VZCZCXRO4800
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKU #1741/01 3512335
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 172335Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0447
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1088
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001741 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
//////// C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - TEXT //////// 
 
DEPT FOR WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KCIP OVIP KU IZ IS EAID KPAO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 11-12 
VISIT TO KUWAIT 
 
KUWAIT 00001741  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Alan Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (C) Mr. President, your January 11-12 visit to Kuwait 
offers a timely opportunity to acknowledge the invaluable 
cooperation of a key regional ally, and also to press the 
Government of Kuwait (GOK) to do more on issues of vital 
interest to the United States - especially Iraq and 
counterterrorism.  The Amir has repeatedly expressed to 
us his appreciation for the First Lady's visit in October. 
He will extend the utmost hospitality to you, including 
the personal touch of hosting you in his home for a meal 
following your official meeting.  From the Kuwaiti public 
as well, your arrival will evoke an outpouring of the 
pro-U.S. sentiment that has remained strong here since 
the U.S.-led liberation in 1991.  That goodwill, derived 
from a shared past, will be an important asset as you 
drive home the need for stronger GOK performance to help 
assure a better future for the region. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Domestic Malaise Overshadows Policy Decisions 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Despite record oil revenues and political 
stability (women vote, Kuwait has had a functioning 
constitutional democracy for more than 40 years, and 
the ruling Sabah family has been in charge for more 
than two centuries), the domestic political scene is 
dispirited and dysfunctional.  The Amir remains 
well-regarded and faces no opposition; but the 
Sabahs have lost the political initiative, and 
querulous MPs smear cabinet ministers with impunity 
while neglecting a large docket of urgently needed 
legislation - including key counterterrorism measures, 
tax reform, a new labor law and intellectual property 
protection. 
 
¶3. (C) This slow-rolling domestic "crisis" will not 
destabilize the country; but it does make the Amir 
all the more hesitant to take decisions - e.g. 
attending Annapolis, or sending the first Arab 
ambassador to Baghdad - that might draw parliamentary 
criticism.  The Amir has the power to dissolve 
parliament and call new elections, and last week he 
told Tony Blair "don't be surprised if I do it." 
He may act during the three weeks between the 
December 19-20 eid al-adha holiday and your arrival; 
but it is more likely that Kuwait's internal malaise 
will fester awhile longer before he decides the 
time is right. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Iraq: GOK Backing Indispensable, But Much More Needed 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (S) Admiral Fallon has described Kuwaiti support 
for Operation Iraqi Freedom - including access to 
airspace and ground bases, discounted fuel, and use 
of airports and seaports to move materiel and 
personnel in and out of Iraq - as "indispensable." 
The estimated annual value of Kuwait's contributions 
exceeds a billion dollars.  During 2007 the GOK has 
hosted visits from VP al-Hashemi, PM al-Maliki and 
President Talabani.  Nevertheless, the overriding 
theme of GOK economic and political support for Iraq 
is timidity.  Despite naming retired General Ali 
al-Moumin as its Ambassador-designate to Baghdad in 
2004, the GOK continues to resist our urging to send 
him to post.  Similarly, Kuwait has pledged over 575 
million dollars in aid, but so far disbursed little; 
and despite a few major investments in Iraq's 
telecom and banking sectors, the GOK has not 
promoted merchant-to-merchant contact and still 
bars Iraqi commercial exports from the Kuwaiti market. 
The GOK needs an urgent change of course on these 
issues.  The time will also come to press Kuwait for 
relief of Iraq's 11 billion dollars in pre-war debt; 
but the need for parliamentary approval makes that 
issue extremely tough for the GOK at present. 
 
----------------------------------- 
GOK Falling Short on CT Cooperation 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) The Amir is likely to ask you explicitly for 
at least two things: reassurance of a long-term U.S. 
 
KUWAIT 00001741  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
commitment to Kuwait's security, and the return of 
the four Kuwaitis still detained in Guantanamo. 
On the former, the Amir will hope to hear you affirm 
positive statements by Secretary Gates and Admiral 
Fallon during their fall 2007 visits.  On the latter, 
the Amir needs/needs to hear from you that his 
government's inconsistent handling of the eight 
previously transferred GTMO detainees precludes 
further transfers at this time, and that his 
government urgently needs to boost its CT 
performance across the board. 
 
¶6. (S) Despite the dramatic disclosure in early 
2005 of domestic plotting by the "Peninsula Lions" 
terrorist cell, the GOK has taken few steps to 
strengthen counterterrorism cooperation with us. 
It urgently needs to do so, particularly in the 
areas of intelligence sharing, oversight of 
Islamic charities, and the monitoring of 
previously transferred Guantanamo detainees 
(several of whom have traveled outside Kuwait 
and are re-engaged in supporting terror). 
Through financing, recruiting, and propaganda, 
a small number of Kuwaiti nationals play a 
significant role in facilitating al-Qaeda 
operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. 
The leadership nevertheless continues to 
indulge a reflexive preference for cooptation 
and appeasement of local extremists and 
terrorist facilitators in order to mute 
domestic opinion. 
 
¶7. (C) The GOK also needs to push ahead with 
a long-delayed comprehensive terror finance 
law and a law criminalizing affiliation with, 
or support of, terrorist groups.  Kuwait's 
oil infrastructure represents an attractive 
and relatively soft target for terrorists; 
but the GOK, even after receiving 
vulnerability assessments and technical 
recommendations from us, has been slow to 
embrace a U.S. offer of formal cooperation. 
On a positive note, the GOK has launched a 
somewhat promising Islamic Moderation 
Initiative designed to discourage 
extremism through standardized training 
for imams and Islamic Studies teachers. 
 
------------------------ 
Treading Lightly on Iran 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (S) On Iran, Kuwaiti leaders are 
conflicted: they distrust Khamenei, 
Ahmadi-Nejad and co., but also fear the 
consequences of regional conflict.  In 
fact, the Defense Minister has launched 
his own preemptive strike, publicly 
stating several times that the GOK will 
not allow an attack against Iran to be 
launched from Kuwait.  The Amir is 
likely to express to you his anxiety 
over the risk of fallout from Busheir, 
only 90 miles from Kuwait City, and 
seek your views on the NIE.  Trade and 
investment between Iran and Kuwait are 
small.  You should urge the Kuwaitis 
to support international sanctions, 
refrain from commercial ventures with 
Iran, and to put the Iranian regime on 
notice that its involvement in Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian 
Territories is unacceptable. 
 
---------------------------- 
Supporting Middle East Peace 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) The Kuwaiti leadership has 
consistently supported regional peace 
efforts, mainly through financial 
support to the Palestinian Authority 
(lingering ill will over Palestinian 
support for Saddam's 1990 invasion 
notwithstanding).  The Amir and his 
government remain unwilling to play 
 
KUWAIT 00001741  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
a more active role or meet with 
Israelis, however, and the decision 
to skip Annapolis put them on an 
embarrassing regional short-list 
with Libya and Iran.  A 300 million 
dollar pledge in Paris appears to 
reflect a return to the GOK's 
traditional approach: a willingness 
to get out the checkbook when we ask, 
but not necessarily to write the 
check we sought.  The Amir will be 
keen for a briefing on your vision 
for the way ahead, but not keen to 
take on a bigger role. 
 
--------------------- 
Sustaining Friendship 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Your visit can have a 
powerful impact in helping to 
strengthen Kuwait's pro-Americanism 
within the generation born since 1991. 
There are favorable trends.  Embassy 
Kuwait handled 26,000 visa cases 
this year, surpassing pre-9/11 
levels for the first time.  There 
are currently over 2000 Kuwaitis 
studying in the United States, an 
all-time high and a 20 percent 
increase over last year.  Public 
encouragement for Kuwaiti students 
to pursue higher education in the 
United States will go far toward 
sustaining the current bilateral 
friendship for years to come. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
 
MISENHEIMER