume he 
stage-managed the timing and optics for maximum bounce. 
Recent months had seen his polling in decline, due partly to 
a string of foreign policy setbacks.  But in the last seven 
days, he has delivered -- or at least created the impression 
of delivering, through media hyping of the normal 
give-and-take of the UNSCR rollover exercise -- success on 
both the EU and UN fronts, and won endorsement from Nicosia's 
closest CyProb ally, Russia.  The next round of polls will 
emerge in early January, and we expect the President's 
numbers to level out or even inch up as a result. 
SCHLICHER