VZCZCXRO1099
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0951/01 3471614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131614Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5959
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1454

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000951 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNSC PGOV PREL PREF CD CR
SUBJECT: CHAD: EUFOR PROSPECTS GLOOMY 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 942 
 
NDJAMENA 00000951  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Cancellation or postponement of EUFOR due 
to resource and logistics constraints is a possibility 
according to EUFOR's General Gannacia.  Nonetheless, EUFOR 
and MINURCAT advance teams continue to lay the groundwork for 
eventual deployment. MINURCAT may request assistance from 
donors in overcoming obstacles with the Chadian government. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) EUFOR's General Gannacia made a two day visit to 
Chad to view EUFOR preparations in N'Djamena and Abeche.  In 
a meeting December 12 with DCM, he informed her that EUFOR 
might have to be canceled due to lack of funding for field 
operations and lack of air support.  Even if support 
materialized, the operation might be postponed until December 
2008 if the operation could not deploy sufficiently ahead of 
the start of the next rainy season (which begins in May). 
Ganaccia explained that he could live with a force of 3,000 
rather than the hoped for 4,500, but he needed funding in 
order to contract logisticians, field engineers, etc.  And he 
needed helicopters for quick reaction capability in order to 
successfully patrol Chad's vast eastern region.  For its 
part, France had stated that it would not exceed the amount 
already pledged. For other Europeans, Ganaccia considered the 
problem to be lack of political will, rather than resources. 
The UK and Germany, in particular, were not interested in 
seeing a European defense force succeed. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Ganaccia was confident that EUFOR's mission was 
achievable -  even with the recent insecurity in the east - 
although it would have been preferable to have been up and 
running before the rebel incursions began.  EUFOR would deter 
attacks on IDPs,  refugees and humanitarian operations and 
provide force protection to the UN-trained gendarme force 
(MINURCAT).  He would consider the mission a success of IDPs 
returned home.  EUFOR would not interfere with Chadian rebel 
movements if they did not threaten these groups (they would, 
however, pass on intelligence of their movements  to the 
Chadian authorities.) He discounted the threats from Chadian 
rebels that EUFOR might be considered a "belligerent force" 
and therefore a legitimate target.  In his words, "let them 
try." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Ganaccia said that the relationship with the UN 
force, MINURCAT was proceeding well.  Both sides had a good 
idea as to how EUFOR would go about supporting and protecting 
MINURCAT.  Agreement had been reached on common warning 
systems and "direct intervention circumstances"  EUFOR would 
have intelligence cells co-located with MINURCAT in their six 
presence towns (Abeche, Iriba, Guereda, Goz Beida, Bahai and 
Farchana.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ganaccia also felt that relations with the Chadian 
authorities were good, with a high degree of cooperation.  He 
noted, however, that they particularly interested in ensuring 
that this would be just a one year mission, with no UN 
follow-on force.  An assessment is mandated in UN Security 
Resolution 1788 at the six months mark.  But the six months 
mark was still unknown given the uncertainty as to the start 
date. 
 
MINURCAT PREPARATIONS 
 
¶6.  (SBU) MINURCAT officers gave a well-prepared briefing to 
members of the diplomatic corps on December 12 on status of 
preparations (largely recapitulating information provided by 
MINURCAT head to DAS Fitzgerald reftel).  MINURCAT will have 
six police commissariats in the towns of Abeche, Iriba, 
Guereda, Goz Beida, Bahai and Farchana. They will have 
smaller police posts in the 12 refugee camps/IDP areas.  An 
area of 5-10 kilometers around the camps/areas will be 
patrolled.  They hope to begin "training of trainers" no 
later than December 18, with the four week training for the 
gendarmes completed by March.  Training will include skills 
refresher (candidates are supposed to have spent at least two 
years already either in the Chadian police or gendarmerie), 
pofessionalization and human rights training.  Deployment of 
the 850 Chadian gendarmes will take place in stages starting 
with Goz Beida, Djabal and Goz Amir camps, with the final 
deployment reaching Bahai by June. However, if EUFOR deploys 
sooner, MINURCAT deployment could speed up. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  MINURCAT will supply 214 vehicles, 900 side arms 
with ammunition, 507 VHF radios, uniforms, personal items, 
office equipment, and renovation of existing police/gendarme 
facilities.  However, MINURCAT too is experiencing 
shortfalls.  Only 180 police trainers (out of 300 desired) 
have been provided by Francophone countries to date. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000951  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Contributions to the trust fund were lagging: the EU had 
contributed Euros 10 million EUROS, Japan Euros 2.2 EUROS, 
and Norway $1 million, but they were still a long way from 
the $20 million target.  MINURCAT is also encountering 
problems with the Chadian government, which, among other 
issues, is not satisfied with the proposed stipend to be 
offered to the Chadian Gendarmes.  MINURCAT head Campaore 
informed DCM that the Chadian government was pressing for 
international scale salaries to be paid to the Chadian 
gendarmes.  (MINURCAT has provided for them to receive a 
stipend of approximately USD 300 plus $5/day for living 
expenses.)  Campaore explained that he would work this issue 
with the Chadian authorities, but might need UN members to 
weigh in if the government continued to reject the UN's 
stipend plan. 
NIGRO