VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #4630/01 3370750
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030750Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3718
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004630 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2027 
TAGS: KCRM KE PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR MR. KABUGA: POSSIBLE SIGNS OF 
INCREASED KENYAN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION WITH ICTR 
 
REF: A. 06 NAIROBI 5301 
     ¶B. 07 NAIROBI 1416 
     ¶C. 07 NAIROBI 3739 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Samuel Madsen for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.   (U) SUMMARY:  Chief Prosecutor Jallow of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) met on 29 
November with Kenyan Foreign Minister Tuju.  FM Tuju promised 
Jallow that he would press for the Kenyan government to 
increase its cooperation with the ICTR's efforts to find and 
apprehend indicted Rwandan war criminal Felicien Kabuga.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2.    (U) On 29 November Poloff attended a meeting between 
the Friends of the ICTR and Chief Prosecutor Jallow 
hosted by the Canadian High Commission.  Prosecutor Jallow 
began by thanking the members of the Friends group for 
their efforts to convince the Kenyan government to fully 
cooperate with the ICTR prosecutors. Jallow believes these 
efforts made possible his first ever meeting with Kenyan 
Foreign Minister Tuju, held earlier that morning (see COMMENT 
for information on the joint Friends demarche to the Kenyan 
Foreign Ministry). During the meeting, Tuju claimed he had 
been kept in the dark as to the status of the ICTR's efforts 
to determine if Kabuga is in Kenya.  He was unaware that 
the ICTR had determined Kabuga had bank accounts in Kenya 
until recently and claimed the Foreign Ministry had not been 
kept up to date on the progress of the case by the police and 
intelligence services. 
 
¶3.    (U) Jallow told Tuju that the ICTR's mandate is to 
assist the Kenyan police in searching for Kabuga, not to 
find him themselves.   He noted that early in their 
investigation Kenyan intelligence officials had shown ICTR 
investigators a large file on Kabuga, but had never allowed 
them to examine its contents.  He also noted that the 
ICTR investigators had been unable to gain Kenyan government 
cooperation in interviewing certain Kenyan citizens, 
including former government officials, regarding their ties 
to Kabuga.  Furthermore, he described the ICTR's 
unsuccessful efforts to petition the Kenyan government to 
freeze bank accounts and other assets identified as being 
owned or controlled by Kabuga.  For his part Tuju admitted 
that some officials in the government may have ties to 
Kabuga.  He also accepted that corruption within the 
government and law enforcement agencies could be impeding the 
investigation.  Jallow responded by pointing out that time is 
short because the ICTR's mandate expires at the end of 
¶2008. 
 
¶4.    (U) Tuju responded to Jallow's presentation by 
declaring he would immediately discuss this matter with 
President 
Kibaki and seek his support.  He further promised to provide 
a letter to Jallow on Friday, 30 November, giving 
assurances the Kenyan government will cooperate more fully 
with the ICTR, including a timetable for specific actions 
to be taken.  Tuju and Jallow agreed the Foreign Ministry 
will be the focal point between the Kenyan government and 
the ICTR.  Tuju also pledged that he would work with other 
Kenyan government agencies to get their cooperation for the 
ICTR's efforts and specifically promised to meet with the 
Attorney General to discuss freezing Kabuga's Kenyan assets. 
 
¶5.    (U)  Jallow noted that Tuju was not specific on the 
timelines his letter would propose.  Jallow promised to 
provide a copy of the letter to the Friends as soon as he 
received it.  The UK representative observed that these 
statements were not new and the ICTR and the Friends had 
heard similar things before.  He added that he would be 
surprised if Tuju had actually been as ignorant of the status 
of the ICTR's investigation and the lack of Kenyan 
cooperation as he claimed.  Other participants noted that 
Tuju's indluence within the Kenyan government is limited, 
particularly over the security services. 
 
¶6.    (U)  Jallow agreed that, while the message from Tuju 
was positive, the Friends must keep up their pressure on 
the government.  He said he would wait to see what was in 
Tuju's letter before making any decision as to whether or not 
he will have to refer the Kenyans to the UN Security Council 
as being uncooperative in the Kabuga investigation. 
 
¶7.    (U)  The representatives of the Friends agreed that 
little effective action is likely during the next month as 
the Kenyan electoral campaign concludes.  While agreeing 
Tuju's statements were positive no one believed any major 
turning point has been reached.  There was also skepticism 
Tuju would be able to produce a letter with firm proposals 
in only one day.  All agreed it would be a good idea to 
continue pressure on the Kenyan government to fully cooperate 
 
with the ICTR. 
 
¶8.    (C) COMMENT: DCM Slutz represented the USG at a 
November 6 meeting with MFA Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi 
at 
which the Canadian High Commissioner, on behalf of the 
Friends of the ICTR, regretted that GOK officials had been 
"unavailable" to meet with Jallow in September, 2007 and 
formally requested that the GOK/MFA reconsider its formal 
October 11 response to the Canadians and Jallow that "during 
the months of November/December 2007, Mr. Jallow will not 
be able to get the appointments as requested."  The Canadian 
and other embassy representatives highlighted the need for 
Kenya to meet with Jallow so that he could include the Kenyan 
response in his end of the year report to the UNSC.  They 
pointed out that failure to cooperate with Jallow would 
compel the UNSC to take action to sanction Kenya.  The 
Canadian 
High Commissioner also handed Mwangi a copy of the September 
24, 2007 letter from Jallow to Minister of Interior Michuki, 
Minister of Justice Kaura, and AG Wako which outlines that 
the joint Kenyan police-ICTR Task Force has found that Kabuga 
was issued with a Kenyan entry and work permit (no. 772865) 
on April 1995 and that he did enter and carry on business in 
Kenya; that while the Task Force cannot confirm Kabuga's 
current whereabouts, there have been sightings of him in 
Kenya 
between 2002 and October 30, 2006; and that he has business 
interests and bank accounts in Nairobi. The Canadian High 
Commissioner and others also pressed MFA to encourage the 
Kenyan National Intelligence Service (NSIS) to be more 
cooperative and forthcoming in sharing information it has on 
Kabuga with the joint Kenyan Police-ICTR Task Force set up 
to investigate the presence and activities of Kabuga in 
Kenya.  The MFA Permanent Secretary stated that he was 
uninformed about GOK efforts to find Kabuga and he promised 
that he would put GOK - specifically NSIS --cooperation on 
the agenda for the November 7 Kenyan National Security 
Council meeting.  We have not been informed of the outcome of 
the 
Kenyan Security Council deliberations on GOK, particularly 
NSIS, cooperation but Tuju's willingness to cooperate may be 
the result of such deliberations. 
 
¶9.    (C)  It is likely that Tuju is well aware of the need 
for Prosecutor Jallow to report to the UNSC on Kenya's level 
of cooperation within the next few weeks.  His promise of a 
new committment to cooperate with the ICTR may be sincere, 
but may also be an effort to dealy a negative report to the 
UNSC.  Unless Tuju's promised letter provides compelling 
assurances of specific concrete action Jallow may have little 
choice but to report that Kenya continues to fail in it's 
obligation's to assist the ICTR's investigation. Even if 
Tuju's claims of renewed cooperation are sincere, the 
electoral  campaign in Kenya is reaching its climax and at 
least a majority of the cabinet members are expected to be 
replaced.  There is little likelihood any senior government 
officials will make a substantial effort to increase 
cooperation with the ICTR until the new administration and 
cabinet take office. 
 
RANNEBERGER